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Abstract of On Some Ancient and Medieval Roots of George Berkeley's Thought, a 
thesis submitted by Costica Bradatan for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy, 
University of Durham, 2003 
This thesis proposes a consideration of Berkeley's thought from the standpoint of its 
roots, rather than (which is the prevalent perspective in today's Berkeley scholarship) 
from the point of view of the developments that this thought has brought about in modern 
philosophy. Chapter One deals with a number of specific introductory issues, and then 
delineates a theoretical context within which my own approach wi l l reveal its scholarly 
significance. In Chapter Two I advance the idea that there is in Berkeley's early writings 
an entire network of Platonic features, attitudes, and mind sets, prefiguring his 
speculative and openly Platonic writing Siris. Chapter Three is a systematic attempt at 
considering Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy in close connection to the topic of liber 
mundi, with the twofold objective of pointing out those of the medieval implications of 
the topic that Berkeley preserved, and the "novelties" he brought forth in his use of the 
topic. The central idea around which Chapter Four is clustered is that, in Siris, Berkeley 
comes to make use of one of the most ancient "spiritual techniques": alchemy. Berkeley's 
arguments and notions in Siris wi l l be discussed by constant reference to alchemic 
notions, writings and authors. Chapter Five is an attempt at considering Berkeley's 
thought from the standpoint of the Christian apologetic tradition, and its objective is to 
show that one of the roots of Berkeley's thought could be found precisely in this tradition. 
In Chapter Six I wi l l show that even when designing such a practical project as the 
"Bermuda scheme" Berkeley was under the modeling influence of the past. More 
precisely, the chapter purports to offer a discussion of Berkeley's "Bermuda scheme" in 
light of the Western representations of the "happy islands", "earthly paradise", 
"eschaton". The last chapter (Chapter Seven) purports to undertake a comparative 
analysis of some of the ideas professed by medieval Catharism, and George Berkeley's 
denial of the existence of matter. The central notion around which my comparative 
approach is articulated is the idea that, in both cases, matter is regarded as the source of 
evil. What I w i l l try to show is that Berkeley's attitudes to the material world echoed 
certain Cathar theological anxieties and patterns of thought. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter has a twofold aim. In the first place, I wi l l deal with a number 
of specific introductory issues: what are the primary objectives to be attained through this 
work, why these particular objectives rather than any others, what are the main guidelines 
and principles on which my approach is based, how is this work related to the existing 
scholarship, and what precisely a reader should not expect from this work. This wi l l be 
done in the first part of the chapter (1.1.). In the second place, in light of the fact that this 
thesis purports to be, above all, a study in the history of philosophy, I wi l l advance some 
general considerations about the nature and significance of the historical research, the role 
that the past plays in the configuration of present states of affairs, and about the 
philosophical significance of the study of the past. Finally, the philosophical past wi l l be 
specifically considered, along with a number of issues in the history of philosophy. These 
rather general considerations are intended as an attempt at delineating a theoretical 
context within which, it is hoped, my own approach wi l l reveal its scholarly significance. 
A l l these w i l l make the object of the second part (1.2.). 
1.1. The objective, character, and structure of the present work 
1.1.1. The Objective 
The ultimate objective of this dissertation is to propose a new way of looking at George 
Berkeley's philosophy. More precisely, to propose a consideration of Berkeley's thought 
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from the standpoint of its roots, rather than from the point of view of the various 
developments that this thought has brought about in the sphere of modern philosophy. In 
other words, I propose a consideration of Berkeley's philosophy from the perspective of 
its past, rather than from that of its future. The most interesting thing about such a shift of 
perspective is the fact that what we see when we look at George Berkeley from the 
perspective of his past is strikingly different from what we see when we consider him 
from the perspective of his future, which is to say, from the perspective of our own time. 
It is as i f there were two Berkeley's, separated from each other. 
A characteristic trait of today's mainstream (analytically-minded) Berkeley 
scholarship is its tendency to single out from the whole of Berkeley's thought only those 
features, topics, problems, questions that seem to have a certain importance for today's 
philosophical debates. There is a certain inclination to consider Berkeley interesting only 
insofar as he has something relevant to say about the problems we are concerned with, 
and only as long as he is able to solve what we consider as significant philosophical 
problems. (Of course, this is the case not only with Berkeley.) As a result, a certain 
selection operates throughout the exegesis, teaching — and, by way of consequence, 
common reception — of Berkeley's philosophy: from the huge variety of arguments, 
topics, problems, and ideas one might come across when reading Berkeley's writings, 
only some of them are, on the criterion of their usefulness for the contemporary 
philosophical debates, taken seriously and given the "right" of being really 
"philosophical". Accordingly, in today's mainstream scholarship, Berkeley seems to be 
considered an "important philosopher" because of, among others, his anticipation of the 
"linguistic turn" in philosophy (hence, his significant contribution to the advancement of 
analytic philosophy), his contribution to the development of the Empiricist tradition, his 
"linguistic" approach to problems of traditional metaphysics, his anticipation of 
pragmatism as a philosophical position, his contributions in philosophy of mathematics, 
philosophy of science, economics, even twentieth century physics', and so on. Hardly wi l l 
one find today a monograph dedicated to George Berkeley without encountering in it a 
great deal of discussion about Berkeley's doctrines of vision, perception, abstraction, 
meaning, existence, realism, other minds, distinction between primary and secondary 
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qualities, intentionality, causality, common-sense, etc. These are indeed topics about 
which Berkeley certainly had something significant to say, and they are popular in today's 
philosophical debates, too. Needless to say, the fact that Berkeley could still be found 
useful from the point of view of the various contemporary philosophical concerns, and 
that he can still offer answers to our own philosophical interrogations, testifies to his 
greatness as a philosopher, and to the sharpness of his thinking. As a consequence, those 
mainstream Berkeley scholars (most of them of analytic orientation) who, whether 
knowingly or unknowingly, make the linkage between Berkeley's writings and our own 
philosophical concerns — looking in Berkeley for solutions to our problems — have 
merits difficult to over-estimate. Of course, contemporary philosophy must take over, re-
interpret and make use of arguments borrowed from the past philosophers (Berkeley's 
arguments included) for its own purposes: this has always been the case, and this is the 
way in which philosophy, and knowledge in general, advances. I f there is already a body 
of knowledge available, it would be absurd to simply ignore it and start everything anew. 
There is absolutely nothing wrong with a critical attitude to what has been said in the 
past. My only observation is that this thing must be done in full awareness of the 
situation: that is, with the understanding that, when doing so, we do not do historical 
work, but simply deal with our own (present) problems. 
Nevertheless, my present thesis is not necessarily intended as a criticism of what 
the mainstream (analytic) Berkeley scholars have done. Its only intention is to do justice 
to the historical truth, as far as this is possible, by pointing to the existence of another 
Berkeley, as it were, one in general unaccounted for by the mainstream analytic 
scholarship. The idea of the present work has been born out of precisely the realisation 
that today's mainstream Berkeley scholarship, valuable as it is, does not deal with the 
entire Berkeley (and, which is worse, in most of the cases it does not even acknowledge 
that it has to do so), but only with certain segments of his philosophy, namely with those 
that, in some way or other, prove to be useful in our debates, and interesting from the 
standpoint of our current concerns. As I wi l l show in the following chapters, there are in 
Berkeley a number of important topics, notions and concerns, that are not dealt with — 
sometimes, not even mentioned en passant — in today's mainstream Berkeley 
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scholarship. In other words, this scholarship does not seem interested in taking aboard the 
entire intellectual universe that is Berkeley's philosophy, and sometimes it happens that 
Berkeley scholars even seem embarrassed when coming, in some of Berkeley's writings, 
across issues totally out of fashion: alchemy, the search for the Elixir Vitae, the search for 
the "earthly paradise", Utopia, philosophy as apologetics, philosophy as palimpsest, liber 
mundi, Platonism, Cathar-like attitudes to the material world, and so on. These topics are 
not in general present in our current philosophical debates, but — as I wi l l try to show — 
they are massively present in Berkeley, and i f one hopes to know "things as they are", 
one cannot simply pass over the existence of such topics in Berkeley's thought. There 
must be a sense in which dealing with a past figure goes beyond what that figure might 
have to say about our present philosophical concerns, a sense in which a past figure, 
event, or system of thought, must also be studied for their own sake, and not only for 
ours. (But more about this wi l l be said in the second part of this chapter.) 
Of course, this is not the case with the entire Berkeley scholarship. For there are 
also excellent monographs dedicated to George Berkeley's historical background, 
predecessors and past influences, there are studies trying to place him within a broader 
historical context and to relate him to the past. A. A Luce, T. E. Jessop, Charles 
McCracken, Ian Tipton, David Berman, Harry Bracken, Stephen Clark, Stephen Daniel, 
to give only very few examples, have published over the years excellent scholarly studies, 
in which Berkeley's philosophy is approached with a sense of awareness of its historical 
roots, and its predecessors. The numerous references that I make to their writings 
throughout this thesis testify to my indebtedness to these authors. 
The character of novelty of the present research comes, I suggest, from its plan to 
systematically look at George Berkeley from the perspective of his intellectual ancestors, 
rather than from that of his "descendants" (which is commonly the case with the 
mainstream scholarship), from its constant focusing on a number of traditional roots of 
Berkeley's thought, some of which have never been previously considered ("earthly 
paradise", utopianism, Cathar-like attitudes), while others have been only briefly 
discussed {liber mundi, philosophy as palimpsest), as well as from the accompanying 
attempt at placing Berkeley's thinking within a much broader framework of 
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spiritual/religious traditions, perennial patterns of thought and bold Utopian projects. It is 
hoped that, as a result of these endeavours, a more complete and more faithful image of 
George Berkeley's philosophy, and of his place in the history of European thought, wi l l 
be proposed. 
1.1.2. The Character 
The first thing I should emphasise at this stage is that it is not my intention in this thesis 
to undertake a critical analysis of Berkeley's philosophical theories, arguments and 
concepts. In other words, what I am concerned here with is not whether Berkeley is right 
on such and such a point, nor whether his arguments are good ones, and his theories 
empirically justified. Precisely because there are already plenty of excellent works dealing 
analytically with Berkeley's arguments and theories2, I have chosen to take in this 
research an approach significantly different from the current (analytical) ones. 
I would very briefly characterise my approach as being: 
a) history of ideas-based. The roots of Berkeley's thought that this thesis seeks to 
explore are traditional topics, or clusters of topics, whose individual "stories" are 
narrated, and whose genealogies are followed in some detail, before discussing the way in 
which Berkeley incorporated them into the texture of his own philosophy. And it is 
precisely this genealogical approach to the roots of Berkeley's thought that plays an 
important part in the present research. This is why a good part of it might well be seen as 
a study in the history of ideas. 
b) comparative. Berkeley's philosophy is constantly "confronted" in this thesis 
with various other systems of thought, modes of thinking and worldviews. In an attempt 
to discover who are his intellectual ancestors, I wi l l constantly look at Berkeley's 
philosophy as i f it were a voice within a larger conversation. 
c) interdisciplinary. Apart from the specific fields of the history of philosophy and 
history of ideas, which are the two main areas into which this research is to be articulated, 
there wi l l also be frequent "journeys" into issues and topics belonging to other humanistic 
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fields: history of religions, religious studies, literary history, comparative literature, 
symbolic geography, Utopian studies. 
In terms of writing procedures and techniques, the present research constantly 
makes use of extensive quotations from Berkeley's works, as well as from various other 
authors to whom he is being related and compared with throughout the thesis. What lies 
behind this particular technique is my belief that, in some way or other, even Berkeley's 
stylistic inclinations and literary preferences might betray certain affinities with those 
authors, traditions and modes of thought into which, as I try to show, the substance of his 
philosophy was rooted. 
Finally, given the obvious necessity of focusing this research only on a limited 
number of topics and areas of study, I have been forced to leave aside, with some 
exceptions, George Berkeley's significant contributions to the field of: ethics, politics, 
economics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science. The discussion of these 
contributions in this dissertation, important and interesting as they are, would have made 
it unreasonably lengthy, and consequently weakened the argument it proposes. 
1.1.3. The Structure 
The structure of this dissertation derives to some extent from the character of the 
approach it undertakes: each of its chapters explores historically a certain topic — or 
cluster of topics — and then seeks to determine the precise role that particular topic plays 
within Berkeley's thinking. 
After this introductory chapter, I wi l l try to advance, in Chapter Two, the idea that 
there is in Berkeley's early writings an entire network of Platonic features, attitudes, and 
mind sets, and that however allusive or ambiguous these Platonic elements might seem, 
they constitute a coherent whole, playing an important role in shaping the essence of 
Berkeley's thought. In other words, I suggest that, given some of the ideas contained in 
his early works, it was in a way unavoidable for Berkeley, in virtue of the inner logic of 
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the development of his thought, to arrive at such an openly Platonic and speculative 
writing as Siris. 
Following on from the chapter dealing with Berkeley's Platonism, Chapter Three 
is a systematic attempt at considering Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy in close 
connection to the topic of the Book of the World (liber mundi), with the twofold 
objective o f pointing out, on the one hand, those of the medieval implications of the topic 
that Berkeley preserved in his philosophy, and, on the other hand, the "novelties", or at 
least some of the major changes, he brought forth in his use of the topic. 
The central idea around which Chapter Four is clustered is that, in his Siris, 
Berkeley comes to employ and make extensive use of the alchemic tradition. Berkeley's 
arguments and notions in Siris wil l be discussed by constant reference to alchemic 
notions, writings and authors. It is the objective of this chapter to show that, apart from its 
being under the strong influence of the Platonic tradition Berkeley's thought, as it appears 
in Siris, seems to have been also marked by some intellectual inclinations, spiritual 
concerns, and mind-sets characterizing the alchemic tradition. 
Chapter Five is an attempt at considering Berkeley's thought from the standpoint 
of the Christian apologetic tradition, and its objective is to show that one of the roots of 
Berkeley's thought could be found precisely in this tradition. This chapter deals mainly 
with Alciphron as an apologetic writing, in an attempt to place this book in the tradition 
of Christian apologetics. Also, it discusses some of the rhetorical tools employed by 
Berkeley against free-thinkers, and the pragmatism of Berkeley's apologetics: that is, the 
beneficial practical effects that the adoption of an active Christian attitude might have 
upon people's morality and social life are seen as an argument for the Christian faith. 
In Chapter Six I wi l l show that not only his philosophy was rooted in some 
ancient or medieval traditions of thought, but also even when designing such a practical 
project as the "Bermuda scheme" Berkeley was, in a serious way, under the modeling 
influence of the past. More precisely, the chapter purports to offer a discussion of 
Berkeley's project to build a theology college in the Islands of Bermuda in light of some 
traditions and patterns of thought governing the Western representations of the "happy 
islands", "earthly paradise", "eschaton". I wi l l also point to a certain symbolic 
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relationship that might be established between the substance of Berkeley's immaterialist 
philosophy and the Utopian character of his "Bermuda project". 
Finally, the last chapter (Chapter Seven) undertakes a comparative analysis of 
some of the ideas professed by the medieval Dualistic heresies (Catharism in particular), 
and George Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter. The central notion around which 
my comparative approach is articulated is the idea that, in both cases, matter is regarded 
as the source of evil. What I wi l l try to show is that Berkeley's attitudes to the material 
world echoed certain Cathar theological anxieties and patterns of thought. 
1.2. Dealing with the (philosophical) past 
1.2.1. The past and our knowledge of it 
One of the main suppositions on which my present research is based is that there is 
something called "the past", something objective, exterior to us, and different in several 
ways from ourselves, and from our personal perspectives and interests. As such, i f this is 
granted, the historical scholars — as truth-seekers — must be guided in their enterprises 
by the principle that what they should be focused on is precisely this objective reality 
called "the past", their mission being to try to offer the best possible description o f it, 
leaving aside, for the time being, the various ways in which their historical knowledge 
might be used by other people, for purposes alien to the historical scholarship. My point 
here is that, even i f such things as "historical truth" and "historical certainty" are 
sometimes extremely difficult to attain, this is not at all a reason for ceasing to pursue 
them. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only way of seeing the nature and role of dealing with 
the past. There is another position, one according to which knowledge of the past cannot, 
and should not, be pursued for the past's sake, but for satisfying our own current 
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intellectual needs and pragmatic interests. I f the results of a particular historical research 
cannot be translated into something interesting /or us, then we do not have any reason to 
further pursue that research. In other words, there is no such a thing as gratuitous 
historical research. What this position upholds has been expressed, analogically, as 
follows: 
The anthropologist is not doing his job i f he merely offers to teach us how 
to bicker with his favourite tribe, how to be initiated into their rituals, etc. 
What we want to be told is whether that tribe has anything interesting to 
tell us — interesting by our lights, answering to our concerns, informative 
about what we know to exist. Any anthropologist who rejected this 
assignment on the grounds that filtering and paraphrase would distort and 
betray the integrity of the tribe's culture would no longer be an 
anthropologist, but a sort of occultist. He is, after all, working for us, not 
for them. (Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner 1984: 6-7) 
As such, history is seen as being the business of the present, whose pursuit must result in 
our better dealing with the present — and future — states of affairs. Historical research is 
of course to be encouraged because it supplies us with excellent means through which we 
can be more successful in our various undertakings. For example, we appeal to historical 
arguments for supporting our current positions and undermining our rivals' positions. 
According to such a line of thought, this is the case with every field in which knowledge 
of the past might play a certain part. In philosophy, for example, the various "versions" of 
the philosophical past might be used as arguments for various contemporary 
philosophical positions. Each "historian of philosophy is working for an 'us' which 
consists, primarily, of those who see the contemporary philosophical scene as he does. So 
each wi l l treat in a 'witchcraft' manner what another wi l l treat as the antecedents of 
something real and important in contemporary philosophy." {Ibid.: 7) As such, the past 
"in i tself , the past as it really is, does not concern anyone anymore. The true importance 
of the past actually lies in its flexibility and wonderful capacity of supplying us with the 
various arguments we need for our current purposes. 
Pushed at its limits, this position comes to assert that the idea of "the truth about 
the past, uncontaminated by present perspectives or concerns" is "like the idea of 'real 
essence, uncontaminated by the preconceptions and concerns built into any human 
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language." It is a romantic ideal of purity which has no relation to any actual enquiry 
which human beings have undertaken or cou Id undertake." {Ibid.: 8) 3 As a result, history 
becomes instrumental, and does not have an epistemic value per se: it acquires a certain 
(pragmatic) value only when the arguments it provides are successfully employed by 
others, in other fields. 
The problem with this position comes, I suggest, from a certain confusion it seems 
to make between the actual conditions under which such and such historical researches 
take place, on the one hand, and the principles guiding any historical research, on the 
other hand. It is true, it happens that the research is, to various degrees, "contaminated", 
or "impurified", by the researcher (that is, by his personal and cultural background, by his 
particular "prejudices", idiosyncrasies and minds-sets, etc.), but that research would be 
utterly impossible as a serious intellectual enterprise i f the researcher would start his work 
with the conviction that there is no such thing as "historical truth", and that the past is not 
"out there", but it is ultimately the result of some human invention. In other words, a 
serious historical research cannot be done in the absence of an ideal of truthfulness. We 
have of course personal inclinations and preferences, certain perspectives and affinities, 
but this does not necessarily mean that we wil l eternally remain, in Maclntyre's words, 
"prisoners of the present in our ostensible renderings of the past" (Maclntyre 1982: 33). 
There are ways of freeing ourselves from the prison of the present, and our sheer 
awareness of the fact that the past objectively exists is certainly one of them. Needless to 
say, the historian knows that some results of his work might be interpreted and "used" for 
a better dealing with present states of affairs, but this does not prevent him from 
performing the specific tasks that his profession requires him to do. To use the same 
analogy with the anthropologist, the "anthropologist wants to know how primitives talk to 
fellow-primitives as well as how they react to instructions from missionaries. For this 
purpose he tries to get inside their heads, and to think in terms which he would never 
dream of employing at home." (Rorty 1984: 50) Even i f the historian realizes that, say, 
such and such ancient beliefs he studies are wrong ("wrong", of course, by standards 
current in the world from which he comes), this realization should not change his attitude 
to them 4. It is not his mission as an historian to assess the truth value of those beliefs, nor 
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to express his personal views on them, but only to unearth them, place them in the 
appropriate context (thus making them intelligible), describe the role that those beliefs 
played within that particular context, and so on. And — it might be further observed — 
the less he lets his personal proclivities and idiosyncrasies interfere with his work the 
better historian he is. 
It seems to me that, above all, it is a matter of "intellectual honesty", to say the 
least, not to try to interfere with the past, and "change" it for one's purposes. Properly 
speaking, the past does not, and cannot, belong to us: it is a reality outside us, much 
greater and "older" than ourselves. The best thing we can do about the past is to simply 
take it as such, and, as far as we can, try to understand it. And understanding the past 
means acknowledging its character of otherness. We always have to establish certain 
relationships with this otherness, but this fact does not make it ours. Ultimately, I suppose 
that we must have to the past a, so to speak, "ecological" attitude: we do not have any 
right to "use" the past, the less so to "abuse" it. 
The alternative to this "ecological" attitude to the past is what we encounter, in its 
extreme version, in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, the permanent re-writing of the past 
in the (changing) interests of the present. With supreme literary talent, Orwell grasps the 
entire absurdity of the situation, and shows how (just like in that old joke, once very 
popular in Eastern Europe) it is not the future that is impossible to predict, but the past: 
Day by day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to date. 
In this way every prediction made by the Party could be shown by 
documentary evidence to have been correct [ . . . ] A l l history was a 
palimpsest, scraped clean and re-inscribed exactly as often as was 
necessary. [ . . . ] Books, also, were recalled and re-written again and again, 
and were invariably re-issued without any admission that any alteration 
had been made. (Orwell 1987: 42-3) 5 
1.2.2. Philosophy and the history of philosophy 
This tendency to "correct" the past, and to "adapt" it to the various needs of the present is 
manifest in the field of philosophy, too. The fact has been noticed with concern by 
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numerous philosophers, historians of philosophy and intellectual historians, and it is seen 
as having given birth to a certain crisis in today's philosophical world. 
As a result of this tendency in philosophy, the great philosophers of the past are 
commonly considered philosophers only insofar as they seem to "understand" and are 
able to answer our own questions: "Past authors may be read, but they are treated as i f 
they were contemporaries. They earn a right to enter the dialogue because they happen to 
offer good formulations of one or another position which is worthy of a hearing. They are 
not explored as origins, but as atemporal resources." (Charles 1984: 17) We return to the 
great dead to take from them what we need in order to successfully deal with our 
problems, without paying in general attention to what they are like aside from their being 
useful to us. We "use" them and, as Alasdair Maclntyre ironically puts it, they even must 
be proud for having been helpful to us in this way: "we shall admit the philosophers of 
the past to our debates only in our own terms, and i f that involves historical distortion, so 
much perhaps the better. We shall have paid the past the compliment of supposing it to be 
as philosophically acute as we are." (Maclntyre 1982: 39) 
According to a widespread opinion 6, this situation has been triggered by the 
dramatic process of re-definition of philosophy, and of the "genuinely philosophical 
problems", that has been undertaken by the analytic philosophy during the last one 
hundred years or so. Rorty et al describe how the new definition of philosophy has had as 
a result the emergence of a division of the entire philosophical past into two main 
categories7. Attacking the analytic philosophers' tendency to consider themselves "the 
first to have understood what philosophy is, what questions are the genuinely 
philosophical ones"8, Rorty et al relate how this self-representation of the analytical 
philosophers resulted in an attempt 
to tease out the "genuinely philosophical elements" in the work of past 
figures, putting aside as irrelevant their "religious" or "scientific" or 
"literary" or "political" or "ideological" concerns. [ . . . ] This... has the 
result of dividing up past-philosophers into those who anticipated the 
questions asked by contemporary analytic philosophers and those who 
held back the maturity of philosophy by diverting attention to other 
questions. Such an attitude produces a history of philosophy which 
eschews continuous narrative, but is more like a collection of anecdotes — 
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anecdotes about people who stumbled upon the "real" philosophical 
questions but did not realise what they had discovered. (Rorty, 
Schneewind, & Skinner 1984: 11) 
Strictly speaking, even i f references are made in their writings to past philosophers, the 
analytic philosophers do not, according to Rorty et al, have a genuinely historic interest in 
studying the past, but they simply make use of various philosophical arguments of the 
past, taking them out of context, and depriving them of any historical specificity. As 
Rorty et al ironically say, "stories about people who almost stumbled upon what we now 
know to be philosophy are like stories about people who would have discovered America 
i f they had just sailed a little further. A collection of such stories cannot be a history of 
anything." (Ibid.: 12) Thus, it could be said that, according to the analytical (re-)defmition 
of philosophy, the problems with which the past philosophers have been concerned are 
either "genuinely philosophical problems", and in this case they do not have anything to 
do with history, or simply pseudo-problems, in which case they do not have anything to 
do with (analytical) philosophy.9 
The programmatic tendency — the big ambition, actually — of the analytical 
philosophy to "solve problems", and to focus upon things "as they are in themselves", has 
gradually determined the rise, among its supporters, of a certain impatience with what 
appear as uselessly sophisticated "stories" that have been woven over the centuries 
around the "genuinely philosophical problems". Hence a certain dismissive attitude on 
their side towards history of philosophy and any historically-centred philosophies. It is 
this attitude among many analytic philosophers that makes Richard Popkin talk about "a 
very strong tendency among philosophers, especially those of our century, to reject any 
historical study of the subject, to reject any historical interpretation, and to reject the 
historians of philosophy as part of the philosophical enterprise." (Popkin 1992: 325) 1 0 
The lack of a more serious interest in historical issues is certainly one of the 
causes of the criticisms that analytic philosophy has had to face over the last decades. 
This is seen as lacking in historical self-awareness, and even driven by an unreasonable 
"arrogance". On the other hand, the fact that problems with which some great 
philosophers of the past were concerned, but considered pseudo-problems from the 
analytic perspective, are still debated today in various circles — philosophical or not — is 
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taken as a sign of the failure of the analytic project. Rorty et al, for example, decries that 
fact that 
analytic philosophers have tried to think of themselves as the culminating 
development of a natural kind of human activity ("philosophical activity"), 
rather than simply as participants in a brilliant new intellectual initiative. 
This attempt has had bad effects... on philosophy itself. For the 
disciplinary matrix of analytic philosophy has made it increasingly 
difficult for those within it to recognize that questions once asked by great 
dead philosophers are still being asked by contemporaries — 
contemporaries who count neither as "philosophers" nor as "scientists". 
(Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner 1984: 13)" 
It seems to me that the analytic philosopher's dismissal of the history of philosophy — 
and of any historically-minded philosophy — as dealing with "stories" about things, and 
not with "things are they are" (which, for him, is the real job of a philosopher) betrays a 
certain misunderstanding on his side. For what concerns the historian of philosophy is not 
a futile thing at all, but something very serious: just like the analytic philosopher, the 
historian o f philosophy deals with things as they are, which is for him: the past. The 
historian's job is not simply "story-telling", he does not seek to "tell stories" for their own 
sake, or look for entertaining "anecdotes", but his object of research is the historical 
truth, and those "stories" he "tells" are the particular modality through which this truth 
reveals itself. 
Finally, in light of these introductory and general considerations, I would like to 
point out that, in a sense, this thesis itself comes as a response to the crisis in today's 
philosophy I mentioned earlier on in this chapter. By showing the various ways in which 
George Berkeley's philosophy is connected to a system of ancient traditions and 
neglected modes of thought, and by revealing the crucial role that these traditions and 
modes of thought play in the formation and identity of Berkeley's way of thinking, I hope 
to point also to the tremendous importance of the historical scholarship for a better 
understanding of the philosophical thinking. It would be foolishly naive to claim that 
what this research wi l l have offered its reader at the end wi l l be, as it were, the whole 
truth about Bishop Berkeley. What I want to say is that what I have all the time borne in 
16 
mind when working on this research was the belief that there must be a truth about 
Berkeley, and that through what 1 was doing at least I would not go astray from it. 
Notes: 
' See, for example, Karl Popper's article " A Note on Berkeley as Precursor o f Mach" (Popper 1956) 
2 1 wi l l give only few examples, out o f very many possible: A. C. Grayling's Berkeley: the central 
arguments (Grayling 1986), Jonathan Dancy's Berkeley: An Introduction (Dancy 1987), David Berman's 
Berkeley: Idealism and the man (Berman: 1994), George Pappas' Berkeley's Thought (Pappas 2000), etc. 
3 Let me say here that this is not necessarily the position defended by Rorty, Schneevvind & Skinner. They 
just try to make a case for it, and compare this position with its rivals. I use their description o f this position 
simply because it is clear and precise. 
4 "There is knowledge — historical knowledge — to be gained which one can only get by bracketing one's 
own better knowledge about, e.g., the movements o f the heavens or the existence o f God." (Rorty 1984: 50) 
3 In a very recent book, Bernard Williams makes (Williams 2002) the same point about historical research 
being based upon an idea o f truth and an ideal o f truthfulness. He, too, uses the example offered by Orwell's 
masterpiece. 
6 I make here repeated references to Rorty et al (Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner 1984), finding their work 
particularly useful for my purposes in this thesis, but there are also other contemporary authors who hold 
similar views. 
7 "'Philosophy' is a sufficiently flexible term so that no one is greatly surprised when a philosopher 
announce that half o f the previous canon of 'great philosophers' must be thrown out because the problems 
o f philosophy have been discovered to be different than had been previously been thought. Such a 
philosopher usually explains that the slack wi l l be taken up by something else ( 'religion' or 'science' or 
'literature')." (Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner 1984: 8-9) 
8 The complete fragment runs as follows: "We would urge that, in Britain and America, the historiography 
o f philosophy has recently been less conscious than it ought to have been. In particular, the influence o f 
analytic philosophy has worked against self-consciousness o f the desired sort. Analytical philosophers have 
seen no need to situate themselves within Gadamer's 'conversation which we are' because they take 
themselves to be the first to have understood what philosophy is, what questions are the genuinely 
philosophical ones." (Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner 1984: 11) 
9 "On the analytic philosophers' own account o f the situation, indeed, there is nothing which can properly 
be called 'the history o f philosophy', but only a history o f almost-philosophy, only a pre-history o f 
philosophy." (Ibid.: 12) 
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For Popkin the (analytic) philosophers "are often wil l ing to eliminate the study o f the history o f 
philosophy, since what called itself philosophy in the past was just confusion and error. They are wi l l ing to 
curtail access to the historical past through what they encourage and discourage as proper activities o f 
students, professors and publishers." (Popkin 1992: 325) 
" A more commonsensical criticism is brought by Maclntyre: "for any particular philosophical generation 
its occupation o f the present can only be temporary; in some not too distant future it wi l l have been 
transmuted into one more part o f the philosophical past." (Maclntyre 1982: 39) 
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Chapter Two: 
George Berkeley and the Platonic Tradition 
There is already a certain amount of literature dedicated to the presence in Berkeley's 
early philosophy of some Platonic topics (archetypes, the problem of God's mind, etc.). 
Based on some of these writings, on Berkeley's own works, as well as on the examination 
of some elements of the Platonic tradition, in this chapter I wi l l advance the idea that, far 
from being just isolated topics, loosely scattered in Berkeley's early writings, they form 
an entire network of Platonic features, attitudes, and mind sets, and that however allusive 
or ambiguous these Platonic elements might seem, they constitute a coherent whole, 
playing an important role in shaping the essence of Berkeley's thought. In other words, I 
suggest that, given some of the ideas contained in his early works, it was in a way 
unavoidable for Berkeley, in virtue of the inner logic of the development of his thought, 
to arrive at such an openly Platonic and speculative writing as Siris (1744). 
2.1. Platonism in Berkeley's Early Philosophical Writings 
2.1.1. Defining the Platonic tradition 
"Platonism", or "the Platonic tradition", is not easy to define. The more so in a paper 
dealing not with Platonism as such, but primarily with Berkeley's philosophy and with a 
possible connection between the latter and certain elements of the Platonic tradition. It 
seems to me at this stage that a reasonable solution to such a difficulty would consist in 
starting out this discussion without attempting to give a complete, fully satisfactory 
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definition of Platonism, but only provisionally outlining some general information on it, 
in the hope that by constantly seeing and considering the development of Berkeley's 
thought in light of some elements of the Platonic tradition, and by setting the two terms 
"face to face" (which is actually the main objective of this chapter), a much more 
complete and appropriate understanding of Platonism would also result. 
Very schematically, by "Platonism", in accord with a long usage of the term, I 
mean here a certain line of metaphysical thought originating in Plato's doctrines, and 
developed by such figures as Philo, Plotinus, Proclus, Dionysius the Areopagite, Marsilio 
Ficino, the Cambridge Platonists and many others. There are authors who draw a clear-
cut distinction between Platonism (strictly understood as Plato's doctrine), and 
Neoplatonism (the subsequent philosophical schools and currents inspired by Plato's 
thought). For reasons of simplicity, in this thesis I wi l l use throughout the term 
"Platonism" in a broad sense, that is, as covering also the meaning(s) of any 
"Neoplatonisms". Besides, I wi l l sometimes use the phase "the Platonic tradition" with 
more or less the same meaning as "Platonism". 
Obviously, just as this impressive tradition of thinking which Plato inaugurated 
did not take over the whole of Plato's thought1, so it has with the passing of time acquired 
new elements, Christian or otherwise, more or less alien to Plato's initial ideas. For one 
of the important traits of the Platonic tradition has always been its impressive capacity to 
interact, "communicate" and establish relationships with — to "colonise" and eventually 
incorporate — various other philosophical systems, ways of thinking and cultural forms. 
There have been links, whether profound or superficial, temporary or long-lasting, 
between Platonism and theology (be it Christian, Jewish or Islamic), Platonism and 
mysticism, Platonism and Gnosticism (Esotericism, or Kabalah), between Platonism and 
literature (and, in general, the arts), between Platonism and the Utopian tradition, etc. 
From all these forms of marriage have resulted new entities: sub-currents, sects, heresies, 
various schools of thought, philosophical clubs, intellectual fashions and attitudes. The 
fascinating thing about this situation is probably the fact that, pervading all these 
"alienations", "alliances" and combinations, there almost always remains a distinct 
"Platonic" flavour, something that ultimately reminds us of "the spirit of Plato's thought". 
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But in what precisely lies the essence of this "Platonic spirit"? What is ultimately 
"Platonism"? Because of its synthetic qualities, I have chosen to borrow the description 
offered by Andrew Louth: 
It is fundamental to Platonism, in virtually any guise, that this world, the 
world we perceive through the senses and about which we hold a variety 
of opinions, is not the real world. This world is a world of change, decay, 
and, for all of us, death; all of which bear the mark of unreality. The real 
world is changeless, incorruptible, a place of enduring life: it is, for Plato, 
the realm of the Forms. (Louth 1994: 54) 
Another issue to recall before properly starting discussing the problem of the Platonic 
influences on Berkeley's thought is that of the specific Platonism-Christianity 
relationship. There was a sense in which Christianity and Platonism had something 
essential in common, something they shared, making, in a way, unavoidable their 
"marriage", very early in the history of the Christian church. This privileged relationship 
between the Platonic tradition and Christianity should play an important part in any 
discussion of the Platonic tradition within the European context. For, of all ancient 
philosophical schools, it was probably Platonism that had the strongest and most durable 
influence upon the shaping and development of Christian theology. As it has been said, 
Platonism encouraged an emphasis on man's spiritual side, "where the clear air of the 
knowledge of God was attained by self-denial, subjugation of the flesh and the cultivation 
of the intellectual purity, and man's soul could rise above his baser nature. Christ could 
be seen as the highest Reason, God's Wisdom." (Evans 1993: 25) When Nietzsche called 
Plato a "Christian before Christ" he did nothing but openly recognise a fundamental truth 
about the ultimate constitution of the European mind. Platonism simply helped the 
Christian faith acquire its doctrinal, theological identity. As Andrew Louth rightly 
notices, the story of the influence of 
Platonism on Christian theology goes back as least to the second century 
of the Christian era, i f not earlier, and became so pervasive that it is almost 
impossible to envisage Christian theology apart from its Platonic dress. 
[ . . . ] The principal reason for this influence is simply that Platonism and 
Christianity had so much in common: that [ . . . ] meant that Christian 
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theologians soon came to look to Platonism for arguments with which to 
defend Christianity. (Louth: 1994: 52). 
At the same time, several Christian notions, attitudes and beliefs influenced to an 
important degree the further development of the Platonic thinking itself, Dionysius the 
Areopagite, John Scotus Eriugena, Marcilio Ficino, the Cambridge Platonists being only 
the most notorious cases from this point of view. There was a mutual influence involved 
here, or, as Andrew Louth puts it, "the traffic between the Platonic tradition and 
Christianity was not all one way." (Ibid.: 59) 2. 
2.1.2. Seeing Berkeley as a Platonist 
It was within this particular metaphysical Christian-Platonic context that the rise of 
George Berkeley's philosophy took place. But there is no agreement among Berkeley 
scholars as to the exact extent to which Berkeley was a Platonist, i f he was one. I f 
Berkeley has sometimes been perceived as a Platonic thinker, this has only been with 
regard to his last work Siris, the earlier ones not being in general considered from a 
Platonic point of view. For example, in his history of The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-
Saxon Philosophy John Muirhead, on the occasion of one of the very few mentions of 
Berkeley in the entire book, describes how that "the seed" of Platonism, replanted in 
Britain by the Cambridge Platonists, "failed to show above the ground except in the pale 
form of the later speculations of Bishop Berkeley." (Muirhead 1931: 13). More than that, 
Paul Shorey even considered that "Berkeley's earlier writings are apparently at the 
opposite pole from Platonism." (Shorey 1938: 207) In the first part of the twentieth 
century Berkeley's early philosophizing was still perceived in the strict context of the 
"new philosophy", and in the terms determined by the development of the "British 
empiricism", as a natural logical step from Locke to Hume. 
However, during the last thirty years or so many studies have been published 
dealing with the presence in Berkeley's earlier writings of some specific topics which 
could be seen as belonging to the Platonic tradition 3. The problem is that these topics are 
in general considered isolated Platonic topics, or notions, or patterns o f thought, 
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occasionally scattered in Berkeley's earlier work, and no systematic and sustained attempt 
has been made until recently to establish some sort of "necessary connection", on the one 
hand, between themselves as they appear in the early Berkeleian writings and, on the 
other hand, between their presence in Berkeley's early writings and his avowed Platonism 
in Siris. It is true, Peter Wenz, for example, wrote some decades ago that "the neo-
Platonism of the Siris should be viewed as compatible with, rather than as a reversal of 
both the empiricism and the attack upon abstract ideas present in the Principles of Human 
Knowledge" (Wenz 1976: 542) pointing to such a connection, but without following it up 
in detail, or considering it otherwise than in light of the archetypes-"abstract ideas" 
relationship. Then, some other authors took over Wenz's insight, but it was Stephen 
Daniel who, in a recent article (Daniel 2001), took a decisive step forward, proposing "to 
consider the Principles and the Dialogues in light of his [Berkeley's] Christian 
Neoplatonic metaphysics", and suggesting that "that metaphysics is already present in his 
early works". (Ibid.: 239-40) 
In a certain sense, my approach in this chapter might be seen as a continuation of 
Daniel's. Nevertheless, I wi l l be trying to significantly enlarge this discussion by 
assuming that there is an entire network of Platonic topics, patterns of thought, and mind 
sets in Berkeley's earlier works (a network within which the archetypes dealt with by 
Daniel and others represent only one "knot"), that, however allusive, ambiguous or vague 
these Platonic elements might seem, they formed a coherent whole, and played a crucial 
part in shaping the essence of Berkeley's thought as he displayed it in his earlier 
philosophical writings, and that — moreover — once Berkeley started following this line 
of (Platonic) thinking, the speculations in Siris were not only possible, but in a way 
unavoidable4. 
In the following I wi l l be outlining some "knots" of this "Platonic network". 
2.1.3. The likeness relationship: the human mind—the divine mind 
One of the central arguments employed by Berkeley in order to supply his immaterialist 
system with logical soundness, metaphysical depth, and eventually with a serious means 
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of refuting any accusations of solipsism is that the existence of sensible things is 
ultimately based on their being continually perceived (conceived of) by God, or — in 
other words — on their being in God's mind. Simply saying that esse is percipi is not 
enough, but it necessarily requires this essential addition: perceived not only by us, but 
also by God. We perceive things in the world and this fact makes them existent to us, but 
in our absence, before our birth and after our death, they must be, so to speak, "cared for" 
by some infinite, uninterruptedly active spirit — that is, God: 
sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I 
conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that seeing they depend 
not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by 
me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist. As sure therefore as 
the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent 
spirit who contains and supports it. (Berkeley 1949: I I , 212 [Three 
Dialogues...]) 
As it were, as far as we human beings are concerned, things exist only insofar as we 
perceive them, according to our limited faculties, and — in some sense — "for our sake", 
but as far as things themselves are concerned, they must necessarily be thought of by an 
infinite mind, according to its infinite powers, and for their own sake. In a similar 
passage, Berkeley stresses that when 
I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind 
in particular, but all minds. Now it is plain that they have an existence 
exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of 
it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the 
intervals between the times of my perceiving them [. .] . And as the same is 
true, with regard to all other finite created spirits; it necessarily follows, 
there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows, and comprehends all 
things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to 
such rules as he himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of 
Nature. {Ibidem, 230-1) 
The most obvious thing to observe here is that the underlying supposition behind such an 
argument is that there is a fundamental likeness and a similarity of function between the 
human mind and the divine mind. Of course, the human mind is endowed only with 
limited powers, has a limited scope, and is deeply marked by a character of dependence 
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and finitude, but — despite all its imperfections — in Berkeley the human mind performs 
exactly the same act as the divine mind actually does: perceives, or conceives of, objects, 
thus conferring on them existence and intelligibility, and ultimately rendering them real. 
Even i f on a much more reduced scale, the human mind mirrors as it were the activity of 
the divine one. 
Now, in light of the fact that, for Berkeley, philosophy had pre-eminently religious 
and apologetic5 functions and objectives6, and considering the entire religious background 
against which his thought emerged, as well as Berkeley's own formation as a churchman, 
I would propose here the hypothesis that this notion of a fundamental "similarity of 
function" between the human mind and the divine mind should be considered in 
connection with a certain ancient insight. Namely, it is the notion, we encounter in the 
"Book of Genesis" (1 : 26, 27) that God made us in his "image and likeness": "And God 
said, Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness. ...So God created man in his 
own image, in the image of God created he him." Needless to say, this is too complex a 
theological problem to be satisfactorily dealt with here, even in passing, but all what I am 
now concerned with is only to point to a possible theological source of Berkeley's 
argument. I do believe that this is a reasonable hypothesis to advance: Berkeley was 
formed as a theologian, considered that what he was doing must serve religion to the 
highest degree, in the sense that he conceived of his mission as a philosopher to "utterly 
destroy" atheism and free-thinking; therefore, borrowing a theological notion on which to 
build up one of his main arguments seem quite plausible. 
It is true that, according to this line of theological thought, although God created 
man "in His image and likeness", due to several causes, "the image of God in us" (imago 
Dei in nobis), as the medieval writers put it, has become corrupted and unclear. St. 
Anselm expressed very well the deep anxiety caused by the realisation of this fact: 
Lord, I acknowledge that I thank thee that thou hast created me in this 
thine image, in order that I may be mindful of thee; but that image has 
been so consumed and wasted away by vices, and obscured by the smoke 
of wrong doing, that it cannot achieve that for which it was made, except 
thou renew it, and create it anew. (Anselm 1962: 6 [Proslogion]) 
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Nevertheless, the fact remains that, despite all its imperfections, errors, and bad 
inclinations, the human mind still bears on itself the mark of God. 
As far as Berkeley's philosophy is concerned, this divine mark impressed upon 
the human mind manifests itself precisely through the fact that human mind functions as a 
God en miniature. The idea that, within Berkeley's system, the human mind perceives 
things and thus renders them existent (esse est percipi) does nothing but confirm that it is 
indeed created "in the image of God", and "after His likeness", insofar as the supreme 
mission of God himself — the main reason for his existence, so to speak — is to do 
exactly the same thing, namely, to perceive things thus rendering them existent: "Men 
commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe 
the being o f a God, whereas 1 on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the 
being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him." (Ibid. : 212) 
At the same time, this privileged relationship between the human mind and the 
divine one is a crucially important topic in Platonism. It is one of those points where 
ancient Greek philosophy turns out to be so amazingly akin to some central ideas derived 
from the biblical tradition. As in the Judaic-Christian Weltanschauung, within a Platonic 
context, the two terms are not at all indifferent to each other, but there is a permanent 
dramatic drive, on the human side, towards the divine realities, and this is possible 
precisely in virtue o f the above mentioned "ontological" likeness between the human and 
the divine. A central doctrine in Platonism is that based on "the belief in a world of higher 
realities, beyond the fallible realm of sense-perception; the belief that the soul belongs to 
that higher world and can find its way back there." (Sheppard 1994: 17-8) As it were, the 
human mind, through all its endeavours, efforts, and undertakings, permanently "looks 
for" its divine origin; this tendency is embedded in its deepest structures. For example, in 
Phaedo, Plato makes Socrates imply that his being ready (and happy) to die is actually a 
required part of an ampler scenario, a scenario at the end of which the human mind/soul 
is to encounter and find the rest in its divine counterpart: 
there is good hope that on arriving where 1 am going, i f anywhere, I shall 
acquire what has been our chief preoccupation in our past life, so that the 
journey that is now ordered for me is ful l of good hope, as it is also for any 
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other man who believes that his mind has been prepared and, as it were, 
purified. (Phaedo 67b-c, Plato 1997: 58 [trans. C M . A Grube]) 
This is why philosophy, as the supreme form of spiritual achievement, comes to be seen 
as a "training for death" (Phaedo 81a [trans. G.M.A. Grube]). "Death" means, 
accordingly, a fundamental initiatory experience by means of which the ultimate truths 
are completely revealed to the human mind, it coming to see its divine counterpart "face 
to face" (facie ad faciem), as St. Paul would say later. To put it briefly, "the soul's 
gaining the spiritual world is experienced as a homecoming (nostos)." (Louth 1994: 54) 
In a remarkably expressive manner, Plotinus says that "our fatherland is whence we have 
come, and there is the Father." (Plotinus, Enneads 1.6.8.21) Therefore, trying to get 
beyond all what the sensible world gives us, in order to comprehend as much as we can of 
the intelligible realities (in the hope of a final "re-joining" with them), should be taken as 
most important employment of the human mind throughout one's lifetime. This is not, of 
course, an easy job: a common Platonic concern was that deriving from the fact that "the 
human condition is a perpetual struggle between a debasing materialism and an elevating 
spirituality" (Evans 1993: 95), but, nevertheless, it is only through this difficult struggle 
that we can free ourselves from the "prison of the body" and of the material world, and 
through which we arrive at what is "most appropriate" to us. The "place" where human 
reason can most properly be said to be "at home" is only where the Reason resides. Hence 
the prevalence, within the Platonic-Christian tradition, of the ideal of "reason 
transfigured, able to see clearly the supreme Reason which is its pattern and to enjoy 
purely intellectual joys untainted by the urgencies of the demands of the flesh." (Ibid.: 95) 
In view of these brief considerations, Berkeley's account of the relationship 
between the divine mind and its human counterpart acquires, it is hoped, a more complete 
understanding, and a more appropriate contextualization. For his argument was not at all 
a piece of brilliant sophistry, or some philosophical device ingeniously employed in order 
just to dismiss accusations of solipsism, but — when using such an argument — he 
actually followed an ancient and consecrated pattern of thought. This was a pattern whose 
feasibility and strength had already been "tested" by a long tradition of Platonists and 
religious thinkers who took basically the same view as Berkeley: a view according to 
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which the human mind actually functions as some speculum Dei, mirror of God. And it is 
precisely this function that gives the mind ("the Candle of the Lord" in us, in Benjamin 
Wichcote's phrasing) a very special character, transforming it into a definitely privileged 
realm. Our perceiving of things, with the very special sense that the word "perception" 
has in Berkeley, is our profoundest way of "imitating" God. Made as we are in "His 
image" and "after His likeness" we faithfully reproduce, en miniature, the divine process 
through which the world comes into being. 
2.1.4. The archetypes 
Yet, the sheer assertion of God's mind as a "place" where things exist is not enough: 
there must be an immediate modality through which God's mind can perceive objects, or 
— in other words — a means by which objects exist in the divine mind. Hence the 
introduction of the ancient notion of archetypes. In his article on the archetypes in 
Berkeley published in 1976 Peter Wenz writes that: "there is good reason to believe that 
Berkeley was [ . . . ] a Christian neo-Platonist, one who holds the view that abstract ideas 
exist in the mind of God and that the world was created by God using these ideas as 
models or archetypes." (Wenz 1976: 537) Even i f there are still some problematic aspects 
in this identification, in the sense that Berkeley's attack upon abstract ideas might be seen 
as one against the divine abstract ideas as wel l 7 , and even i f Berkeley's immaterialism 
does not match in absolutely every detail the traditional pattern of using the archetypes, it 
could be however shown that the existence and function of the archetypes (a Platonic 
topic per excellence) is crucially important in Berkeley's thought. As a matter of fact, the 
employment of the notion of archetype is simply necessary and unavoidable for 
accounting for the way in which God's mind comprehends and makes intelligible things 
in the world. It is not enough to say that "things exist in God's mind": an account of how 
they do so is also required. As Steven Daniel pointed out, " i f God's perception of things 
is [ . . . ] Berkeley's way to avoid the solipsistic implications of his doctrine that to be is to 
be perceived, then it would seem that his theory of divine ideas or archetypes would be at 
the heart of his idealistic immaterialism." (Daniel 2001: 247) 
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Although the role of the archetypes is so important in Berkeley's system, as they 
supply it with a relatively non-problematic — and long verified — means of making 
things exist in the divine intellect, Berkeley did not in his earlier writings pay a 
proportionate attention to the theory of archetypes as such. He frequently used the term, 
with its Platonic meaning, but did not seem to rely upon the archetypes theory as much as 
one could expect. For example, in the Principles of Human Knowledge, he says: 
whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, wi l l [ . . . ] 
acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; 
that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, to wit, in his mind, and 
that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind. (Berkeley 1949: I I , 
84) 
In the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous the notion of archetypes is 
systematically and thoroughly employed, but at the same time one often encounters 
hesitation on Berkeley's side between considering the perceivable "things" (that is, 
"ideas") and "their archetypes". For example: "no idea or archetype of an idea can exist 
otherwise than in a mind" (Berkeley 1949: I I , 212-3). Or, in another passage: 
the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out 
of my mind: but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes, can exist 
otherwise than in an understanding: there is therefore an understanding. 
But wi l l and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. 
{Ibidem: 235) 
Nevertheless, for all his hesitation, the logical context within which he employs the 
notion of archetype is the same as that in which archetypes were employed in traditional 
Platonism, which is to say, archetypes are in God's mind, being the favorite divine way of 
comprehending the created world: 
the things I perceive are my own ideas, and [ . . . ] no idea can exist unless it 
be in a mind. Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, 
either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, 
since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to 
determine at pleasure, what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon 
opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in some other mind, 
whose wi l l it is they should be exhibited to me. {Ibid.: 214-5) 
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Finally, in a letter to Samuel Johnson, dated March 24, 1730, that is, some twenty years 
after Berkeley published his first works, he comes to say that: 
I have no objection against calling the ideas in the mind of God 
archetypes of yours. But I object against those archetypes by philosophers 
supposed to be real things, and to have an absolute rational existence 
distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever. (Berkeley 
1949: I I , 292) 
This statement is of greatest importance as it allows us to realize that Berkeley was much 
against the use of the term "archetype" with a Lockean meaning, that is, against 
"archetype" as meaning simply an external object, a "real thing", whose mental image (or 
idea) is reflected in our mind, and which can be said to be the "model", "original" or 
"archetype", on which that image is moldered. Given the then prevailing influence of 
Lockean opinions and language in the intellectual and philosophical circles, this explains 
to a great extent why Berkeley was so hesitant in using the term "archetype", still without 
rejecting it. On the one hand, he was inclined to resorting to the term for its metaphysical 
implications and the problems its employment would have solved in his philosophy; yet, 
on the other hand, he was aware that "archetype" still had Lockean connotations he did 
not want to take aboard. This is exactly what most commentators have noticed about the 
issue in question. T. E. Jessop, for example, says: "On archetypes not as supposed 
corporeal originals of mental copies but as models in the divine intellect, Berkeley seems 
to have had an open mind." (Jessop 1949: 78, n. 1) 
A very important, not to say decisive, step forward, as far as the employment of 
the Platonic notion of archetypes is concerned, is taken when Berkeley, in Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, comes to recognize that: " I am not for changing 
things into ideas, but rather ideas into things." (Berkeley 1949: I I , 244) The things are, as 
it were, reified ideas, they exist only in so far as are the expressions of a higher order of 
reality — that is, the order of ideas. In a remarkably precise manner, this last Berkeleian 
statement virtually contains, or summarizes up, a fundamental principle of Platonism: that 
this sensible world we see around is but a reflection of a world of ideas, or archetypes, 
that all things in "this world" are — in a sense — but some sort of "embodied ideas", 
"terrestrial" shades of a higher, "celestial" ontological order. And in the process of 
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bringing things into being it is God who plays the decisive part. Thanks to His 
intervention, a process of "reflection" takes place, through which things in the world 
appear as more or less faithful "copies" of the archetypes: "God is the supreme soul, the 
Mind which knows the intelligible objects but whose function is to create the sensible 
world in terms of the intelligible model furnished to it by the Ideas." (Feibleman 1971: 
28) From this point of view, Berkeley's understanding of the role of God, and of the use 
He makes of the archetypes, is strikingly similar to that of the traditional Platonism: 
A l l objects are eternally known by God, or which is the same thing, have 
an eternal existence in his mind: but when things before imperceptible to 
creatures, are by a decree of God, made perceptible to them; then are they 
said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. (Berkeley 
1949: I I , 252 [Three Dialogues...}) 
This passage casts an excellent light on Berkeley's use of the notion of archetypes, and 
their role in "producing" the sensible world. " A l l objects" means of course the 
archetypes, the "models" of the physical objects we come across in the world: they have 
an eternal existence in the mind of God, and only at some point in time, by a decree of 
God they cause another order of reality — it is, presumably, what we read about in the 
Book of Genesis. This is an order of reality "relative" to our perceiving faculties, 
dependent on our mind: it exists only insofar as we perceive it. Now, what we do on our 
encounter with the world is precisely a re-construction, from our point of view, of the 
process through which God instituted things simply by thinking them: we perceive things 
and thus render them existent. And by so doing, we can safely be said to be re-producing, 
on a much smaller scale, en miniature as it were, the divine process. 
This being said, it wi l l not be too surprising that John Dillon, in a comparative 
study on Plotinus and Berkeley, comes to openly conclude that in his using of the term 
"idea" itself Berkeley was in fact under a strong Platonic influence, borrowing its 
meaning from Plotinus: "En se servant du term 'idee', Berkeley est soumis a l'influence 
de l'usage du mot grec idea chez Plotin, et dans la tradition du platonisme disponible a 
Berkeley, il allait de soi que ces ideai etaient des pensees dans Pintellect d'un dieu 
supreme." (Dillon 1997: 107) As a matter of fact, once embarked on his ambitious project 
of understanding the world as some form of "unfolding" of God, Berkeley could not 
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avoid doing so: thanks to their elegant functionality and explicative virtues, in a way he 
had to accept the archetypes, along with all the Platonic philosophizing clustered over the 
centuries around them. 
Moreover, there are, in Dillon's view, some other similarities that could be found 
between Plotinus' idealism and Berkeley's. For example, within the context of a Platonic 
theory of archetypes, there must be some individualised modality through which the 
divine archetypes come to be effective in terms of bringing the sensible things into 
existence, and it is at this point that Plotinus sees the sensible things as been "radiated", 
or "issued", in some hierarchical way, from the One, the supreme metaphysical reality: 
A l l things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily 
produce from their own substances, in dependence of their present power, 
a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of 
the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which 
comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed 
things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is 
diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their 
existence. (Enneads V. 1.6.27-40) 
Even i f it would be only in Siris that Berkeley would take over, almost literally, such a 
view as this just quoted from Plotinus, incorporating it in his own thinking and making 
extensive use of it, at this stage (that is, when writing the Three Dialogues...) there is 
nevertheless a sense in which Berkeley could be said to be not completely alien from 
some of the implications of Plotinus' doctrine: 
there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible 
impressions I perceive. And from the variety, order, and manner of these, I 
conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond 
comprehension. [ . . . ] the things by me perceived are known by the 
understanding, and produced by the w i l l , of an infinite spirit. (Berkeley 
1949: I I , 215) 
God is not at all a quiet presence in Berkeley's world, but he continuously reveals himself 
to our minds; in Berkeley God overwhelms us with his presence. As such, above all other 
similarities one might encounter in Berkeley and Plotinus, there is this one that makes 
their philosophies so strikingly akin. Namely, in Dillon's words, 
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le point ou les deux philosophies se rencontrent et ou ils semblent s'eclairer 
l'un 1'autre [ . . . ] c'est leur opposition radicale a toute theorie qui voudrait 
inserer une difference entre ce qui se trouve disponible a nos sens et 
quelque substance qui leur est sous-jacente. (Dillon 1997: 107) 
As a result, in both Plotinus and Berkeley, what we immediately encounter in the world is 
the direct effect of a generous Divinity. There is no place, in either of these two 
philosophies, for any intermediary substances, source of alienation and useless 
digressions from our true mission in this world. 
2.1.5. "The two worlds" 
An immediate logical consequence of the theory that there are archetypes in the mind of 
God is the idea that there are two worlds: in virtue of its nature, the world of archetypes 
(kosmos noetos) implies the existence of a world of sensible "copies" (/cosmos aisthetos), 
of things made in their image, existing as mere "earthly" imitations of the "celestial" 
models. A theory of archetypes thus implies necessarily "the recognition of an unseen 
world of unchanging reality behind the flux of phenomena, a spiritual universe compared 
with which the world of appearance grew pale and unsubstantial and became only a 
symbol or even an illusion" (Inge 1926: 7-8) This is actually (another) central doctrine 
professed by virtually all Platonic movements, whether ancient or modern, a doctrine with 
important consequences not only in metaphysical terms, but also in anthropological and 
soteriological terms. It is this doctrine that makes Plato, as it has been said, "the 
paradigmatic representative of a perennial, 'other worldly' tendency which has never 
ceased to attract or repel, the emotions as much as the intellect." (Cooper 1996: 107) In 
light o f this twofold state of reality, the human beings are now to be defined by their dual 
nature8: 
We human beings belong to both worlds: clearly to this world (which is 
why we call it this world), but in virtue of our possessing (or strictly: 
being) a soul (strictly: an intellect, nous), we belong to the spiritual world. 
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For Plato the whole point of philosophy is to secure our passage to the 
spiritual world: philosophy is "practising death", melete thanatou {Phaedo 
81a), for death is the separation of the soul from the body. (Louth 1994: 
54) 
The true philosophical and intellectual accomplishment means, in a Platonic context, to 
understand what lies behind the misleading multiplicity of things, to find out their eternal 
"patterns" or "forms". Obviously, our immediate knowledge of the external world is only 
a knowledge of sensible "copies", it being impossible to be otherwise, but the most 
important thing is to understand their true nature, and not to mistake them for their 
"archetypes" — which might be sometimes a difficult job because although the copies 
"lack the perfection of the Form they are nevertheless regarded as 'imitating' the Form; 
they are like it even though they fall short of it ." (Sheppard 1994: 6) That means that an 
appropriate knowledge of the world presupposes, on the Platonic knower's side, an acute 
awareness of the specific ontological "weight" of each class of things that his mind is 
concerned with at every moment. 
Let me also observe, in passing, that, under the massive influence of a Platonizing 
St. Augustine, this representation of how our knowledge of the world is constituted, was 
to become one of the most widespread notions in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, 
before the rediscovery of Aristotelism. Important and influential medieval thinkers saw 
the knowledge of the world as a progressive and liberating ascension from the sensible 
level of things to their intelligible source — namely, God, truly the only reality towards 
which we should permanently direct our epistemic enterprises and intellectual efforts: 
Medieval versions of Augustine's account of a progression from sense-
perception by way of image-making and abstraction to a truly spiritual and 
rational encounter with the mind of God are to be found in, for instance, 
Anselm's Monologium and Bonaventure's Ilinerarium Mentis in Deum; 
but the notion is widely diffused in many authors. (Evans 1993: 38) 
It is this doctrine postulating the existence of two worlds that Berkeley readily admits. As 
a matter of fact, he could not have done otherwise as such an idea was the logical result of 
the principles on which his approach had been based. In Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous, his mouthpiece, Philonous comes to ask: 
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do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, 
the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter 
existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the 
common notion of divines? or is any more than this necessary in order to 
conceive the Creation? (Berkeley 1949: I I , 254 [Three Dialogues...]) 
In other words, insofar as things are perceived by us they are ideas, "second hand" 
realities, "imitations", whereas insofar as they are comprehended by God they are 
archetypes, eternal models upon which sensible things are made. 
More than that, in Alciphron, written some twenty years later, Berkeley would 
express views not only consonant with those expressed in his early writings, but in a 
sense even more deeply Platonic. The fundamental metaphysical attitude betrayed by a 
passage like the following one is likely to be found in any important writing o f the 
Platonic tradition: "To me it seems the man can see neither deep nor far who is not 
sensible of his own misery, sinfulness, and dependence; who doth not perceive that this 
present world is not designed or adapted to make rational souls happy." (Berkeley 1950: 
I I I , 178) In a sense, it is this kind of existential anxiety that confer upon Berkeley's 
thinking an even more Platonic flavor. I f in his earlier writings, Berkeley's Platonism was 
rather theoretical, conceived of as a sophisticated system of metaphysical notions by 
means of which the existence and nature of things were explained as in detail as possible, 
it was in Alciphron that Berkeley allowed himself to express the specific anxieties and 
feelings accompanying a Platonic way of seeing the world. 
There is nevertheless a certain ambiguity in Berkeley's doctrine of the "twofold 
state of things", which gives rise to a difference between his own view and the traditional 
Platonic view of "the two worlds". This ambiguity is originated in his radical denial of 
the existence of matter. Plato himself allowed matter (hide) some sort of existence, even 
i f a problematic, inferior and obscure one, and so did many Platonists after him, even 
though some others, Plotinus included, took a view closer to Berkeley's9. Berkeley 
instead did not recognize any sort of material existence and reduced the traditional 
Platonic opposition between "the two worlds", one of ideas and the other of physical 
objects, to an opposition (somehow less dramatic than in Plato) between a realm of 
archetypes, existing in God's mind, and a realm of sensible objects, occasioned by our 
35 
perceiving God's archetypes. (Of course, there is some element of novelty in Berkeley's 
solution, which novelty is still to be dealt with by scholars of Platonism.) In this respect, 
as John Dillon suggests, Berkeley is even more radical than Plotinus: 
Pour Berkeley, meme plus que pour Plotin, le monde exterieur des objets 
physiques, au dela des sens, constituait une menace. II lui semblait que, si 
on admettait I'existence d'une couche materielle inferieure aux qualites 
primaires et secondares [ . . . ] on defiait ainsi l'omnipotence et la 
providence de Dieu. Ces objets materiels de Locke seraient des entites 
extra mentales qui existeraient en depit de la connaissance de quelque 
esprit. lis seraient done des entities dont l'existence serait tout a fait 
independante de 1'esprit — meme de l'esprit divin." (Dillon 1997: 100-1) 
On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that such an ambiguity is to be found not 
only in Berkeley's philosophy. It probably derives from what Andrew Louth calls the 
"unresolved problem for Christian Platonism". When God occupies so important a place 
within a system of thought, when —- according to such a system — He permeates 
everything and it is only him who renders the whole of reality intelligible (as he does both 
in Berkeley and in the Christian Platonists referred to by Louth), then it becomes difficult 
indeed to find any appropriate room for the existence of matter as such, or of any other 
bodily reality. There is a sense in which, in these systems, matter tends to "dematerialise" 
itself.. 
2.1.6. "The book of the world" 
(Since the next chapter of this thesis — Chapter Three — wi l l be dedicated precisely to 
the place that Berkeley occupies in the liber mundi tradition, I wi l l deal here with this 
topic very briefly, only insofar as this is necessary for a better understanding of the 
Platonic character of Berkeley's early philosophical writings.) 
However dramatic the gap between "the two worlds" might appear in traditional 
Platonism, there is nevertheless at least one means of bridging it. Very schematically put, 
it consists in considering the immediately visible reality ("this world") as a mere system 
of signs, or symbols, by means of which God communicates with us, keeping a living 
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relationship with his creatures, and informing them about his nature. Even i f Plato 
himself did not use the topic as such, in the Middle Ages the Christian Platonists used to 
a large extent the topic in the form of the metaphor of the "book of nature" or "book of 
the world" (liber naturae or liber mundi). As A. E. Taylor has pointed out, according to 
such a Christian Platonic view, nature "is only half-real", at the same time suggesting the 
existence of a "further reality which lies beyond i tself . Nature is "a system of symbols", 
and our ascension to the ultimate reality takes place as a result of "learning to pass from 
the symbols to the non-sensuous realities symbolized" (Taylor 1963: 41-2) Saint 
Bonaventure, for example, says that "the creature of the world is like a book in which the 
creative Trinity is reflected, represented, and written" (Creatura mundi est quasi quidam 
liber, in quo relucet, repraesentatur et legitur Trinitas fabricatrix) (Breviloquium, I I , 
chap. 12). The physical world is, so to speak, "redeemed" in the Christian Platonism, 
being radically transformed into something meaningful to the greatest extent. 
It is precisely this ancient topic of the "book of the world" that is one of the 
notions most frequently resorted to by George Berkeley. In the shape of a "divine 
language", or o f an "optic language", Berkeley employs the topic in almost all his 
important philosophical writings, and considers it as properly expressing the essence of 
his philosophy. In his first philosophical writing, namely An Essay towards a New Theory 
of Vision (1709), he says that 
the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author 
of Nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order 
to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being 
of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of 
them. It is by their information that we are principally guided in all the 
transactions and concerns of life. (Berkeley 1948:1, 231) 
Then, in The Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley talks, in a manner reminding us 
of the medieval authors, of the true mission of the philosopher when he is to approach the 
natural world: 
it is the searching after, and endeavoring to understand those signs 
instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the 
natural philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal 
causes; which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of 
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men from that active principle, that supreme and wise spirit, in whom we 
live, move, and have our being. (Berkeley 1949: 69-70)'° 
For George Berkeley the world is thus a book ("an universal language") in a fundamental 
way, and not only as a rhetorical device. For him "the whole system of Nature is a system 
of signs, a visual divine language, speaking to our minds of God" (Copleston 1994: V, 
248). He clearly speaks of the existence of an author who has "written" or rather 
"spoken" the world ("the Author of Nature"), of the existence of an author/subject 
relationship between him and the world, as well as well of the existence of a "reader" 
whose ultimate aim should be to transcend the "sign", which is the immediately visible 
world (kosmos aisthe(os), to the "signified thing", which is the world of the divine 
archetypes (kosmos noetos). 
2.2. Platonism in Sir is 
2.2.1. Preliminary remarks 
Although, as we have seen, it would be possible to talk, in Berkeley's early philosophical 
works, of an entire network of Platonic notions, "traces" and mind sets, there is a sense in 
which their Platonism might still be seen as "veiled", or "hidden", behind the (non-
Platonic) terminology and ways of thinking presupposed by the "new philosophy". (This 
is why it has been difficult to reach some agreement, among Berkeley scholars, as to the 
Platonism of his early writings, some of these authors being utterly opposed to accepting 
such an idea.) It is in Berkeley's last published work, Siris (1744), that one encounters the 
specific topics, the whole scope, manner, and unmistakable "flavor" of the old Platonic 
style of philosophizing. In Siris Berkeley makes fully explicit and avows openly what in 
his early writings had sometimes only an implicit Platonic character. 
Since, on the one hand, the contents of Siris makes the object of another chapter 
in this thesis (Chapter Four) and, on the other, its Platonism is somehow speaking for 
itself, I have decided to focus the remainder of the present chapter on the literary form of 
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Siris rather than on its contents, in attempt to find out the particular rhetorical procedures 
through which Berkeley seeks to insert himself in the Platonic tradition. Therefore, the 
main question I wil l be trying to answer in the following is: is there any sense in which 
the literary form itself of this writing comes to betray certain Platonic suppositions or 
ways of thinking? 
In trying to answer this question I wi l l have to discuss a certain way of 
understanding the nature and role of philosophy, characterizing especially the Platonic 
tradition: namely, philosophy as a systematic attempt at recovering a 
primordial/immemorial wisdom, or, to put it otherwise, philosophy as palimpsest. The 
metaphor of the "palimpsest" seems to me particularly useful in this context since it 
suggests, with a certain degree of accuracy, the existence of a multileveled, multifaceted 
discourse, and the notion that, within a given philosophical text, it is always possible to 
come across fragments, or "layers", belonging to earlier authors or writings. This second 
section of the chapter wi l l have, in its turn, two parts: 1) In the first part (2.2.2.) I wil l 
very briefly explore those elements of the Platonic pointing to the existence, throughout 
it, o f a conception of philosophy as palimpsest. 2) Then, the second part (2.2.3.) wi l l be 
dedicated to showing how this topic works within a particular case, namely in Berkeley's 
Siris. 
2.2.2. In search for a primordial wisdom 
An however rapid look at Plato's dialogues reveals the perplexing fact that one of the 
most original and influential philosophers ever frequently prefers to disguise himself, 
resorting to various masks: he appears, more often than not, to play the modest role of the 
mouthpiece for others. Not only does he attribute his main teachings to Socrates, but he 
often employs mysterious characters to whom he attributes doctrines and myths that had 
been supposedly established a "very long time ago". He repeatedly appeals to figures of 
the past (be they real or legendary, Greek or otherwise) as preservers, or conveyers, of a 
perennial genuine wisdom, of an almost celestial origin, and compared to which his own 
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philosophy — or any other philosophy of his time — seem to be, as it were, a mere 
imitation. For example, Plato is fascinated with the — already in his time — ancient 
Egypt, and, in several of his dialogues, he makes numerous enthusiastic references to the 
Egyptian world, resting some of his philosophical claims on a supposedly Egyptian 
tradition of wisdom and inspired knowledge. In general, to our amazement — and, 
anyway, to some of his modern commentators' embarrassment — rather than simply 
following his own arguments and ways of thinking, Plato seems often very keen to mix 
ancient myths, sayings, and "exotic" stories with his own philosophical line of 
argumentation, and — more than that — he seems to highly value the employment of 
such procedures. 
It is worth noticing that this is not in Plato merely a rhetorical device, some 
technical subtlety employed for literary purposes only, but such a way of thinking 
essentially stems from his own way of considering the past, from his philosophy of 
history, as he revealed it in some of his dialogues. Namely, it is the view that history is a 
process of decay and corruption, that the "best things" occurred sometime "at the 
beginning", and that, with the passing of time, things are necessarily getting worse and 
worse, until another cosmic cycle starts anew. For example, in the Statesman, he makes 
the "Eleatic Stranger" speak of a "golden age" in which everything was marked by some 
form of original perfection. The Stranger kindly invites the young Socrates to follow him 
in his attempt "to explain the origin of our traditions concerning man's life in that 
paradise": 
A god was their shepherd and had charge of them and fed them even as 
men now have charge of the other creatures inferior to them - for men are 
closer to the divine than they. When God was shepherd there were no 
political constitutions and no taking of wives and begetting of children. 
For all men rose up anew into life out of the earth... they had fruits 
without stint from trees and bushes. ...For the most part they disported 
themselves in the open needing neither clothing nor couch, for the seasons 
were blended evenly so as to work them no hurt. (Plato 1961: 1037 [27 le-
272a, transl. J.B. Skemp]) 
Of course, what matters here, from the perspective of a history of philosophy seen as a 
palimpsest, is not so much the contents of the Platonic myth taken in itself, with all their 
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political implications, nor the specific narratives or anecdotes that the myth bring forth, 
but rather the elements of philosophy of history that Plato exhibited in the Statesman by 
the means of this myth. For, I believe, it is precisely in Plato's vision of history as one 
marked by a primordial fall and then characterised by a continual decay that the notion of 
philosophy as an attempt at recovering a primordial, "paradisiacal" knowledge originated. 
Very briefly, according to the myth narrated in the Statesman, humanity as we 
know it appeared as a result of some primordial disaster after which the state of the world 
changed decisively for the worse: 
Bereft of the guardian care of the daemon who had governed and reared us 
up, we had become weak and helpless ... Men lacked all tools and all 
crafts in the early years. The earth no longer supplied their food 
spontaneously and they did not yet know how to win it for themselves: in 
the absence of necessity they had never been made able to learn this. For 
all these reasons they were in direst straits. It was to meet this need that the 
gifts of the gods famous in ancient story were given, along with such 
teaching and instruction as was indispensable. Fire was the gift of 
Prometheus, the secrets of the crafts were made known by Hephaestus and 
his partner in craftsmanship, and seeds and plants were made known by 
other gods. (Ibid : 1039 [274b-d]) 
As a consequence of this view of history, the doctrines professed, as well as the ways of 
life recommended, by our remote ancestors were necessarily much better and more 
appropriate than ours, more genuine and completely fitted for the prosperity of human 
nature. As such, the best thing for us to do is to try and resuscitate the teachings of that 
golden past as much as we can. For there are reasons to believe that, as the Eleatic 
Stranger puts it, "the happiness of the men of that era" might have been "a thousandfold 
greater than ours." (Ibid: 1038 [272c]) 
Some centuries after Plato, in a perfectly Platonic manner, Plotinus claimed that 
he was only a commentator on Plato, doing nothing more than to explain and clarify 
Plato's philosophy to his own disciples. However strange this might appear to us today, 
Plotinus conceived of his mission simply as a teacher of the Platonic philosophy. In his 
Enneads the references to Plato are numerous and highly appreciative: "We can scarcely 
do better ...than follow Plato." (Plotinus 1956: 86); or "We have to fall back on the 
illustrious Plato, who uttered many noble sayings about the Soul..." (Ibid.: 357) As one 
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rightly remarked, "Plotinus would have been surprised at being thought of as the founder 
of a new school, Neoplatonism. He considered himself a Platonist, pure and simple, 
without prefix or qualification — in other words, as an interpreter and follower of Plato." 
(Paul Henry in Plotinus 1956: xxxvii) 
And this sophisticated form of philosophical modesty eventually became one of 
the distinctive features of all subsequent Platonic movements, in which not only the 
authorities cited by Plato or Plotinus were venerated, but also Plato and Plotinus 
themselves, as well as other supposedly kindred figures, whether historical or fictitious 
(Moses, Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, etc.). A l l of them were seen as forming a 
"golden chain", through which the true wisdom of the remote past could still be conveyed 
to those living in the immediate present. They saw their own role within this chain as 
being limited to simply conveying the received knowledge to their audiences, in an 
attempt to make sure that this privileged knowledge is in no way altered or corrupted, but 
faithfully transmitted to the next generation of scholars. In other words, knowledge was 
not so much produced as administrated, not discovered, but taught. 
Over the centuries, this notion of a "golden chain" become absolutely central to 
the Platonic tradition. It came to be regarded as so important that, for example, among the 
Renaissance Platonists there was a widespread opinion according to which 
Plato was the heir to a line of philosophers going back to earliest times. In 
this scheme of things, Plato was the conveyor of ancient wisdom deriving 
ultimately from Adam and shared by others in a line of ancient sages 
which also included Zoroaster, Orpheus and Hermes Trismegistus. Thus in 
the Renaissance, the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato rendered his 
philosophy at once more systematic as a coherent whole, and more 
eclectic, incorporating strands of thought not properly belonging to Plato. 
(Hutton, 1994: 70) 
Now, it is fair enough to say that one of the theoretical presuppositions behind this vision 
on the history of philosophy must have been the notion that the source of the true 
(philosophical) knowledge was to be found not in the limited faculties of the individuals 
(living necessarily in deeply corrupted epochs), nor in the empirical observations of (or 
experiments with) things in the world around, but only in the "old books", legends and 
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myths, privileged containers of all important revelations, as well as the visible 
embodiments of an immemorial tradition. 
This wi l l be the case with the modern representatives of the Platonic tradition, too. 
The Cambridge Platonists, for example, basically shared with almost all previous Platonic 
authors the view that there was some "golden chain" connecting them, in a subtle way, to 
the most ancient sages and doctrines. As Ernst Cassirer noticed, for 
Cudworth and More, as for Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, Plato formed 
but one link in that golden chain of divine revelation, which besides him 
includes Moses and Zoroaster, Socrates and Christ, Hermes Trismegistus 
and Plotinus. Plato is for them the living proof that the true Philosophy is 
never opposed to genuine Christianity. He is the ancestor and patron of 
that pia philosophia, which existed even before the Christian revelation, 
and which has proved its force and vitality throughout the centuries. 
(Cassirer 1953: 9) 
Ernst Cassirer is perfectly right to speak of a curious "intermingling of the holy and the 
profane, of the Christian and the heathen" in the case of the Cambridge Platonists (Ibid.: 
25) Indeed, the perfect compatibility, or the complete synthesis, of (pagan) Greek 
philosophy with the requirements of the Christian faith seemed to be, in their cases, 
something beyond any reasonable doubt. In light of their unifying principles, Christian 
and heathen authors, beyond any superficial disagreements that might seem to have 
existed between them, partook in the same tradition. Let us consider only an isolated 
example: namely, a fragment by John Smith, one of the most prominent figures among 
the Cambridge Platonists. What he talks here about does not matter so much, but the 
manner in which he deals with the subject is very significant for the purposes of the 
present discussion: 
When Zoroaster's Scholars asked him what they should doe to get winged 
Souls, such as might soar aloft in the bright beams of divine Truth, he bids 
them bathe themselves in the waters of Life: they asking what they were; 
he tells them the four Cardinal Vertues, which are the four rivers of 
Paradise. It is but a thin, aiery knowledge that is got by meer Speculation, 
which is usher'd in by Syllogisms and Demonstrations; but that which 
springs forth from true Goodness, is theioteron ti pases apodeixeos, as 
Origen speaks [ . . . ] We may, like those in Plato's deep pit with their faces 
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bended downwards, converse with Sounds and Shadows; but not with the 
Life and Substance of Truth... (Smith 1969: 130) 
As it clearly appears, John Smith finds absolutely no inconsistency in putting together 
such differing (and, for many authors, conflicting) sources within one and the same 
paragraph. For, to him, beyond any local differences that might have existed between the 
Persian, Greek, and Christian authors he quotes, there is a fundamental underlying unity 
making them contributors to the same tradition of the true wisdom, to the same 
philosophia perennis. The differences that might have existed between their principles, 
doctrines, backgrounds and purposes, are decisively overshadowed — in Smith's view, 
and in continuity with an entire tradition of Platonic thought — by their deeper 
similarities, by their having been active parts of the same primordial wisdom. 
2.2.3. Berkeley's c a s e 
A striking characteristic of Siris is its purposefully impersonal ecriture. There is, so to 
speak, an impressive amount of modesty involved in this writing as, within it, Berkeley 
seems just to appeal to ancient authorities and sources (mostly Platonic, alchemic and 
esoteric, but also modern), and report others' opinions on the subject he deals with, 
without trying very much — especially in the last (Platonic-speculative) part of the work 
— to give his own version of it. We can eventually learn his views not by simply reading 
his text, but by gradually realizing what is his attitude towards the authors and sources he 
quotes. There is a sharp contrast between this manner of writing (doing) philosophy and 
Berkeley's earlier style, as it is revealed in such works as The Principles of Human 
Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. Almost needless to say, 
this manner of writing philosophy opposes Berkeley to most of the other promoters of the 
"new philosophy" (Descartes, Locke, etc.). Based primarily on the supposition that, in 
virtue of its natural "lights", powers and abilities, the human mind can grasp, and then 
describe, the true nature of things, these representatives of the "new philosophy" did not 
feel in general that they had to appeal to ancient authorities in order to validate the truths 
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about the natural world they were talking about. Indeed, such appeals to venerated 
authorities (either sacred or profane) was then perceived as having been massively 
discredited by many Scholastic authors (whose excessive bookishness was actually one of 
the factors making possible the rise of the "new philosophy" itself). 
While in his early works Berkeley did — following the guiding lines of the new 
manner of philosophizing — try to expound his views only by appeal to the "natural 
light" of reason, and using, in weaving his discourse, basically the same rhetorical tools 
as those employed in shaping the "scientific discourse" of his day, almost without any 
references to past authorities, in Siris the repeated appeals to venerated authors and 
ancient sages who supposedly "grasped" the truth of things is, so to speak, Berkeley's 
main working method. His own contribution, as he seems to see it, consists only in a 
better understanding of how the "great tradition" works, how the ancient authors are 
connected to each other, and how they complement one another. In his last writing 
Berkeley conceived of his own role as an extremely modest one and he apparently gave 
up any "ambition" to discover and express the "nature of things" by himself, being 
content only with telling how the ancients, long before him, discovered and expressed the 
most important truths one can ever attain: 
I f we may believe Diogenes Laertius, the Pythagorean philosophers 
thought there was a certain pure heat or fire, which had somewhat divine 
in it, by the participation whereof men became allied to the gods. And 
according to the Platonists, heaven is not defined so much by its local 
situation as by its purity. The purest and most excellent fire, that is heaven, 
saith Ficinus. And again, the hidden fire that everyone exerts itself, he 
calls celestial. (Berkeley 1953: V, 103-4) 
He seeks, as it were, to make his writing play the role of a palimpsest, the fortunate 
occasion on which others' writings come to reveal themselves. Obviously, the underlying 
idea here is that there is — or must be — some fundamental truth "hidden" in these 
ancient writings, a truth of which modern authors have been unfortunately deprived, and 
which could to a certain extent be resuscitated by a proper re-assertion and cultivation of 
the classical scholarship: 
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It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the world was an animal [ . . . ] . I f 
we may trust the Hermaic writings, the Egyptians thought all things did 
partake of life. This opinion was also so general and current among the 
Greeks that Plutarch asserts all others held the world to be an animal, and 
governed by Providence, except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. 
[ . . . ] from all the various tones, actions, and passions of the universe, they 
supposed one symphony, one animal act and life to result. {Ibid.: V, 129) 
Against a clearly and repeatedly asserted Christian religious and intellectual background, 
Berkeley quotes and makes extensive use of opinions of an amazingly diverse nature and 
origin. And, I believe, this fact places him decisively in the long tradition of thinking I 
dealt with in the previous section (2.2.2.). For what is interesting at this point is that, 
following exactly the same discursive practices as the Platonic authors discussed above, 
Berkeley finds it perfectly justified to quote, within — say — one and the same sentence, 
figures belonging to the ancient Egypt, ancient Greece, the Hellenistic world, and so on, 
clearly implying in this way the existence of an essential agreement between these authors 
and the possibility of their being considered as forming one and the same "family of 
minds". For example, Berkeley writes: 
It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hermaic writings 
that all things are One. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, 
and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion of to hen, 
THE ONE, from Egypt. Though that subtle metaphysician Parmenides, in 
his doctrine of hen hestos, seems to have added something of his own. 
{Ibid.: V, 134) 
Each of the authors Berkeley quotes is, as it were, an important link within a "golden 
chain" of esoteric knowledge, a chain through which we could possibly get connected 
with the genuine wisdom of the past, and extract from it a perfectly valid science for 
coping with the present. Almost needless to say, any increase in knowledge — 
augmentatio scientiarwn — could under such circumstances occur not in terms of an 
enlargement of the amount of information we have about the surrounding world (along 
with a better systematization and clarification of it), but only in terms of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the philosophical past, of the Tradition, as it were, and 
through a better interpretation and clarification of it. Ideally, all the information we could 
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have of the natural world is filtered through the ancient doctrines, and — in this way — 
validated: 
Jamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in which the parts, 
however distant each from other, are nevertheless related and connected by 
one common nature. And he teacheth, what is also a received notion of the 
Pythagoreans and Platonics, that there is no chasm in nature, but a Chain 
or Scale of beings rising by gentle uninterrupted gradations from the 
lowest to the highest, each nature being informed and perfected by the 
participation of a higher.. {Ibid.: V, 128-9) 
As far as the authorship problem is concerned, it should be clear by now that an unspoken 
supposition laying behind this way of thinking (and writing) is that there must be some 
primordial anonymous text, one and the same, not conceived of by any human author, but 
in some mysterious way revealed to the humans at an immemorial time, and containing 
virtually all the ultimate truths at which human mind could ever possibly, at its best, 
arrive. This text (Text) is "out there", it has some mysterious, yet certain existence, and 
all what we can do about it is to sharpen our intellectual and critical faculties so that to be 
able to properly "extract" it, as it were, from the multitude of texts, legends, stories, 
myths, and other relics, we encounter in our dealings with the past. 
As a consequence, the crucial mission that the scholars, philosophers, and sages of 
this world have to accomplish is only to preserve, convey, and explain the contents of this 
primordial text to those of their fellow-humans less endowed to do so by themselves. 
2.2.4. Berkeley's Library 
Before concluding this chapter, let me just add that, by a fortunate chance, there is at the 
British Museum a catalogue of Berkeley's family library as it was put up for sale in 
1796". It is a forty-six pages document, listing over 1600 titles 1 2. It goes without saying 
that such a document is of greatest importance for anyone studying Berkeley's thought, its 
formation and sources. A careful and detailed study of this document, in connection with, 
say, a study of the disciplines and authors studied by Berkeley as a student at Trinity 
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College, Dublin, would massively contribute to the proper understanding of his 
philosophical formation and background. As far as the topic of the present discussion is 
concerned, it wi l l suffice here to say that this library contained, among other things, four 
different editions of Plato's opera (in Greek, Latin and French) 1 3, Plotinus' Opera 
Philosophica, Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae, some work by Philo Judaeus, 
two titles by Origen, two titles by Moses Maimonides, "Dionysii Opera", Sir Thomas 
Browne's Religio Medici, Boehme's Aurora and many others. The presence of all these 
works, and of other similar ones, in Berkeley's library might be seen as a visible trace that 
his deep immersion in the Platonic tradition left in the world. 
Notes: 
"The Neoplatonists stressed and developed certain aspects o f Plato's metaphysics and o f the resulting 
view of man. For them the important part o f man is his soul and any discussion o f the soul's abilities and 
aspirations must be seen in the context o f the universe as a whole." (Anne Sheppard, "Plato and the 
Neoplatonists" in Baldwin & Hutton [eds.] 1994: 6) 
2 Obviously, the relationship was more complex than it could appear at a first sight. Christianity borrowed 
certain ideas from Platonism, at the same time criticizing or rejecting others: "Certain Platonic doctrines 
were fairly uniformly rejected, notably the doctrine of the Pre-existence of Souls; gradually the Christian 
doctrine o f creatio ex nihilo came to distinguish Christian theology from developments in Platonism, 
notably in Neoplatonism [ . . . ] This piecemeal adaptation o f Platonism makes it, in fact, dif f icul t to put one's 
finger on unambiguously Platonic elements in Christianity." (Andrew Louth, "Platonism and the Middle 
English Mystics" in Baldwin & Hutton [eds] 1994: 53) 
3 For example, on the particular problem of the archetypes in Berkeley's philosophy there is already number 
o f studies by Peter S. Wenz (Wenz 1976), Charles J. McCracken (McCracken 1979), C.C.W. Taylor 
(Taylor 1985), Stephen H . Daniel (Daniel 2001), and others. 
A "As he grows older he gains confidence; he conceals less from prudential motives; he makes less and less 
use o f the current (and confusing) jargon of the philosophers; and he widens his horizon and finds his 
kinship more surely with the ancient philosophers." (Ardley 1968: 10) 
3 See Chapter Five in this dissertation for a detailed discussion o f this problem. 
6 He constantly claimed that his immaterialist view is, and should be considered, perfectly compatible with 
the basic principles o f the Christian Weltanschauung: "to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the 
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real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, exists in) the infinite mind 
of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware o f the direct and immediate proof there is o f this, 
inasmuch as the very being o f a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is." (Berkeley 
1949: I I , 235 [Three Dialogues...]) 
7 See, for example, the criticisms brought by Robert M c K i m to Wenz's ideas ( M c K i m 1982). 
8 More about the Platonic dualism wi l l be said in Chapter Seven (especially 7.2.3.). 
9 Dil lon speaks o f "...les precedes philosophiques pour 'deconstruction' clu monde materiel objectif que 
ces deux philosophes [Berkeley and Plotinus] partageaient egalment." (Dil lon 1997: 100) 
1 0 Some twenty years later, in Alciphron or The Minute Philosopher (1732) he re-affirms the importance o f 
the liber mundi topic: "God speaks to men by the intervention and use o f arbitrary, outward, sensible signs, 
having no resemblance or necessary connexion with the things they stand for and suggest; ...by innumerable 
combinations o f these signs, an endless variety o f things is discovered and made known to us; ...we are 
thereby instructed or informed in their different natures; ...and we are directed how to regulate our motions, 
and how to act with respect to things distant from us, as well in time and place." (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 149) 
1 1 The front page o f the auction catalogue reads: 
" A Catalogue of the Valuable Library of the late Right Rev. Dr. Berkeley, Lord Bishop of Cloyne. 
Together with the Libraries o f his Son and Grandson, the late Rev. George Berkeley, D. D., 
Prebendary o f Canterbury, and the late George Monk Berkeley, Esq. 
Including a good Collections o f Books in Divinity, Foreign and English Domestic History, 
Voyages, Travels, Classics, Belles Lettres, Miscellanies, Poetiy, and in almost in every Branch o f Polite 
Literature, in both modern and dead Languages. 
N .B . Several Editiones Principes in the fifteenth and sixteenth Centuries. 
Which will be Sold by Auction, 
by Leigh and Sotheby. Booksellers, At their House in York-Street, Covent-Garden, On Moday, 
June 6, 1796, and the Five following Days. 
Beginning each Day at Twelve o 'clock. 
To be viewed to the Time o f Sale." 
1 2 For a detailed discussion o f the fortunes and contents of this catalogue, see Aaron's article " A Catalogue 
of Berkeley's Library" (Aaron 1932). 
' J The library in question was a family library, containing also books purchased after Berkeley's death, by 
hiss son and grandson. But I think that Jessop's following remark is applicable not only to the books by 
Plato, but also to those by the Platonic authors: "The sale-catalogue o f Berkeley's family library (1796) lists 
four different editions o f the works o f Plato. I f we may judge from the directions o f interest o f Berkeley's 
son and grandson, the volume had probably not been their." (T. E. Jessop, "Editor's Introduction" in 
Berkeley 1949: I I , 156, n. 1 [Three Dialogues...]) 
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Chapter Three: 
George Berkeley and the liber mundi tradition 
As it has been showed in the previous chapter, one of the hallmarks of the Platonic 
tradition is a consideration of the whole visible world in symbolic terms: namely, as a 
coherent system of signs, as a sophisticatedly encrypted message that God is continuously 
sending to his creatures. Born somehow out of the chapter dealing with Berkeley's place 
in the Platonic tradition, the present chapter is a systematic attempt at considering George 
Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy in close connection to the topic of the Book of the 
World (liber mundi or liber naturae), with the twofold objective of pointing out, on the 
one hand, those of the medieval implications of the topic that Berkeley preserved in his 
philosophy, and, on the other hand, the "novelties", or at least some of the major changes, 
he brought forth in his use of the topic. 
The chapter is structured in two major sections: 1) the first part is a brief historical 
survey of the tradition of liber mundi as it developed within the Christian world from St. 
Paul to George Berkeley. Given the tremendous complexity, multifaceted and 
interdisciplinary character of this tradition, I wil l limit myself only to very few moments 
and features of it, a significant number of other implications of the liber mundi topic 
being only hinted at in footnotes or simply left aside. 2) The second section deals almost 
exclusively with the presence of the topic in Berkeley's philosophy in the shape of the 
"visual language". 
Let me also add at this stage that Berkeley never uses the phrase "Book of 
Nature" as such: he only talks of the "language of nature" or "natural language", just as 
he talks of the "optic" or "visual language", of nature as a Discourse of God, and so forth. 
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This is why, in this chapter, I take the topic of the Book of Nature in a rather broad sense, 
as an umbrella-topic including all these sub-topics. 
3.1. Liber mundi from St. Paul to modern times 
3.1.1. The theological grounding of the liber mundi 
Liber mundi is one of the most complex and fascinating cultural-philosophical topics of 
the medieval universe. It seems to belong to that sort of all-encompassing metaphors that 
eventually come, in some way or other, to "mirror" or "encrypt" in themselves the 
essentials of an entire culture. Almost needless to say, the topic predates significantly the 
Christian Middle Ages. To give only one example, out of many possible, the history of 
this topic could traced as far back as the Platonic usage of the ancient notion of stoicheia. 
Initially, the word stoicheia (singular: stoicheion) meant simply "letters" as part of the 
alphabet, but later, starting with Plato, it was used to designate also the four elements out 
of which the entire visible world was made: "Originally the name for the letters of the 
alphabet, stoicheia was a technical term from Classical physics and metaphysics, 
apparently beginning (...) with Plato's Theaetetus and then in (...) Timaeus, for fire, 
water, air and earth and the four elements." (Pelikan 1993: 104) This situation has 
triggered significant difficulties as far as the translation of Timaeus into modern 
languages is concerned. Benjamin Jowett, for example, was forced to resort to a 
compromise solution: "...we speak of fire and the rest of them, as though men knew their 
natures, and we maintain them to be the first principles [archai] and letters or elements 
[stoicheia] of the whole". (48b) (Plato 1961: 1175) 
Nevertheless, it was within the theological context generated by the emergence of 
Christianity that the topic of the liber mundi was given a new, much deeper significance, 
una vita nuova, as it were. There are at least two fragments in the New Testament where 
one can possibly find the theological Christian grounding of the liber mundi as it would 
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reveal itself throughout the Middle Ages: namely, in St. John (1: 1-14) and in St. Paul (1 
Cor 13: 12-13). What is interesting is that this "double grounding" would be well 
preserved and remain easily recognizable along all the subsequent developments of the 
topic. One of my working hypotheses in this chapter is that each of these two fragments 
implies a consideration of the liber mundi from a specific perspective. As the idea of 
"book of the world" necessarily requires at least two elements (a text to be read and a 
reader to do it), I propose to hypothetically take, on one hand, St. John's fragment as 
implying the liber mundi "text perspective" (which is to say, the cosmic text considered 
in itself, or in relationship with its divine author), and, on the other hand, St. Paul's 
fragment as implying liber mundi "reader's perspective" (which is to say, the cosmic text 
considered in its relationship with its "readers", with their intellectual/spiritual needs, and 
with their awareness that their encounter with the natural word around is actually a 
process of "reading" and "interpretation"). Let me also note that these perspectives are 
not opposite at all, but, on the contrary, they are fully complementary, and sometimes 
sophisticatedly interwoven. 
From a strictly theological point of view, we find in St. John's Gospel the most 
clearly stated Christian ground on which liber mundi is based: "In (the) beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with 
God. A l l things received being through him, and without him not one (thing) received 
being which has received being. (...) And the Word became flesh" (1 : 1-14). One comes 
across, in this short passage, a very fruitful semantic ambiguity at work, since the word 
"Word", as it is presented in John's Gospel, is in fact the translation of the Greek word 
logos meaning at once both "word" (verbum) and "reason" (ratio). As a result, from a 
Christian theological standpoint, it would be fair to say that the Incarnation made the 
world not only "readable" (since the Word "penetrated" and "inscribed" it), but — more 
than that — "ration-able", comprehensible (since God as ratio brought this world into 
being); indeed, not only do we have access to the world, but we have good chances to 
"grasp" it, to know it as it is in itself.1 In the long run, this fact would play a crucial role 
in the configuration and development of some of the patterns of rationality characterizing 
the European culture as one "obsessed" with knowledge of the world: the world is 
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considered "thinkable" since it essentially contains "reason" (logos), that is, a process of 
knowledge of the world is a process of "self-recognition" in which our reason (as a 
faculty of knowledge) is recognizing itself in the essence of world (as one that was 
brought into being by Supreme Reason). It is quite interesting, precisely from this point of 
view, to see how St. John's saying that " A l l things received being through him, and 
without him not one (thing) received being which has received being" (1 ,3) would be, 
many centuries later, rigorously reflected in that cryptic Hegelian statement: "What is 
rational is real and what is real is rational". In a way, what St. John's Gospel did was 
(echoing a certain Parmenidian idea: to on = to noeton) to offer one of the essential 
theological premises of the European culture, as far as the knowledge of the world is 
concerned. 
On the other hand, St. Paul's fragment offers a grounding of the liber mundi that 
is related to the set of soteriological, "existential", and even ethical consequences of the 
fact that the world is perceived as a divine message. The Pauline text (1 Cor 13: 12-3) in 
question reads as follows: "For we see now through a dim window obscurely, but then 
face to face; now I know partially, but then I shall know according as I also have been 
known." (Videmus enim nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; 
nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum.) As a matter of 
fact, the Latin version conveys much better than the English one the Pauline idea that, on 
our encounter with the world, this world is given to us in the shape of a system of 
symbols we have to decipher: we see the world per speculum, which is to say (as i f ) 
through a mirror, and have to go beyond the play of appearances. More than that, there is 
with certainty a significance hidden in these appearances, and throughout our lifetime we 
have incessantly to attempt at "extracting" this meaning from the riddle (aenigma) of the 
existence. Of course, we do not come across in the Pauline text such direct words as 
"letter", "book", "reading", and the like. Nevertheless, there is at least one important 
reason why St. Paul should be placed at the root of the Christian tradition of the liber 
mundi: as it has been often noticed, there is a hermeneutic "interchangeability" between 
the idea of mirror (speculum) and that o f book (liber), and this interchangeability operated 
to a large extent throughout the medieval culture. Both speculum and liber point to some 
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determined physical objects, endowed with a special capacity of comprehending virtually 
unlimited contents. To take only one example, the medieval poet Alan of Lille (1128?-
1202), whose place in the history of the liber mundi I wi l l be discussing in some detail 
later on in this chapter, simply takes for granted this interchangeability between liber and 
speculum, as i f these two terms were more or less synonymous: omnis mundi creatura / 
quasi liber, et /pictura / nobis est, et speculum. (Alan of Lille 1909: I , 288) Significantly, 
speculum came to be in the Latin Middle Ages a very common name for encyclopedias as 
"books of books". An encyclopedia was seen as "a mirror of . . ." 2 . It was a microcosm in 
itself, ambitiously compiled in the hope of reflecting, or "mirroring", the truths about the 
cosmos proper: "Encyclopedias... are also called mirrors because, as Vincent [of 
Beauvais] says, mirrors induce speculations and imitation..." (Mazzotta 1993: 4) 3 
As such, the whole world comes to be seen in St. Paul as a great, though 
sometimes confusing, system of signs and messages, of "riddles" and hidden meanings; 
no one of its parts is insignificant or accidental, but each of them is as it were a letter, a 
gramma, and the whole frame of things constitutes this most interesting "book", that we 
are actually faced with. The most important thing is to learn how to "read" it, to grasp its 
"grammar". And this "reading" is not a "cultural practice" among many others, but it 
plays — in St. Paul's view — the role of a supreme praeparatio: this "reading" of the 
world is an important stage of an "initiatory process" through which we are given a 
chance to attain the plenitude of our life (tunc). The "reader's perspective" on liber mundi 
mentioned above is massively implied by this Pauline passage; actually, this whole 
fragment is about the "reader" and their inner needs to be "saved", their spiritual 
"benefits" and "progresses", and their other intimate interests in reading the "book of the 
world". Most important, the Pauline text testifies to the need, on reader's side, to 
transcend the mere and imperfect act of reading (nunc cognosco ex parte) and to 
necessarily associate the "reading" of the "cosmic text" to a process of ascensio coeli as 
salvation, in order to reach a state of perfect ultimate ontological transparency (tunc 
cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum). 
It was precisely this "existential" component of the liber mundi ("reader's 
perspective") that would be further developed to a significant extent by St. Augustine. 
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Actually, St. Augustine was among the first Christian authors to write systematically 
about this topic, and — moreover — to place it within a system of theological-
philosophical speculations. St. Augustine's place in the history of liber mundi has been 
recognized as such and praised by those of the modern writers who have dealt with the 
topic. Umberto Eco, to give only one example, simply regards Augustine as the Christian 
author in whom all the medieval speculations on liber mundi originated: "The Middle 
Ages would borrow from Augustine the idea of a perfect language, that is not a language 
of words, but one of things, a language of a world which is — as later it would be called 
— quasi liber scriptus digito Dei." (Eco 1994: 11)4 
One of the passages in which Augustine employs the liber mundi topic is in his 
Confessions (Book 13, chap. XV, § 16-8). Here St. Augustine depicts the entire cosmos 
as an ample text being displayed in front of our eyes: 
You have extended like a skin the firmament of your Book, your 
harmonious discourses, over us by the ministry of mortals.... Let the 
angels, your supracelestial people, praise your name. They have no need to 
look upon this firmament, to know through reading your word. For they 
always see your face, and read there without the syllables of time your 
eternal w i l l . They read, they choose, they love. They are always reading... 
the changelessness of your counsel. 
Augustine emphasizes the fateful gap between the two levels of being ("the celestial" and 
"the earthly"), namely by implying the existence of a huge difference between "angels" 
and "mortals" as far as their approach to the cosmic book is concerned: angels do not 
need to read this book at all, as they have direct access to its source, this being actually 
the hallmark of their superiority, whereas humans find in this book their only source of 
meaning (apart from the Scripture). Paradoxically, St. Augustine's fragment, for all the 
restrictions it imposes, points at the same time to the only way of (as well as the supreme 
purpose for) reducing such a difference: for it is precisely within this ontological interval 
that human beings are able to genuinely discover themselves and their world by 
comparison to, and by meditation on, the celestial "archetypes", and by finding out the 
likeness relationship connecting the earthly and the celestial. As Jesse Gellrich has noted, 
this Augustinian fragment "illustrates the value of meditating on their similitude, and his 
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procedure corresponds perfectly with the broad exhortation of the fathers of the church 
who instructed mediaeval readers to clarify and explain the mysterious purpose of the 
divine Word within the revealed words, such as the Bible and the Book of nature." 
(Gellrich 1985: 29) 
Almost needless to say, the fact that Christianity is a "religion of the Book" 
contributed greatly to the emergence and then flourishing of the speculations on the liber 
mundi throughout the Middle Ages and later.5 It was the central role that the Bible 6 
played within Christianity that made this topic not only immediately comprehensible, but 
also appealing to a remarkably wide audience. As it were, the sheer reading of the Bible, 
as the Book, triggered in some way or other a representation of the world in the shape of a 
book: "In its simplest form, the idea of the Book begins in mediaeval readings of the 
Bible." (Gellrich 1985: 32) Within the medieval Weltanschauung, the Bible played the 
role of a universal divine "prototype" of all possible human knowledge, and it was 
perceived as the model par excellence of every kind of writing, be it religious or profane. 
The Bible fascinated and enchanted the medieval minds to such an extent that eventually 
it came to be seen as providing some a priori "interpretative pattern" by means of which 
the whole natural and social world was to be perceived, understood and explained. In 
other words, the sheer fact of the "centrality" of this sacred text marked in a deep and 
serious way almost all the medieval conceptions about the natural world and the place of 
the human beings within it, about the human society, the human knowledge and the shape 
it should take, about the "meaning of l ife" and the ultimate aim of the human's 
intellectual efforts. 
On the other hand — and in addition to the Christian prestige of the Bible itself 
(as a "revealed" or "divinely inspired" text) — the book was already, at the time when 
Christianity emerged, a "cultural product" generally received as the most important 
means for preserving, conveying and enhancing human knowledge. It was regarded as 
one of the most significant "human inventions", with tremendously beneficial effects on 
the state of affairs in the field of sciences and arts: within a conveniently limited space it 
was possible to store an enormous amount of information, and, which was more, that 
information could be conveyed to an audience belonging not only to other cultural spaces, 
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but also to other epochs. (The fabulous prestige that the Library of Alexandria enjoyed 
over the centuries would be a sufficient proof for that.) Finally, the book was an "object" 
governed by some strict constructing and functioning rules, and therefore an autonomous 
and self-sufficient entity, a precise "device" whose functionality and usefulness could be 
easily assured, controlled, and even enhanced. 
As such, by the time when Christianity made its debut, the book had come to have 
all the theological, historical, technical and symbolical premises to become a fully 
convenient and highly expressive metaphor to be successfully employed within the 
medieval cultural universe. This being said, a metaphor such as this one, especially within 
a cultural and religious context like the Judeo-Christian one, in which the idea of book 
had acquired so privileged a status, was to become one of the dominant topics employed, 
for several centuries, in the theological, philosophical, literary, scientific, devotional, and 
ethical discourses7. It was precisely the use of such a topic that made possible for the 
medieval man to see the surrounding natural word as a most meaningful thing. As Taylor 
remarked, in the medieval worldview: 
Nature, the realm revealed by our senses, is only half-real, but it suggests a 
further reality which lies beyond itself. It is a system of symbols, and we 
ascend to truth by learning to pass from the symbols to the non-sensuous 
realities symbolized. Christian thought was dominated by this view of 
nature from St. Augustine to St. Thomas, and it has never really outgrown 
it. (Taylor 1963: 41-2) 
Almost needless to say, within such a context, the study of nature belongs decisively to 
the field of the theological disciplines, and there must necessarily be a certain religious 
sense in any "scientific" approach to the natural word. Nature is not to be studied for its 
own sake, nor for our pragmatic interests, but only as a means of learning more about 
God. For, ultimately, there is only one reason enabling us to do research on nature: "The 
true reason for seeking information about Nature is that given by St. Paul, that the 
invisible things of God have been made known from the beginning by the things which 
are visible." {Ibid.: 45) 
On the other hand, between Nature and Scripture there is a privileged relationship. 
Not only is God directly involved in making both of these texts, by Creation and 
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Revelation respectively, but the Book of Nature might well serve as a prolegomenon 
toward any serious study of the teachings of Scripture. Given the extreme difficulty of 
properly grasping what the Scriptures say, spending some time with the "reading" of 
Nature, before starting to read the Scripture, is highly recommended by the medieval 
authors: 
Nature, rightly understood, becomes a key to the divine hieroglyphics of 
Scripture. This is the only reason why Nature has an interest for the mind. 
In its own right, Nature would not concern the intellect at all, for the 
proper and adequate object of the intellect is not the symbols but the God 
whom they partially disclose. (Ibid.: 44) 
3.1.2. Medieval philosophy and the topic of liber mundi 
In philosophy the notion of liber mundi or liber creaturarum had its promoters, too. A 
great number of important medieval philosophers may well be considered as belonging to 
this way of thinking inaugurated by St. Paul and St. Augustine: Jahannes Scottus 
Eriugena, Guilelmus of Auvergne, Raymundus Lullus, Saint Bonaventure, Raymond 
Sebond, and others. It is not the object of this chapter to study in detail how each of these 
thinkers made use of the topic of the Book of the World. Nevertheless, an however rapid 
look at some of their ideas would be sufficient to convey to us the sense in which liber 
mundi was indeed a serious source of inspiration for a good part of the medieval 
philosophy. 
St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) is one of the important medieval thinkers who 
systematically developed this topic, and threw a new light on it. According to 
Bonaventure, i f we look carefully at the world around (natura or creaturd), we w i l l soon 
be able to discover within it something important about the nature and the ways of 
manifestations of God Himself as Creator of this world. In his treatise Itinerarium mentis 
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in Deum, Bonaventure sees the knowledge of creatura as the first stage of an "ascending" 
epistemic process through which the human mind is approaching God. 8 And this first 
stage (called theologia symbolis) supposes the consideration of the sensible world as a 
system of signs {vestigia) revealing God. In a fragment faithfully echoing the Pauline 
language used in the text quoted earlier in this chapter, Bonaventure says: "We may 
behold God in the mirror of visible things, not only by considering creatures as vestiges 
of God, but also by seeing Him in them; for He is present in them by His essence, His 
power, and His presence." (Sed quoniam circa speculum sensibilium non solum contingit 
contemplari Deum per ipsa tanquam per vestigia, verwn etiam in ipsis, in quantum est in 
eis per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam.) (Bonaventure: 1998: 50-51) The things we 
come across in the world should not be taken in themselves, simply as "natural 
phenomena" with no significance beyond their sheer physical appearances, but they 
should be considered in what they signify since, as far as we are concerned, they play the 
role of "reminders" of our divine author: Haec autem omnia sunt vestigia, in quibus 
speculari possumus Deum nostrum. (Ibid.: 54) Bonaventure took over from St. Augustine 
the notion of Vestigia Trinitatis, and integrated it within his own system of thought. 
According to him, in nature we could see reflected the Trinity itself: " I f , therefore, all 
knowable things must generate a likeness of themselves, they manifestly proclaim that in 
them, as in mirrors, can be seen the eternal generation of the Word, the Image, and the 
Son, eternally emanating from God the Father." (Si ergo omnia cognoscibilia habent sui 
speciem generare, manifeste proclamant, quod in illis tanquam in speculis videri potest 
aeterna generatio Verbi, Imaginis et Filii a Deo Patre aeternaliter emanantis.) (Ibid.: 56-
7). 
Raymond Sebonde (d. 1436), to take another example, wrote a massive volume 
entitled Liber creaturarum, seu Naturae, seu Liber de Homine propter quern sunt 
creaturae aliae. In the "Prologue" to this work, Sebonde attempts at offering the basis of 
a "science of the book of creatures". This is a book that every Christian must know in 
order to be able to defend it and, i f necessary, even to die for its sake. He argues that it is 
only such a science that makes possible the unmistakable knowledge of the whole 
Catholic faith and the proof of its truth (et per istam scientiam tota fides catholica 
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infallibiliter cognoscitur et probatur esse vera). This science is a complete and self-
sufficient one, as it does not need any other complementary sciences or books. For the 
only two books which God gave us are the Book of Nature and the book of Scriptures: 
...duo sunt libri dati a Deo, scilicet liber Universitatis creaturarum seu liber naturae, et 
alius est liber sacrae scripturae. (Sebonde 1909: Prologue)9 
Finally, although Sir Thomas Browne (1605-1682) was a "modern man", 1 have 
chosen to discuss here his dealing with the topic of liber mundi since he offers an 
interesting synthetic view of this notion, and of how it was received in some circles 
toward the end of the Middle Ages and at the dawns of modernity. His Religio Medici 
contains an ample and sophisticated exposition of some of the theological, philosophical 
and scientific implications that the use of the liber mundi topic came to have for a 
seventeenth-century man: 
there are two Books from whence I collect my Divinity; besides that 
written one of God, another of His servant Nature, that universal and 
publick Manuscript, that lies expans'd unto the Eyes of all; those that 
never saw him in the one, have discover'd Him in the other. This was the 
Scripture and Theology of the Heathens: the natural motions of the Sun 
made them more admire Him than its supernatural station did the Children 
of Israel; the ordinary effects of Nature wrought more admiration in them 
than in the other all His Miracles. Surely the Heathens knew better how to 
joyn and read these mystical Letters than we Christians who cast a more 
careless Eye on these common Hieroglyphicks, and disdain to suck 
Divinity from the flowers of Nature. (Browne 1943 : 337) 
The interesting thing about a passage like this is that, apart from the usual (traditional) 
considerations on the relationship between "the two books", it reveals a new, then 
emerging "epistemic attitude" toward nature, and — more than that — it is implied that 
this attitude should be considered as a serious and equal alternative to the strictly 
theological knowledge. This new epistemic approach consisted in trying to know the 
essence of nature (the "Creature") in a more genuine way: namely, in the way in which 
the Ancients did, or at least in the way Browne thought the Ancients did. To me, this 
fragment seems extremely symptomatic as it succeeds, under the guise of a rhetorical tour 
de force, in putting "face to face", within the same page as it were, two radically different 
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attitudes to the natural world: the medieval one, sophisticatedly theological and highly 
symbolic, and the modern one, marked by a drive to "grasp" nature as it is in itself. 
Considering the whole medieval system of speculations and doctrines clustered 
around the idea of liber mundi, it is fair to say now that in this tradition of thinking the 
knowledge of the natural world, of God's Creatura, had — besides its specifically 
gnoseological, cognitive function — a certain soteriological dimension: what the 
medieval man sought in most cases in his encounter with the world was to gain a 
knowledge allowing him to "save" his soul, and to secure his immortality. Let me also 
say that, on the long run, this particular connection between knowledge and faith {id est, 
the fact that knowing the world was part of a religious experience), as a characteristic 
feature of the medieval worldview, might be regarded as a premise of the outstanding 
scientific developments in modern Europe. In other words, the intensely 
religious/soteriological character of the medieval starting point might have conferred a 
certain strength and depth on the secular "drive to knowledge" subsequently 
characterizing the European modernity. This is not to say, however, that this is the only 
root of the modern drive towards knowledge as a form of essential human experience. In 
fact, there were medieval thinkers (Roger Bacon, to take only one example) who 
advocated a certain "reading" of the world for its own sake, without necessarily looking 
for its Author within it, and no one can deny that such thinkers played an important role 
in announcing, and indirectly configuring, the modern Weltanschauung. A l l what I want 
to say here is that the intense soteriological attitudes that often accompanied the medieval 
"readings of the world" might have later turned into what is considered a modern 
(secular) "religion" of knowledge: "knowledge for its own sake", knowledge as a 
supreme, self-sufficient and total experience. 
In conclusion, liber mundi is a significant texture of the things themselves and the 
writing of an un-human author. "Learning to read the signs of that Book was a process 
not of 'inventing' or 'creating' sententia for the 'sentences' in the Bible or nature, but of 
coming to comprehend a writing" that was, as it were, objective (Gellrich 1985: 34). 
Since this writing is not a human product at all, but belongs to the things themselves and 
points to something beyond the things themselves, there arises the necessity of searching 
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for its proper "author", for the ultimate source of this writing. Such a compelling 
necessity was felt and dealt with by all those who have been concerned with the problems 
of writing and authorship. Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1976: 18), for instance, shows how 
the writing is transcending itself in search for its own "eternal" author. And what the 
medieval philosophy clustered around liber creaturarum did was precisely to address 
these issues in a wonderfully sophisticated and fruitful manner. 
3.1.3. Everything is a book 
As a "master metaphor", liber mundi is without a doubt present not only in mysticism, 
theology and philosophy, but it is manifest in other cultural forms of the medieval life, 
too. Given the "centrality" of the Bible in the medieval period referred to earlier on in this 
chapter, and the profound consequences this fact had on shaping and modeling the 
medieval life, in all of its forms, liber mundi ended up being received as a global 
metaphor, the highly condensed expression of the medieval civilization 1 0 . 
Poetry, for example, was a privileged space where the topic could be exploited at 
its maximum. Ernest Robert Curtius proved this impressively in his European Literature 
and the Latin Middle Ages (Curtius 1979), and so did Jesse Gellrich in The Idea of the 
Book in the Middle Ages (Gellrich 1985), to give only a couple of examples. Their 
contribution to the study of the history of this topic in the Middle Ages is difficult to 
overestimate, and the present research is very much indebted to what these authors (and 
others, besides them) did. 
Anyone studying the presence of the liber mundi in the medieval poetry cannot 
overlook Alan of Lille's contribution, as in it the topic of liber mundi undoubtedly 
reached its cultural maturity and one of the best literary expressions: 
omnis mundi creatura 
quasi liber, et pictura 
nobis est, et speculum. 
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Nostrae vi/ae, nostrae mortis, 
Noslrae status, nostrae sortis. 
Fidele signaculum. 
(Alanus de lnsulis 1909: I , 288) 
It is within a passage like this one that, thanks especially to the formal aspects of the 
poem (sonority, rhythm, alliteration, etc.), Alan of Lille succeeds in conveying to his 
readers the sense of existential ambiguity, subtle melancholy, and delicate uneasiness that 
seeing everything as a book, or as in a mirror, brings about. For, in spite of all the lofty 
metaphysics this topic presupposed, the poet felt that, ultimately, there was a sense in 
which to see something "as in a mirror" was to admit its ontological precariousness and 
uncertainty. As it were: maybe these things are something in the eyes of God, but hie et 
nunc they are nothing more than mere letters and reflections coming out from an empty 
and cold mirror. 
On the other hand, of course, Alan grasps here, in a most artful and elegant 
manner, almost all the fundamental metaphysical implications of the metaphor we have 
been dealing with in this chapter: 
Alan's most quoted verse reflects the sense that the whole of creation is a 
harmonious totality and a symbolic construction of things and words, a 
book and a mirror, whose alphabet can be deciphered, whose arcane signs 
can be distinguished and classified, and whose secret allegorical images 
can be revealed as a faithful representation (fidele signaculum) of our 
condition. (Mazzotta 1993: 17) 
Another important medieval writer who artfully employed this topic in his poetry was 
Dante Alighieri (1265-1321). In his book Dante's vision and the circle of knowledge, 
Giuseppe Mazzotta places Dante in the long tradition of using this metaphor within the 
Western literature and shows how Dante developed and enriched the topic (Mazzotta 
1993). In his doing so, Mazzotta refers to this marvelous fragment from Divina 
Commedia: 
Nel suo profondo vidi che s 'interna 
legato con amore in un volume 
cio che per I 'universo si squaderna: 
sustanze e accidenti e lor costume 
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quasi conflati insieme, per tal modo 
che cid ch 'io dico e un semplice lume 
{Par. X X X I I I , 85-90) 
I saw how it contains within its depths 
all things bound in a single book by love 
of which creation is the scattered leaves: 
how substance, accident, and their relation 
were fused in such a way that what I now 
describe is but a glimmer of that Light. 
(Dante 1984: 392-3 [Trans. Mark Musa]) 
Mazzotta finds Canto X X X I I I of Paradiso in the Divina Commedia highly indicative of 
both what liber mundi means philosophically and of the encyclopedic tendencies of the 
Middle Ages. As we saw earlier, the liber mundi topic was inextricably connected 
throughout the Middle Ages to a certain canonical form of organizing, administrating and 
transmitting the knowledge then available: encyclopedia. Just as the author of an 
encyclopedia aspired to "grasp" and "embody" in it the entire corpus of knowledge about 
the world available at a given moment, so those who employed the idea of liber mundi 
nourished similar aspirations: to use an ingenious device by means of which to 
encapsulate the entirety of the world, and "translate" it, i f possible, into one single 
ideogram. At the heart of both approaches lies one and the same "drive to completeness", 
one and the same dream of synthesizing everything into a conveniently limited device. 
And what Mazzotta finds in Dante is precisely this sense of universality and holism of 
knowledge: "At the end of the poem, the pilgrim's vision of the whole cosmos as a 
volume whose leaves are scattered through the layers of the material world (. . .) merely 
confirms both Dante's notion that creation is a book and his imaginative impulse of 
conflating and reconstructing into a unity the rich, unfolding variety of creation." (Ibid.: 
18) 
To conclude, it would be fair to say that, from a general point of view, the whole 
system of medieval speculations clustered around liber mundi reflected in fact some more 
profound religious and metaphysical suppositions on which the medieval culture was 
based. As it has been noticed, the medieval worldview did seriously imply the belief in an 
ordering and organizing principle as an earthly imitation or "shadow" of the heavenly 
order." And it is precisely "the belief in a revealed theological-symbolic universe [that] is 
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the premise making possible the representation of the totality and unity of knowledge". 
{Ibid. : 5) A l l these notions of "unity", "totality", "synthesis" of knowledge are constant 
and essential characteristics of the medieval learning. Hence a general scholarly tendency 
that made itself visible all along the Middle Ages in "the commonplace attempt to gather 
all strands of learning together into an enormous Text, an encyclopedia or summa, that 
would mirror the historical and transcendental orders just as the Book of God's Word (the 
Bible) was a speculum of the Book of his Work (nature)". (Gellrich 1985:18) As such, 
the idea of book most conveniently represented the insight into a central principle 
organizing and structuring the whole knowledge about the world; by paraphrasing 
Thomas of Celano's words, this book would eventually be a book in which the total is 
contained (liber in quo totwn continetur). 
There is a wonderful story told about Saint Francis de Assisi who, allegedly, 
collected and saved carefully every single piece of parchment he came across during his 
travels. To him, the "letters themselves were intrinsically sacred" {Ibid.: 35). For he 
supposedly justified his doing so with this saying: litterae sunt ex quibus componitur 
gloriosissimum domini Dei nomen ("letters are the things from which the most glorious 
name of God is composed") {Ibid.: 35). It is true, then, that — as one author excellently 
has put it — the "metaphor always has and always wil l tend to take on a life of its own 
and ask to be understood literally." (Singer 1989: 69) 
3.2. George Berkeley's "universal language of nature" 
3.2.1. In search for a tradition 
Interestingly enough, among the few major twentieth century thinkers to recognize the 
presence of the topic of Book of Nature in George Berkeley's thought were two French 
philosophers. First, in his influential L'Intuition philosophique (1911), Henri Bergson, in 
an attempt to explain Berkeley's philosophical system, came at a given moment to make 
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the following remark: "It seems to me that Berkeley considers matter as a thin 
transparent film situated between man and God ('comme une mince pellicule 
transparente situee entre l'homme et Dieu'). Matter remains transparent as long as the 
philosophers are not concerned with it, and thus God is immediately manifest." This is 
why, Bergson believes, the most appropriate way of understanding Berkeley's philosophy 
is to consider the material world as being "the language that God speaks to us" ('une 
langue que Dieu nous parle'). This would lead us, in Bergson's view, to properly 
grasping the essence of Berkeley's immaterialism. In contrast, he goes on, the 
"materialist" philosophies, by emphasizing each syllable, as it were, and stating it as an 
independent entity, "divert us from the meaning" and "prevent us from following the 
divine word". (Bergson 1959: 1356) About one decade later, in 1922, Etienne Gilson 
would talk about a relationship that might be established between Berkeley's philosophy 
and a certain way of thinking characterizing the Middle Ages. More precisely, Gilson saw 
a possible connection between Berkeley's notion of "optic language" and the philosophy 
of a medieval Irishman, namely Scotus Erigena: "We would not betray Scotus Erigena's 
thought in saying that for him [Scotus], just as for Berkeley, Nature is the language that 
its Author is speaking to us ('la nature est le langage que nous parle Son Auteur'). Let us 
dedicate this connection to Taine's memory: Berkeley and Erigena were both Irishmen." 
(Gilson 1944: 214) 
Whether or not Berkeley was indebted for his employment of the topic of liber 
mundi precisely to his being an (Anglo-)Irish, is quite difficult to know. What can be 
shown more easily instead is that he made an impressively extensive use of this topic, 
turning it into an argument central to his philosophical system. And this is in fact one of 
the most remarkable things about George Berkeley's case: it renders his philosophy not 
only original in its eighteenth century context, but also strikingly complex when 
considered in itself. 
Berkeley employed the notion of the world as a text starting with his first 
important philosophical work, namely An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, 
published in 1709. Here he basically proposes a theory according to which the things we 
see in the world around are in fact signs: 
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These signs are constant and universal, their connexion with tangible ideas 
has been learnt at our first entrance in the world; and ever since, almost 
every moment of our lives, it has been occurring to our thoughts, and 
fastening and striking deeper on our minds. (Berkeley 1948: 1, 229) 
These signs are what we immediately experience when we encounter the world outside 
us. Even if, for strategic reasons12, Berkeley did not, in this first writing, overtly deny the 
existence of matter as such, he nevertheless considered the external word completely 
mind-dependent, and accessible to us only in the shape of these signs. In light of the 
subsequent developments of Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy, we cannot experience 
anything else apart from such immaterial signs, our cognitive faculties being unable to 
grasp anything of the nature of matter. Berkeley undertakes a rigorous analysis of the 
notion o f its existence and is eventually compelled to conclude that matter does not exist 
as such since, in order for something to exist, we have to have some form of perception 
of it, which is not the case with matter. What we do perceive — properly speaking — is a 
succession of signs, a system of symbols, based on which, through habit and repetition, 
we can get a certain degree of understanding of the world around. In other words, we 
humans are fated to always live among symbols, and to end up turning our lives into a 
form of everyday hermeneutics. Still, one cannot help asking this question: what are the 
principles on which such a peculiar system of thought is based? 
A satisfactory answer to this question is possibly to be found in an essay Berkeley 
published several years later, in the shape of an explanatory and apologetic addendum to 
his earlier work on vision, and titled, quite significantly for the purpose of the present 
discussion: The Theory of Vision — or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence 
and Providence of a Deity — Vindicated and Explained (1733). 1 3 This addendum, by 
making much more explicit what was initially maybe insufficiently clear or somewhat 
ambiguously stated, is extremely useful for understanding the principles on which 
Berkeley based his theory of the "visual language". 
As the title clearly implies, Berkeley conceived of this "visual language" as being 
in immediate relationship with the "presence and providence" of God. This means that 
through this "language" God makes himself known to those who are able to understand 
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such a language, and — moreover — that nature does not have a high value as such, but 
only insofar as it signifies something about God. The nature of this type of metaphor is 
such that it necessarily places God at the heart of the whole system of things. As William 
J. Mills pertinently put it: "To view the earth as a book is necessarily to view it 
theocentrically." (Mills 1982: 238) Given this fact, given that — within such a system of 
thought — nature can never tell us anything about itself, God is, and must be, the only 
source of meaning, the ultimate source of explanation for everything we see happening 
around us. Actually, in Berkeley, seeing is a very important thing, as it is our chief 
cognitive faculty: "Vision is the Language of the Author of Nature, from thence deducing 
theorems and solutions of phenomena, and explaining the nature of visible things and the 
visive faculty." (Berkeley 1948: I , 264) Or, even more explicitly, as Berkeley was to put 
it later on: 
the phenomena of nature, which strike on the senses and are understood by 
the mind, form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, 
entertaining, and instructive Discourse; and to effect this, they are 
conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. The language or 
Discourse is studied with different attention, and interpreted with different 
degrees of skill. (Berkeley 1953: V, 121) 
This is exactly the fundamental supposition based on which all the medieval speculations 
around the topic of the liber naturae/mundi were developed, as it has been shown in some 
detail in the first section of this chapter. There is a sense in which Berkeley's notion of 
the "visual language" faithfully reflects Johannes Scotus Erigena's insight that "[t]here is 
nothing, in visible and corporeal things, that does not signify something incorporeal and 
invisible." (Apud Gilson 1955: 120) In his turn, Erigena based his approach on St. Paul's 
Epistles, on St. Augustine, on the doctrine of Jesus Chris's Incarnation, as well as on a 
markedly Platonic way of thinking. Then, Erigena's insights on the visible-invisible 
dialectics grew more and more popular over the centuries, with the long-term result that 
the notion eventually became widespread that the natural world was, to use the famous 
phase, "like a book written with God's own finger" (quasi liber scriptus digito Dei). A l l 
these things have already been discussed earlier on in this chapter. 
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3.2.2. The world as a divine language: how it works and for whom 
Returning now to Berkeley's works, we can see very clearly how, once he appropriated 
the traditional insight of the world as a divine text, he further developed his own notion 
of a "visual language" — that is, a language of things, not of words, some sort of reified 
discourse — by following in detail the rules, laws and principles based on which any 
human language (or, as he calls it, "artificial language") works 1 4 . For example, in the 
same addendum to his early writing on vision, Berkeley says: 
A great number of arbitrary signs, various and opposite, do constitute a 
language. I f such arbitrary connexion be instituted by men, it is an 
artificial language; i f by the Author of Nature, it is a natural language. 
Infinitely various are the modifications of light and sound, whence they are 
each capable of supplying an endless variety of signs, and, accordingly, 
have been each employed to form languages; the one by the arbitrary 
appointment of mankind, the other by that of God Himself. A connexion 
established by the Author of Nature, in the ordinary course of things, may 
surely be called natural; as that made by men wi l l be named artificial. 
(Berkeley 1948: I I , 265) 
Let us note, at this stage, the special emphasis Berkeley always places on the importance 
of God as Author of the world's discourse. Just as in the metaphysics underlying the 
medieval use of the liber mundi topic God is revealing himself through each individual 
letter of the world's book, so in Berkeley God has a crucial role to play within the cosmic 
scheme of things: God is by no means a remote entity, vaguely associated with the world, 
but he is immediately present in every element of the world's text as the only source of its 
meaning. Actually, God is speaking the "language of nature", and we are his attentive 
audience. God is the supreme guarantor of the grammar of the world as he instituted the 
rules according to which the signs are combined and connected with each other; thanks to 
his continual care and attentiveness, the meaningful cosmos is prevented from turning 
into a meaningless chaos. 
Indeed, in a certain sense, Berkeley's God is even more actively and immediately 
present than was the medieval God who "wrote" the liber mundi: Berkeley's God is 
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speaking through every single thing we see around, whereas in the medieval context of 
liber mundi we are, as it were, reminded of God as its author, the sensible things pointing 
to God as their Creator. This is one of the significant differences between Berkeley and 
those authors who saw God as the author of the Book of Nature: properly speaking, in 
Berkeley the "world is not, as it was for the mediaevals, the book of God, since written 
words have only an indirect connection with their creator. Rather, it is the speech of God, 
so many immediate expressions of, and testaments to, His presence with us." (Cooper 
1996: 264) Of course, both Berkeley's "visual language" and the medieval liber mundi 
belong essentially to the same tradition of thought, one according to which the world as 
we see it is just a system of signs, riddles and symbols, and it is only through them that 
we learn something about God himself, who is behind all these; nevertheless, there is, in 
Berkeley, a certain shift of emphasis, with the result that God is given an even more 
prominent role than in the medieval universe, he being seen now as more directly and 
immediately present in the world. It is only for reasons of simplicity that I am talking in 
this chapter about Berkeley's use of liber mundi: lingua mundi would have been a more 
appropriate term to use in Berkeley's case. 
On the other hand, just as in the case of the medieval philosopher, for Berkeley 
studying "this world" is essentially a theological enterprise, and should be accomplished 
with the carefulness and purity of mind that the practice of theology requires. As he says: 
it is the searching after, and endeavoring to understand those signs 
instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the 
natural philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal 
causes; which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of 
men from that active principle, that supreme and wise spirit, in whom we 
live, move, and have our being. (Berkeley 1949: I I , 69) 
The last (italicized) phrase is, in fact, a quotation from the Bible (Acts, 17: 2 8 ) ' \ and it is 
one of the Biblical sayings most frequently quoted by Berkeley throughout his works. As 
a matter of fact, the notion of God is absolutely central to the immaterialist scheme of 
things. Immaterialism is definitely a God-centered philosophy, a strictly theocentric 
system of thought, in which God is the beginning and the end of everything. In its turn, 
this central position that God occupies in Berkeley's thought determines the way in which 
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he sees the mission of philosophy itself as a discipline "in charge" of making sense of the 
world we live in: to him philosophy is not simply an intellectual discipline among many 
others, but above all philosophy is some form of "religious exercise" {askesis), and, as 
such, has a privileged status among the humanistic disciplines. The primary aim of 
philosophy consists, as Berkeley says in his Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous in providing us with "the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable 
expectation of immortality". (Berkeley 1949: I I , 168) In Berkeley's view, philosophy has 
a clear apologetic and soteriological function, and it should be first of all considered in 
terms of dissemination and making clearer the Christian doctrine, and of pointing to some 
"paths of salvation". He would happily agree with the Augustinian dictum: una vera 
philosophia — Christiana philosophia. And it is particularly this attitude of his towards 
what philosophy should be that, once more, points to a strong relationship between his 
own way of thinking and a certain medieval consideration of philosophy as somehow 
subordinate, as playing the role of "helper" of theology (ancilla theologiae). But more 
about that wi l l be said in Chapter Five of this dissertation, a chapter dedicated specifically 
to Berkeley's place in the history of Christian apologetics. 
As we just saw, Berkeley believes that the "endeavoring to understand those signs 
instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural 
philosopher". The philosopher is, as it were, a "professional reader" of the text of the 
world, one who has the superior ability and competence, along with the social 
recognition, to read and interpret the liber mundi for the others, which more often than 
not is not a very easy thing to do. Throughout his writings Berkeley gives ample and 
sophisticated explanations of the way the "discourse" of the world is constituted, what 
lies behind what we see in the first instance, how precisely the "reading" of the world 
should take place, and which are the best rules one has to follow when undertaking such 
an enterprise. In The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), for example, he says: 
the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but 
only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not 
the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that 
forewarns me of it. In like manner, the noise that 1 hear is not the effect of 
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this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. 
(Berkeley 1949: I I , 69) 
Then, a crucial passage occurs in which Berkeley openly proposes a "methodological 
shift" from an explanation based on "causal" relationships between two given entities to 
one based on a relationship of "signifying" between those entities. Berkeley would say, 
for instance, that fire is not the cause of the pain, but a sign of the pain. Moreover, he 
considers that such a shift cannot but have hugely beneficial effects on the progress of 
knowledge and mark out our better understanding of the world around: 
the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and 
regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into 
words. (. . .) Hence it is evident, that those things which under the notion of 
a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are 
altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very 
naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned them, 
when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. 
(Ibid.: I I , 69) 
In a similar manner, in Alciphron or The Minute Philosopher (1732), namely in the 
fourth dialogue, Berkeley talks of the arbitrary, "non-necessary" character of the 
relationship between what semiotics would consider signum ("sensible signs") and 
signatum ("the things they stand for"). Just as between the particular way in which, for 
instance, the word "tree" sounds, on the one hand, and the form of a real tree, on the 
other, there is no resemblance or necessary connection, so between a certain 
configuration of shapes, colours, and movements we see at a given moment and the real 
thing they "signify" there is no essential relationship, but simply an arbitrary one. 
Besides, within the same dialogue, some important hints are given as to what is the 
ultimate purpose of the reading of the world: 
God speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, outward, 
sensible signs, having no resemblance or necessary connexion with the 
things they stand for and suggest; ...by innumerable combinations of these 
signs, an endless variety of things is discovered and made known to us; 
...we are thereby instructed or informed in their different natures; ...we 
are taught and admonished what to shun, and what to pursue; and we are 
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directed how to regulate our motions, and how to act with respect to things 
distant from us, as well in time and place. (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 149) 
Our approach to the language of nature must first of all be a pragmatic one: we are users 
of the language called "world" because we have necessities, needs and practical interests 
in this world-language. The better and closer our "reading" of the world is, the happier 
and smoother our passing through the world wi l l be. As a comprehensive conclusion of 
this part of the dialogue, Berkeley says: 
Upon the whole, it seems the proper objects of sight are light and colours, 
with their several shades and degrees; all which, being infinitely 
diversified and combined, form a language wonderfully adapted to suggest 
and exhibit to us the distances, figures, situations, dimensions, and various 
qualities of tangible objects: not by similitude, nor yet by inference of 
necessary connexion, but by the arbitrary imposition of Providence, just as 
words suggest the things signified by them. (Ibid.: I I I , 154). 
In other words, just as in the language proper there are puns and other tricks, so in the 
language of nature there are such tricky signs as visual illusions. "These tricky signs 
show (.. .) that there is no necessary connection in either language between sign and thing 
signified." (Berman 1994: 139) 
3.2.3. "Le grand livre de la nature" and the world as a machine 
In his postulating God as an immediate "linguistic" presence, as one who is 
uninterruptedly speaking to us through the sensible things we see around, Berkeley was 
rather eccentric and somehow "outdated" for his own time. For, although the topic of the 
"great Book of Nature" — in virtue of its historical prestige and intrinsic suggestiveness, 
and thanks to the "guaranteed" rhetorical effects one would have obtained through its 
employment — continued to be used to a large extent throughout the eighteenth century 
(and later, of course), nevertheless sometime during the seventeenth century it happened 
that a new, more successful, metaphor began to be increasingly employed in the 
scientific, philosophical, literary and even political discourse: the world as a machine]6. 
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This move is in itself symptomatic for the new theoretical needs and interests of that 
epoch. For, as William Mills excellently put it, the choice of "one metaphor rather than 
another is highly indicative of the needs and aspirations of that society. The chosen 
metaphor is exploited for all its implications, around which a systematic world vision is 
elaborated." (Mills 1982: 238) The machine metaphors (body as a machine, earth as a 
machine, etc.) had been used long before, in a tradition that might be traced back to 
Girolamo Cardano, Leonardo da V i n c i 1 7 or even earlier, but in the seventeenth century, 
within the context of the "mechanical" ways of explanation enthusiastically proposed by 
the "new philosophy", it gained widespread popularity and unprecedented success. To the 
extent that, in sharp contrast with Berkeley's philosophizing on the "visual language", 
most of the promoters of the "new philosophy" (Locke, Descartes, Gessendi, etc.) became 
increasingly more fascinated with a vision of the world as a precise and wonderful 
machine. 
A consequence of such a vision is that all human knowledge should serve to 
finding the functioning rules and principles of this divine, most interesting machine that 
endlessly amazes and delights us. And one of the most consequential things about using 
the machine metaphor — especially when compared to the use of the book metaphor — is 
that, in its case, the emphasis is placed not so much on God as the maker of this 
machinery (he is increasingly seen as a "retired engineer", and his "omniscience and 
omnipotence are now to be demonstrated only by His total abstinence from intervention 
in the world" [Ibid.: 247]) as on discovering, describing and enjoying the machine itself. 
Actually, these modern minds were so fascinated with the "constitution", "movements", 
principles, "predictability", "inner parts" of this marvelous machine, that they failed 
sometimes to seriously question its "origin". 
Of course, people continued to use the topic of the Book of Nature, but they saw 
in it not so much the ultimate "model of the universe" as a rhetorical device. Let us take 
only one example: Rene Descartes' case. It is true, at the very beginning of his Discourse 
on Method we come immediately across the famous Cartesian confession: " I resolved to 
seek no other knowledge than that which I might find within myself, or perhaps in the 
great book of nature." (Descartes 1956: 6) Nevertheless, this metaphor plays for him the 
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role of a rather rhetorical device. Given the precise autobiographical context within 
which he places this confession, it is reasonable to suppose that what he implied by this 
statement was the fact that he preferred the empirical study of nature to the bookishness 
and book-worshipping characterizing, in his view, the Scholastic ways of thinking. That 
his mind was in a serious way attached to the idea of "the world as a machine" is proved 
by the repeated appeals to the mechanistic metaphor in, for example, Principia 
Philosophiae. Here he says: "1 have described the Earth and the whole visible universe in 
the manner of a machine..." (Book 4, § 188) or: "The only difference I can see between 
machines and natural objects is that the workings of machines are mostly carried out by 
apparatus large enough to be readily perceptible by the senses (as is required to make 
their manufacture humanly possible), whereas natural processes almost always depend on 
parts so small that they utterly elude our senses." (Book 4, § 203) (Descartes 1954: 229-
236). And many other similar passages can be found throughout the Cartesian works. 
Let me also say that, in choosing to use the metaphor of the world as a discourse 
rather than the machine metaphor, Berkeley was fully aware of the differing metaphysical 
implications that the use of each of the two metaphors could have. By passionately 
advocating the world as a text, he endeavored to warn against, and rule out, the deistic 
implications that, thought he, the alternative choice might have brought about: 
Some philosophers, being convinced of the wisdom and power o f the 
Creator, from the make and contrivance of organized bodies and orderly 
system of the world, did nevertheless imagine that he left this system with 
all its parts and contents well adjusted and put in motion, as an artist 
leaves a clock, to go thenceforward of itself for a certain period. But this 
Visual Language proves, not a Creator merely, but a provident Governor, 
actually and intimately present, and attentive to all our interests and 
motions, who.... designs throughout the whole course of our lives, 
informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and 
sensible manner. (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 160 [Crito speaks]) 
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3.2.4. Berkeley's "pragmatism" 
Finally, letting aside the distinction book-speech I mentioned above, there is a sense in 
which Berkeley's metaphor of the "universal language of nature" brings something 
definitely new in the history of the liber naturae topic. This novelty is about the ultimate 
"purpose" of reading and understanding the cosmic discourse. More precisely, Berkeley 
talks about "an universal language of the Author of Nature" whereby 
we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things 
that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also 
to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their 
information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and 
concerns of life. And the manner wherein they signify and mark unto us 
the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages and 
signs of human appointment, which do not suggest the things signified by 
any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an habitual connexion that 
experience has made us to observe between them. (Berkeley 1948: I , 231) 
The underlying supposition behind such a passage is the idea that our interests in 
understanding the "universal language of the Author of nature" are — above all — 
practical interests, derived from necessities of our everyday life. The most immediate 
thing one can attain by grasping the meaning of the "language of nature" is, in Berkeley's 
view, the "preservation and well-being" of one's body, and avoiding "whatever may be 
hurtful and destructive" to it. As it were, some "letters" or "words" or "sentences" of this 
visible language may cause injuries and troubles to its users, and have therefore to be 
carefully avoided. 
This is undoubtedly a significant change in the use of this metaphor within the 
European tradition. In a traditional Christian context, the Book of Nature had been 
always regarded as some prolegomenon towards a better understanding of what the Bible 
said: it helped people realize what God's message was about as far as the natural world 
was concerned. Accordingly, considering the liber naturae in itself would have been for a 
medieval man the most incomprehensible thing to do. The two books (Nature and 
Scripture) were always considered together, and they were referred to as such. For 
instance, as Ernest Robert Curtius notices, "[f]or the preacher the book of nature must 
figure with the Bible as a source of material." (Curtius 1979: 320) Reading the "revealed 
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book" (the Bible) and reading the Book of Nature were performed with the understanding 
that these were complementary practices, and not at all alternative. "Those who knew 
how to read this book [of nature] were able to understand the allegories hidden in the 
scriptures, where, beneath references to simple earthly things (plants, stones, animals), 
symbolic meanings lay." (Eco, 1995: 15) There is an intimate connection between Nature 
and Scripture, as both are texts in whose making God is immediately involved. 
Therefore, reading the Book of Nature had a very clear soteriological dimension: it was 
not for the sake of "this world" that one had to endeavor to understand the cosmic 
discourse, but for the sake of his soul's fate once arrived in "the world after". A proper 
Christian life means to know how to grasp in the book of the world the truths revealed by 
the sacred doctrines. For instance, in his famous Imitatio Christi Thomas a Kempis says: 
" I f thine heart were right, then every creature should be to thee a mirror of life and a book 
of holy doctrine." {si rectum cor tuum esset, tunc omnis creatura speculum vitae et liber 
sacrae doctrinae esset). (Thomas a Kempis 1943: 175) Nature as such, along with our 
practical dealings and concerns with it, does not deserve any theoretical interest on our 
side; it is only the superior necessity of "getting rid" of this world that makes us have a 
temporary involvement in its affairs. 
On the contrary, Berkeley's attitude towards his "language of nature" is a 
remarkably pragmatic attitude. Although Berkeley was a genuinely religious person, and 
an ardent apologist of the Christian faith, when he approached the natural world he did 
not look in it for "paths to salvation", but he simply tried to accommodate to its 
conditions, rules and requirements. In other words, his approach to the "external world" is 
one in terms of utility, efficiency and well-being, and his religiosity is of a different kind 
from that of the medieval believer. It is true, ontologically speaking, nature is still a text, 
a sophisticated system of signs, just as in the medieval tradition, but the real reason why 
one has to read this book differs significantly from the reason a medieval man felt he had 
to do it. 
This is not to say that the pragmatic attitude is the only one we might have to the 
surrounding world. Berkeley's world essentially displays a "great beauty", orderliness, 
and harmony. This is precisely because this world is God's epiphany. Moreover, in 
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Alciphron, when talking about the tremendous benefits that the acceptance of the idea of 
God might have upon our understanding of the world, Crito shows that only in a world 
created by God there is place for beauty and orderliness: 
In a system of spirits, subordinate to the wi l l , and the direction of the 
Father of spirits, governing them by laws and conducting them by methods 
suitable to wise and good ends, there wi l l be great beauty. But in an 
incoherent fortuitous system, governed by chance, or in a blind system, 
governed by fate, or in a system where Providence doth not preside, how 
can beauty be, which cannot be without order, which cannot be without 
design? (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 129-30 [Crito speaks}) 
This being said, Berkeley's "pragmatism" should be seen not as an apology for our 
"using" of the world, but — on the contrary — as a wise means through which we can 
integrate ourselves, as smoothly as possible, in this beautiful world: "l iving reasonably 
while we are here upon earth, proportioning our esteem to the value of things, and so 
using this world as not to abuse it ." {Ibid. : I l l , 178 [Crito speaks]) 
3.2.5. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, it should be clear enough by now that for George Berkeley the world is a 
text or, more precisely, a discourse ("an universal language") in an explicit and 
fundamental way. When Frederick Copleston comes to deal with Berkeley's philosophy, 
in his monumental A History of Philosophy, he overtly recognizes that, for the Irish 
Bishop, "the whole system of Nature is a system of signs, a visual divine language, 
speaking to our minds of God" (Copleston 1994: V, 248). In contrast to other promoters 
of the "new philosophy", for whom the topic of le grand livre de la nature plays 
primarily rhetorical roles, for Berkeley "the language of nature" actually means that God 
speaks to us by the means of the world, or, in his own words, "the great Mover and 
Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of men ... In consequence, ... 
you have as much reason to think the Universal Agent or God speak to your eyes, as you 
can have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears." (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 
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157) Thus, in Berkeley, as a result of our appropriate and unprejudiced dealings with the 
world around, we must get the "feeling", or the insight, that our life is ultimately an 
uninterrupted conversation with God: "In fact our understanding of what is the case 
amounts, for Berkeley, to knowing what God wishes us to do: correct description of the 
natural world is to engage in conversation with God who guides us." (Clark 1998: 24) 
Of course, some of the medieval implications of the topic are not manifest in 
Berkeley's thought anymore, but the main metaphysical suppositions on which the use of 
the topic of the liber naturae was based are clearly asserted in his philosophy. For 
Berkeley's explicit manner of postulating liber naturae implies: a) the perception of God 
as a divine author who has "spoken" the world; b) the perception of "this world" as a 
discourse, or text, or language — a meaningful whole and a coherent system of signs; c) 
the existence of a precise author/subject relationship between God and the world; and d) 
the existence o f a "reader" who consciously and constantly endeavors to transcend the 
"sign" {signum) to the "signified thing" (signatum). 
It is worth noticing, I think, that there is a certain sense in which, given his denial 
of the existence of matter, Berkeley is much more radical than any other author, medieval 
or modern, who had written on this topic before him. This radicalism comes from the 
fact that it belongs to the nature of any book, language or discourse — the discourse of 
nature included — to resort to some material support, however lesser or insignificant, in 
order to make itself visible/readable: paper, ink, etc. Of course, i f confronted with such a 
criticism, Berkeley would, based on the principles of his immaterialism, probably show 
that there is nothing inconsistent in supposing a text without a material support: a piece 
of paper, for example, is not matter as such, but only an idea, and that, similarly, in order 
for the world to be a discourse it does not need to be a material world. Nevertheless, in 
order for a sign to signify it has to make use of something that is not sign itself: which is 
problematic when, as in Berkeley's philosophy, everything is sign. It is true that, by 
saying that this world is God's speech, Berkeley reduces to a minimum the need for a 
material support of the sign: a spoken word, or a speech, needs comparatively less 
material than a book does. Nevertheless, even God's speech, in order to make itself 
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heard, needs — like in the case of any other sound — the physical vibration of 
"something". 
This is another consequence of Berkeley's uncompromising immaterialism and 
should be considered, I think, in immediate connection to what might be metaphorically 
called the angelism underlying his whole system: just as in the world of angels there is 
absolutely no need for material entities, bodies, corporal substances and the like, and 
nevertheless such a world works and remains coherent in its own way, so in Berkeley's 
world there is no need for matter and material substances, for bodies and corporeal 
things. For instance, angels can, according to the traditional Christian view, perfectly 
communicate with each other, and uninterruptedly praise God without their having to be 
involved in the world of matter at all. They sing, and speak, and, in so doing, they use a 
language, but the language they use does not suppose any material support at all. In a 
fashion somehow similar to that of the angelic world, Berkeley's "visual language" 
seems to make sense, in its own way, in the absence of the realm of matter. 
Finally, a few words about the necessity of placing Berkeley in the tradition of the 
Book of Nature. There have been numerous studies published over the last decades 
dealing with Berkeley's "optic language". Nevertheless, the general tendency in the 
contemporary Berkeley scholarship, as far as this topic is concerned, is to isolate 
completely Berkeley's dealing with the "optic language" from the long tradition of the 
Book of Nature. The "optic language" is most often considered in itself, as "Berkeley's 
argument for a divine visual language", being discussed almost exclusively in terms of 
formal consistency, logical coherence, etc., ignoring the long and complex tradition of 
thought behind Berkeley's approach. To take only one example, a recent article titled "Is 
Berkeley's World a Divine Language?", by James P. Danaher, and published in Modern 
Theology (18: 3, 2002), deals precisely with Berkeley's "visual language", but without 
making any reference, however vague or allusive, to the theological tradition o f the Book 
of Nature, a tradition that certainly inspired and nourished Berkeley's notion of the world 
as a "discourse" of God. Berkeley's "visual language" is considered either in itself, as an 
argument for his immaterialism, or in connection to Locke's "semantic atomism", 
Saussure's "structuralism", Aristotle's doctrine of the "active intellect", and even a 
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reference is made to Winston Churchill's speeches during World War 11 (Danaher 2002). 
Nevertheless, there is no mention at all of the medieval tradition of the liber mundi. 
Anyway, to write a paper with such a title, and, moreover, to publish it within an 
important theological journal, and, nevertheless, to succeed in systematically avoiding 
any mention of any of the tremendously important theological implications of the notion 
of "divine language" must be, in itself, a remarkable enterprise. 
Notes: 
' Let us note in passing that this theological grounding o f liber mundi, as it is revealed in this context, is 
similar to the theological justification of the representation of divine figures {icons): theologically speaking, 
the icon is not simply a "painting", but it can "grasp" God's image because, by Incarnation, God has decided 
to make Himself visible to earthy eyes. The icon is not made only by wood and paints, but it also contains a 
"hidden" part: God's image as a spiritual unseen reality. Thus the icon has a double nature, just as Christ has 
a dual nature. Just as, to return to my topic, the "book o f the world" itself has: signans and signatum. 
2 Let us also quote, to illustrate, some titles o f medieval encyclopedic books: Speculum qaadruplex 
(Vincent o f Beauvais), Speculum humanae salvationis (Hugues o f Saint-Cher), Speculum humanae 
conditionis, and so forth. 
3 For a recent discussion of the relationship between book and mirror in the Middle Ages and beyond see, 
for example, Peter Harrison's study "The 'Book o f Nature' Metaphor and Early Modern Science" (Harrison 
2003). 
4 It is interesting to see how this metaphor o f the "invisible hand" changed its meaning along the centuries, 
to the extent that, for example, in Adam Smith's economic theory, it would mean nothing divine or 
theological at all, but simply the laws o f free market. 
5 Naturally, the topic is also present within the other "religions o f the Book". For instance, as regards the 
Muslim civilization, Mohhyddin ibn-Arabi considers that "this Universe is an immense book" (Chevalier 
and Gheerbrandt 1969: entry "Book"). But an inquiry, however sketchy, into how the topic appears, not 
only in Christianity, but also in the other "religions o f the Book" would have gone much beyond the scope 
and purpose o f the present chapter. 
6 "The old traditional religions o f the Greeks and the Romans were not embodied in sacred books. Judaism 
and Christianity and, later, Mohammedanism were religions o f the book. The name, Bible, may come from 
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biblion, papyrus rolls, or from Byblus, a town in Syria famous as a papyrus market; as we have it, the Bible 
was written down between 1000 B.C. and A.D. 150." (Artz 1980: 39-40) 
7 See, for this discussion, Chapter 16 ("The Book as Symbol") o f Curtius' book (Curtius 1979: 302-347) 
8 This process is, o f course, much more complex than presented here, the "reading" o f liber crealurarum 
being only a first stage. As a matter o f fact, in Gilson's summarization, "this elevation is marked by three 
main stages. The first one consists in finding again God's traces within sensible world; the second one 
consists in searching for God's image in our souls; and the third one consists in transcending all created 
things and finding the mystical delights o f the knowledge and adoration o f God ." (Gilson 1986: Chap. V I I I , 
§ 2 ) 
9 For a discussion o f Sebonde's doctrine see Gilson's book (Gilson 1944: 465-7) 
1 0 Jesse Gellrich's book, referred to already many times in this chapter and to which I am particularly 
indebted, is specifically concerned with the idea o f book in relation to the many "cultural forms" (language 
theory, mythology, fiction, manuscript painting, sacred architecture, music, etc.) o f the Middle Ages 
(Gellrich 1985). 
1 1 It is not diff icul t to see that a certain "Platonic" dimension is present in this principle o f imitation. Some 
authors, for example, see the climactic point o f this tendency in the thirteenth century: "The perception o f 
the earthly society as an ordered structure reflecting the greater harmonies o f the universe was ... a basic 
pillar supporting the thirteenth-century world view." (Barber 1993: 475) 
1 2 See David Berman's discussion of this problem (Berman 1994: 22-28). 
1 3 Published in answer to a newspaper criticism against An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. Adam 
Smith described this short work as "one o f the finest examples o f philosophical analysis that is to be found, 
either in our own, or in any other language". (Apud Berman 1994: 136). 
1 4 For a detailed discussion o f the "natural language" in the Seventeenth Century, and o f the entire literary, 
philosophical, linguistic context, see, for example, Margreta de Grazia's and Thomas C. Singer's articles 
(Grazia 1980 & Singer 1989) 
1 3 " . . . fo r in him we live and move and exist". (Acts, 17: 28) The idea is also present in Cleanthes. 
1 6 See, for the use o f these two metaphors in the Middle Ages and in the modern period, Mi l l s ' excellent 
article (Mil l s 1982) 
1 7 For Leonardo da Vinci's mechanics, as well as for the specific relationship between his conceptions and 
Descartes's mechanical conceptions, see, for instance, the fascinating book that Paul Valery wrote about Da 
Vinci (Valery 1957). 
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Chapter Four: 
George Berkeley and the alchemic tradition 
In the second part of Chapter Two George Berkeley's last published work Siris have been 
dealt with from the point of view of the literary procedures and rhetorical techniques by 
means of which this writing was produced. In other words, Siris has been considered in 
that chapter from a formal angle, without paying too much attention to what this writing 
is about. It is the present chapter that deals with Siris's contents. The central idea around 
which the chapter is clustered is that, in this writing, Berkeley comes to employ and make 
extensive use of one of the most ancient "spiritual techniques" and speculative ways of 
thinking: that is, alchemy. Hence the fact that Berkeley's arguments and notions in Siris 
wil l be discussed by constant reference to alchemic topics, writings and authors. It is the 
objective o f the present chapter to show that, apart from its being under the strong 
influence of the Platonic tradition — though in close connection with it — Berkeley's 
thought, as it reveals itself in Siris, seems to have been marked by some intellectual 
inclinations, spiritual concerns, and mind-sets characterizing the alchemic tradition. 
The chapter has three parts: 1) the first part is dedicated to the problem of the 
search for Elixir Vitae in alchemy and in Berkeley's Siris; a special prominence wi l l be 
given in this part to the way in which the "philosophers' stone" (lapis philosophorum) 
played in the alchemic tradition a double role: panacea and symbol of salvation; 2) the 
second part deals with the theory of "The Great Chain of Being" as it manifests itself in 
both the alchemic tradition and in Siris; and 3) the third part contains some general 
remarks on the spirit of alchemy and on George Berkeley's late philosophical position, in 
an attempt at making more sense of Siris, one of Berkeley's most neglected writings. 
83 
4.1. The search for the Elixir Vitae 
4.1.1. Siris: a peculiar philosophical writing 
Siris (1744) is quite controversial among Berkeley's works. In Berkeley's lifetime it was 
one of his very few "best-sellers". Nevertheless, despite its being "the most immediately 
influential of all Berkeley's books, with five editions in Dublin and London within the 
year", Siris is "most frequently ignored by modern Berkeley scholars." (Walmsley 1990: 
142) On publication, for all its immediate success, it intrigued the sober-minded scholarly 
circles of Berkeley's day, making many of his learned contemporaries laugh at him' ; then, 
with the passing of time, when not simply ignored, it was particularly this writing that has 
embarrassed many adepts of Berkeley's philosophy, and caused some hot disputes among 
his commentators2. Siris is indeed a peculiar piece of writing: it is a fascinating and 
puzzling book, a writing within which medical knowledge is curiously mixed with 
metaphysical speculations, and the so-called "natural philosophy" is dealt with in close, 
and very often surprising, connection with some ancient esoteric doctrines. As Horace 
Walpole quipped: "The book contains every subject from tar-water to the Trinity." (Qtd. 
in Walmsley 1990: 144) 
Why did Berkeley write such an odd book? What was his intentions when writing 
this piece? Very briefly, in this writing Berkeley intends, in his own words, 
to communicate to the public the salutary virtues of tar-water; to which I 
thought myself indispensably obliged by the duty every man owes to 
mankind. And, as effects are linked with their causes, my thoughts on this 
low but useful theme led me to farther enquiries, and those on to others, 
remote perhaps and speculative, but, I hope, not altogether useless or 
unentertaining. (Berkeley 1953: V, 31) 
These curative virtues are countless and impressive. Berkeley offers a detailed list with 
numerous individual cases he knew of in which this medicine has been successful, as well 
as the numberless illnesses to be cured using the wonder medicine. It proved to work well 
against all sorts of illnesses: not only against various temporary affections, but also 
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against chronic, more serious diseases; it had beneficial effects not only for the health of 
the body, but also for the well-being of the mind. As a matter of fact, in a private letter, 
George Berkeley even comes to recognize that tar-water is for him a panacea: 
I freely own that I suspect tar-water is a panacea. I may be mistaken, but it 
is worth trial: for the chance of so great and general a benefit, I am will ing 
to stand the ridicule of proposing it. [ . . . ] And i f God hath given us so great 
a blessing, and made a medicine so cheap and plenty as tar to be withal so 
universal in its effects, to ease the miseries of human life, shall men be 
ridiculed or bantered out of its use, especially when they run no risk in the 
trial? (Ibid.: 175) 
Very much like in the case of his "Bermuda project", some two decades earlier (a case I 
wi l l discuss in detail in Chapter Six), Berkeley was ready again to "stand the ridicule" of 
proposing what he, in spite of the majority's opinion, believed to have tremendously 
beneficial effects on his neighbours' lives. When such a major thing as easing the 
"miseries of human l i fe" is at stake, the ridicule one might have to suffer as a result is 
very low price to pay. For someone whose "sole end of all his projects, and the business 
of his l i fe" was the "charity to men's souls and bodies" (Berkeley's wife qtd. in Luce 
1949: 182) "standing the ridicule" of proposing a panacea must have meant very little. On 
the other hand, apart from his touching willingness to stand the ridicule, what makes his 
present enterprise even more peculiar is the fact that it is not a very common thing among 
modern philosophers, not even among the most eccentric of them, to deal with such a 
magic medicine, or panacea, as that proposed by Bishop Berkeley. Hence the 
misunderstandings that its proposal has copiously enjoyed over the centuries. 
To a today's reader it is especially the content of some of the "scientific" 
information described in Berkeley's Siris, and the modalities of producing, exposing and 
testing it, that seem particularly outdated. Although "he studied the best chemistry and 
physics of his day" (Luce 1949: 205), Berkeley did no more, from our retrospective point 
of view, than summarize and (re)deliver the markedly deductive and speculative 
statements of late medieval and early modern science3. As one modern editor of 
Berkeley's Siris rightly noticed, to "read Berkeley's scientific sections is humiliating, for 
here one of our ablest and most learned minds is writing things which the most mediocre 
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student of to-day knows to be wrong." (T. E. Jessop in Berkeley 1953: V, 7) In short, as a 
"scientific approach", in the modern, generally received sense of the word, Berkeley's 
Siris is to be considered, either in total or in part, a failure. 
Nevertheless, there is a another, deeper aspect of this work that requires, I think, 
some special attention and a more appropriate contextualization from its today's 
commentators. For, in some way, considered in its spirit and within the broader context 
of history of ideas, Berkeley's specific dealing with tar-water as a panacea, as well as the 
whole historical and metaphysical argumentation he quite impressively employed for that 
purpose, could prove to be more significant and, theoretically, more fascinating than 
many of the sober, more rigorous — but often nothing more than this — medical writings 
of the XVIII- th century. There are things in this writing escaping our current comfortable, 
when not simply complacent, ways of labeling and classifying matters o f the past in view 
of today's received ideas. Not that he is "right" in his considerations on tar-water: his 
being "right" or "wrong" is of little import in this context. I do believe that Berkeley's 
considerations in Siris, i f we are to make some sense of them and not simply rule them 
out as "funny", are not to be judged by standards imposed by the subsequent 
developments in physics, chemistry and biology. I f thus judged, we easily come to realize 
that they are wrong. But, in such a case, this realization is all that we gain from reading 
Siris. 
It is one of the central ideas of this chapter that, in proposing his panacea, 
Berkeley was in fact placing himself in a long (especially alchemic) tradition of the search 
for the Elixir Vitae, for some "magic tincture" or medicine curing all illnesses, and 
supplying the "patient" with a number of outstanding attributes: perfect health, well 
being, moral and intellectual betterment, and so forth. From the standpoint of the 
alchemic way of thinking, Berkeley's puzzling approach was not a "novelty" or an oddity 
at all; rather it could be regarded as a late, even i f somehow "alienated", version of a 
perennial and widespread tradition. And it is particularly such a fact that could to some 
extent explain many of the misunderstandings related to the reception of Berkeley's Siris: 
as it were, even i f it failed as a scientific or medical work, it "succeeded" in some way as 
a comprehensive and bold intellectual attempt, on the part of the "good bishop", at 
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improving the "human condition" and proposing, or dreaming of, a "better l i fe" for his 
neighbours. Berkeley's curious proposal of his panacea betrays a marked 
idealistic/utopian propensity towards human integrity and self-improvement. On the other 
hand, as far as today's reception of Siris is concerned, it is one thing to dismiss 
Berkeley's tar-water panacea as bit of silly medicine, but quite another thing — and a 
presumptuous one — to dismiss the whole alchemic cast of thought to which Berkeley's 
proposals belong. Certainly, it ill-becomes people today — who make very large and 
sometimes Utopian claims about the potential benefits of genetic engineering — to scoff 
at the idea of "transmuting" nature for our benefit. 
I w i l l in the following discuss in some detail the alchemic notion of lapis 
philosophorum, its significance, complexity and symbolism, and the relationships it bears 
especially with the traditional Christian Weltanschauung. Given the fact that, 
hypothetically, the alchemist's lapis is equated in this chapter with Berkeley's tar-water, 
it is hoped that a detailed discussion of the lapis philosophorum w i l l also cast a better 
light on — and bring forth a better understanding of — Berkeley's speculations on tar-
water, its curative virtues, and the broader spiritual consequences deriving from its 
existence. 
4.1.2. Lapis philosophorum a s a universal medicine 
Within the medieval (both Arab and Latin) alchemic traditions one of the most important 
functions o f the "philosophers' stone" was to stand for a universal medicine, for some 
miraculous substance (the so-called Elixir Vitae) healing all imaginable bodily illnesses, 
as well as conferring on the "patient" a constant perfect health and a prosperous, long — 
or rather "prolonged" — life. Simply, as E. J. Holmyard has put it, the Stone "was also 
sometimes known as the Elixir or Tincture, and was credited not only with the power of 
transmuting but with that of prolonging human life indefinitely". (Holmyard 1990: 15) 
The area o f applicability of the lapis was not at all limited to the mineral world, only to 
metals and non-organic substances, but it supposedly worked with good results within the 
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organic realm as well. Paracelsus, for example, starts out one of his alchemic treatises in 
this vein: 
Having first invocated the name of the Lord Jesus Christ our Saviour, we 
wi l l enterprize this Work; wherein we shall not only teach to change any 
inferiour Metal into better, as Iron into Copper, this into Silver, and that 
into Gold, & c, but also to help all infirmities, whose cure to the 
opinionated and presumptuous Physicians, doth seem impossible: But that 
which is greater, to preserve, and keep mortal men to a long, sound, and 
Perfect Age. (Paracelsus 1975: B) 
As a matter of fact, within the Latin alchemic literature one might quite often encounter 
this equivalence: Lapis philosophorum seu Medicina universalis. And it ought also to be 
said that such an equivalence is not an accidental feature, but it seems to be central to 
every system of alchemic thought/practice — in any case, it is one of the factors making 
possible its survival and development, as well as the tremendous success it has widely 
enjoyed over the centuries4. Certainly, there are sophisticated symbols and hardly 
intelligible terminology involved in alchemy, and it is quite frequent that, when coming 
across an alchemic text, one has to fight a Hermetic and highly ambiguous manner of 
saying things, but, in spite of all the obstacles of understanding and impossibility of 
obtaining a unique homogeneous interpretation, this single fact is relatively unambiguous 
and clearly supported by bibliographical evidences5: the special role played in alchemic 
literature by the lapis considered as Elixir Vitae, no matter the numerous different names 
under which this is to be known: Red Tincture, pharmakon athanasias, pharmakon zoes, 
aurum potabile and the like. For example, in Theatrum Chemicum Britannicum (1652), in 
a poem reference is made to 
the Golden Oyle called Aurum potabile, 
A medicine most mervelous to preserve Mans health, 
And of Transmutation the greatest can bee... 
(Ashmole 1968: 422) 
Such an equivalence could take place as an immediate consequence of the decisive fact 
that, in realising his magisterium, the alchemist is, in the first instance, somehow self-
oriented: all the outward things he seems to work upon, and which seem to suffer so 
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radical a transformation (transmutatio) through his approach, play as a matter of fact only 
the role of a visible, "solidified" metaphor of the inner transformation occurring within 
the alchemist himself. A successful transmutatio presupposes the accomplishment of 
some state of perfect ontological transparency between the inner spiritual world of the 
alchemist (artifex) and the natural world around him, as — according to the alchemic 
teachings — the lapis seems to be at the same time an empirical object belonging to the 
external world and an ultimate principle of the human life: "Truly, this matter 
[philosophers' stone] is that created by God which is firmly captive within you yourself, 
inseparable from you, wherever you be, and any creature of God deprived of it wi l l die." 
(Verum est quod ista res [lapisphilosophorum] sit ea que magis in te jixa a deo creatur, 
el ubicumque fueris, semper tecum inseparata manet, et omnis a deo creatus, a quo hec 
res separatur, morietur.) (Morienus 1974: 26-7) There is, o f course, a certain amount of 
ambiguity involved here, but this is an ambiguity making possible in fact the constant and 
fruitful interplay between the "inside" and the "outside" of the alchemic work. Hence 
les indications assez frequentes, meme si parfois seulement allusives, sur 
la connexion necessaire entre transmutation exterieure et interieure, cette 
derniere consistant dans l'augmentation de puissance des valeurs 
spirituelles dans l'ame de Partisan (artifex), comme aussi la frequente 
interchangeabilite des buts soteriologiques prevus par certains courants 
alchimiques (correspondant a des sommets de perfection en differentes 
seeries hierarchiques: or, sante, longue vie, renouvellement spirituel). 
(Crisciani & Gagnon 1980: 50) 
And it is particularly this fact that, in a sense, makes alchemy be a "spiritual technique", 
rather than simply a practical, profit-oriented craft. On the other hand, and in the long 
term, this explains why alchemy enjoyed so deep an interest on the side of several 
psychoanalysts in the XX-th century, Carl Gustav Jung, with his writings on alchemy — 
especially his Psychology and Alchemy (Jung 1953) — being only the most widely known 
and influential. 
According to such a line of thought, the external, visible effects of the 
magisterium (serenity, spectacular longevity and perfect health, etc.) are only "social 
signs" of a successful inner transformation; they are but the inevitable (and pleasant) 
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consequences of a deep and complex, sometimes painstaking, "inward transmutation" 
successfully performed. As a direct consequence of this fact, as it has been noticed, the 
European alchemic literature overflows with delightful legends of adepts 
who attained magical longevity by virtue of their chemical 
accomplishments. The successful practitioner was typically revered as an 
ancient man whose physical well being, in addition to his wealth, marked 
outwardly the nobility of spirit derived from inward transmutation. (Lee 
Stavenhagen in Morienus 1974: 66) 
This is why the myth of longevity, in most cases, is in some way or other related to the 
arcane world of alchemy, i f not openly derived from it. 
Although the search for a panacea is manifest in practically all alchemic 
traditions, it is within the Islamic alchemy that the Elixir Vitae, in the shape of a real, 
concrete "pharmaceutical product", played a quite outstanding role. Here alchemy was 
"professed" most often by professional physicians, and some special relationships 
between alchemy and medicine could be established. Such brilliant personalities as Jabir 
Ibn Haiyan (721-815), al-Razi (866-925) or Avicenna (980-1036) were renowned as 
physicians and alchemists at the same time. Indeed, it happened sometimes that the 
medical art itself was taken for some sort of alchemy as the alchemic "products" were 
believed to have been used with good results in curing various illnesses. Al-Razi, for 
example, explicitly admits that, in case that the "transmutation process" fails, " i f the 
elixir is unsuitable to transform lead into gold or glass into rubies, it may quite possibly 
serve as a medicine". (Federman 1969: 71) In such a case, the medical function of the 
"philosophers' stone" is exclusive and fundamental. Also, following Razi' ideas, 
Avicenna 
saw in this [philosophers' stone] a medication, a medication of universal 
efficacy, the cure-all, the panacea. It was he who [ . . . ] started o f f the 
medieval adepts, who saw in the elixir the way to eternal health and 
everlasting youth. Though the line that leads from Avicenna to Paracelsus 
passes through the brains of ever so many monks, physicians, madmen and 
quacks, the idea is the same. It is the idea of the grand arcanum that cures 
all ills. {Ibid.: 73) 
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In general, as many historians have noticed6, Islamic alchemy had a marked "empirical" 
character, with a special emphasis placed on its sources in the natural world, as well as on 
its would-be applicability to the sphere of everyday life (in medicine, technology, etc.); 
Islamic alchemy was above all a practical enterprise, usually leaving little room, i f any, 
for abstract speculations or other esoteric developments. 
4.1.3. Lapis philosophorum as a symbol of salvation 
Christian alchemy instead has come to acquire a strong esoteric and speculative 
dimension. Of course, the Islamic "medical" component was to great extent transmitted to 
the Christian world along with the alchemy itself (sometimes in the 12 t h-13 t h Centuries). 
But, in addition to all the practical and technical considerations, the Christian alchemists 
supplied their magisterium with a high degree of metaphysical and theological 
sophistication, as well as with a complex system of ethical and mystical speculations. 
Briefly speaking, under the new Christian circumstances, alchemy turned out to be not 
only a medical practice, but also a sophisticated "spiritual technique" and a 
"soteriological art", with its main component {opus magnum) playing the role o f a 
metaphor of the Christian's efforts to acquire the "eternal salvation": 
In Christian Europe, the Great Work, already reflecting a spiritual 
significance, often took on a profoundly soteriological character. Here, the 
stages of the Work, from the initial chaos of matter stripped of its basic 
qualities to the triumphant succes of the last stage were regarded as a 
metaphorical process mirroring the struggle of the human soul toward 
salvation. (Kren 1990: vi i i ) 
Let us have a more detailed look at some of the phases of this interesting process. 
First of all, there were some ethical, religious and "existential" prerequisites an 
alchemist had to meet before properly starting his approach. In other words, performing 
the alchemic art supposed a careful and detailed praeparatio on the side of the alchemist 
not only in terms of specific learning and technical instruction, but also in terms of 
personal morality, self-discipline, and even liturgical katharsis: "The adept has to be 
morally worthy; his magisterium only witnesses the degree of refinement in virtue he has 
personally attained. Nobility of birth, ascetic faith, piety, and humility were still the 
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fundamental requisites, failing which the magic elixir would certainly elude the seeker 
after knowledge". (Lee Stavenhagen in Morienus 1974: 66-7) Why so? Because, 
according to the alchemic teachings, at the heart of his approach the alchemist wi l l find 
the "fingerprints" that the Creator himself left in this world: the most intimate 
constitution of the world wil l come to be as it were at his feet. It wi l l be at this point that, 
thanks to the distinctiveness and superiority of his art, the alchemist wi l l "meet" God, i f 
not facie ad faciem, at least through the numerous vestigia He has left in each single item 
of this world, and such a meeting obviously requires a special ethical preparation and a 
serious spiritual/theological training on the alchemist's side. As Paracelsus clearly states, 
This ART was by our Lord God the Supreme Creator, ingraven as it were 
in a book in the body of Metals, from the beginning of the Creation, that 
we might diligently learn from them. [ . . . ] Therefore, when any man 
desireth thoroughly and perfectly to learn this Art from its true foundation, 
it w i l l be necessary that he learn the same from the Master thereof, to wit, 
from God, who hath created all things, and onely knoweth what Nature 
and Propriety he himself hath placed in every Creature. (Paracelsus 1975 
B - B l ) 
As a matter of fact, one of the most important guiding principles in Christian alchemy 
was that expressed by the formula tarn ethice quam physice: the alchemist's involvement 
in his operatio was explicitly regarded not only as an empirical approach towards the 
natural world, but also as a way of accomplishing spiritual values ad majorem Dei 
gloriam. In other words, the Christian alchemist might well be considered some sort of 
priest or ascetic, rather than simply a secular scholar7. Being able to perform the "royal 
art" was, in fact, not only a matter of scholastic instruction, but especially a consequence 
of a long series of exercitia spiritualia, undertaken under the direct guidance of God 
himself: 
We wi l l therefore take him [God] to be our Master, Operator, and Leader 
into this most true Art. We wi l l therefore imitate him alone, and through 
him learn and attain to the knowledge of that Nature, which he himself 
with his own finger hath engraven and inscribed in the bodies of these 
Metals. {Ibid.: B l ) 
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Eventually, as a result of such a tremendous preparatory process, the practitioner is in a 
position to hope that he wi l l be considered an electus, that he wi l l receive the donum Dei: 
that is, the special divine gift enabling him to perform the opus magnum. There is a sense 
in which the alchemist must be a profoundly modest person, with an acute awareness of 
the partial, provisional — somehow uncertain — role that he is to play within the 
complex alchemic process. In other words, the alchemist must be aware that many of the 
things occurring during the operatio are out of his control, and that ultimately the secrets 
of alchemy "are never merely to be found out by human labour, but by 'bi teaching or 
revelacion' and the Stone is to be obtained by grace, rather than reading. Like religion, 
alchemy depended ultimately on divine revelation. There is a notion of alchemic 
<election>, just as there is a religious one..." (Roberts 1994: 79) Such a fact is clearly 
and repeatedly attested by the alchemic texts themselves. In some of these texts one might 
encounter the term donum dei, used in connection with the successfulness of the alchemic 
approach: 
No one wi l l be able to perform or accomplish this thing [the Great Work] 
which you have so long sought or attain it by means of any knowledge 
unless it be through affection and gentle humility, a perfect and true love. 
For this is something which God gives into the sure keeping of his elected 
servants until such time as he may prepare one to whom it may be handed 
on from among his secrets. Thus it is only the gift of God, who chooses 
among his humble and obedient servants those to whom he reveals it. 
(Morienus 1974: 11)8 
The next stage of this process consisted in considering the entire alchemic process from a 
purely symbolical point of view. And the most appropriate cultural and religious 
framework within which such a symbolism could take some concrete and efficient forms 
was that offered by the Christian theology. Indeed, it was the Christian doctrine, with all 
its complex and already matured soteriology, Christology, doctrines of Sacramento, and 
ethics, that became at that moment the perfect home for the newly adopted alchemy. Carl 
Gustav Jung follows in details how, for example, the holy Sacramentum, as it is described 
by St Ambrose, is being made highly compatible with the alchemic "inner 
transmutation"9. As a matter of fact, from its very outset, alchemy contained a set of 
features that could be easily interpreted in a Christian manner: 
93 
Images of death and resurrection, which for later alchemists prefigured the 
dissolution of the prime matter and its reconstitution into the glorious 
Stone, were central to Christian doctrine [ . . . ] In the eighth century 
Stephanos of Alexandria used the transformation of metals as an analogy 
for the transformation of the soul. Later alchemists too thought of metals 
being redeemed from their "sins". (Roberts 1994: 78) 
Once explicitly and systematically projected onto the Christian theological background, 
all the sophisticated symbols, figures, scenarios and devices of the traditional alchemy 
could live, so to speak, una vita nuova and enjoy a degree of sophistication, 
dissemination and eventually popularity never known before. 
Now, as a result of this ample process, "throughout the Latin literature on the 
subject the alchemic process is treated symbolically. The base matter, of course, was man, 
corrupted by sin; the elixir was the cleansing power of the holy spirit; and so on. 
Consequently, the ultimate attainable by the Great Work was an imitatio, an approach to 
perfection as symbolized by alchemic gold" (Lee Stavenhagen in Morienus 1974: 66) So 
that the Elixir Vitae {lapis philosophorwn), comes to be considered not only a panacea 
(medicina universalis), as it used to be in Hellenistic or Islamic alchemy, but also a strong 
metaphor of the Salvation itself, and constantly seen as some speculum of any human 
perfection. This is why, eventually, within the mainstream of the Christian alchemic 
tradition, the Elixir Vitae came to be regarded primarily not as a means of curing people's 
bodies, but of saving their souls. As it were, producing the Elixir was a way of searching 
for an "eternal", sanctified life, rather than simply of obtaining a worldly medicine. In 
such a case, alchemy was not about "making gold" (crysopoiesis) any more, but about 
making people feel "saved", or — in any event — spiritually elevated; just as alchemy 
was not only a source of medicine for bodily illnesses (like in its Islamic version), but a 
superior "spiritual technique", a way of "healing" human souls. 
It was the above mentioned notion of "inward transmutation" that played a central 
role within this form of alchemy, giving birth to what is usually called "mystical 
alchemy". "Mystical alchemy" is an interesting notion, as it reminds and describes in 
detail the entire alchemic apparatus and all the successive operations required by the 
performance of the alchemic magisterium, but not necessarily implying their real, factual 
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occurrence. The operatio was now a purely inner process occurring within the alchemist's 
spirit, without supposing the real existence of the alchemic substances, laboratory, 
devices, etc. 1 0 As a result, based on the profound knowledge of the Christian theology, 
there have been established a set of such fundamental symbolic equivalencies as: 
"philosophers' stone" = Jesus Christ, "prime matter" = sinful and corrupted man to be 
saved through the magisterium, "alchemic gold" = state of salvation, etc. The most 
important and spectacular of all these symbolical equivalencies was from far the lapis-
Christ parallel. Once this paralleling took place, the "marriage" between alchemy and 
Christianity was completely accomplished: the main figure in Christianity, Jesus Christ 
himself, came to be associated with the most important element of any alchemic system: 
lapisphilosophornm. Moreover, this parallel was not a circumstantial one or merely some 
rhetorical device: it was essentially based on fundamental similitudes and common 
patterns. For example, the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, along with His Resurrection (the 
central points of the Christian doctrine), were to be rigorously mirrored within the 
alchemic process: "the death of our Lord Jesus Christ and His resurrection in a glorified 
body was to the alchemist to be compared to the death of the metals and their rebirth as 
the glorious stone". (Taylor 1951: 152-3) In English alchemic poetry, to take only a 
random example, one could find such convincing evidence of the Chxht-lapis parallel as 
this one offered by a poem of John Donne (1527-1608): 'For these three daies become a 
minerall; / Hee was all gold when he lay downe, but rose / Al l tincture...' (Donne 1952: 
28) 
The parallel C\\ns\-lapis plays a quite prominent role in C. G. Jung's fascinating 
book Psychology and Alchemy (Jung 1953); Jung was in fact one of the main modern 
promoters (or re-discoverers) of this interpretation. As for modern alchemic 
commentaries, the parallel enjoys a broad and enthusiastic acceptance among the most 
important experts on medieval Christian alchemy. Claudia Kren's and Lee Stavenhagen's 
considerations on the subject were just quoted above. Chiara Crisciani and Claude 
Gagnon (Crisciani, & Gagnon 1980), to take some other examples, offer a highly 
synthetic and finely systematized image of the lapis philosophoriim in view of its 
mystical association with Jesus Christ." 
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4.2. "The Great Chain of Being" 
4.2.1. Preliminary remarks 
The notion that Berkeley's speculations in Siris might well be placed within the alchemic 
tradition is supported not only by the equation between lapis philosophorum and tar-
water, but also by other arguments. That there might be an alchemic "reading" of 
Berkeley's Siris has been noticed, even i f with some embarrassment and regret, by some 
of Berkeley's modern commentators12, and it was in 1954 that A. D. Ritchie even gave a 
lecture at the British Academy on Berkeley's Siris in direct connection with the alchemic 
theory (Ritchie 1954). Unfortunately, in his lecture, Ritchie barely did more than 
announce the subject, without going deeply into its substance, and without following 
properly and fully the consequences of his insight. 
Once the relationship between lapis and tar-water has been discussed in some 
detail, 1 would like to deal in this chapter with another important argument supporting the 
notion of a presence of alchemy in Berkeley's Siris. This argument is based upon the idea 
of "The Great Chain of Being", resorted to by both Berkeley and the alchemists. Both in 
Siris and in the alchemic works, what really makes possible the existence, power and 
efficacy of the panacea is the special relationship it bears to the rest of the Creation, or, in 
other words, its particular place and function within "The Great Chain of Being". Apart 
from any other similarities of language, terminology, bibliographical authorities and 
historical sources, Berkeley shares with the alchemists the same fundamental belief in the 
special virtues that a certain link within the chain ("vegetable tar" and "philosophers' 
stone", respectively) comes to acquire, condense and manifest. 
The topic of "The Great Chain o f Being" is one of the oldest and most prestigious 
metaphysical and cosmological notions to be employed, developed and used largely 
throughout the history of European philosophy. As Arthur Lovejoy has expressed it, this 
is a "conception of the plan and structure of the world" which, from the remote antiquity 
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down to the eighteenth century, i f not even later, "many philosophers, most men of 
science, and, indeed, most educated men" accepted "without question". Structurally 
speaking, the universe is, according to this theory of "The Great Chain of Being", 
composed of an immense, or [ . . . ] of an infinite, number of links ranging in 
hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely 
escape non-existence, through "every possible" grade up to the ens 
perfectissimum — or [ . . . ] to the highest possible kind of creature, between 
which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite — 
every one of them differing from that immediately above and that 
immediately below it by the "least possible" degree of difference. 
(Lovejoy 1964: 59) 
Based, originally, on some religious and mythical suppositions, the notion that everything 
existing "in Heaven and on Earth" is in some way unified, linked together, and 
interconnected, matched, so to speak, perfectly with man's primordial need for 
understanding the world he lives in and the ways it "works". There is nothing chaotic in 
the universe, but everything is orderly and in its own place. As a consequence of 
accepting the theory of "The Great Chain of Being", the world becomes essentially 
comprehensible. Not that, thanks to it, we can know now everything about the world, but 
we know how to gain our knowledge of the world. For one of the major merits of this 
theory comes from the fact that it offers a good explanation of how is it that our 
knowledge of the world is possible, and how precisely this knowledge is produced. 
Namely, from the acquaintance with those links which are immediately accessible, we 
can rightly infer knowledge about the remoter links; based on what we are given in our 
immediate encounter with the world, we can make statements and predictions, and 
propose hypothesis about things which are, in virtue of their nature, far away from us, i f 
not simply out of our reach. The result is that, according to the theory of "The Great 
Chain of Being", there is orderliness, hierarchy, interconnection, harmony, meaning, and 
beauty in the world, and — which is equally important — our mind has the capacity of 
grasping the truths about this world. 
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4.2.2. "The Great Chain of Being" in alchemy 
It is precisely the notion of "The Great Chain of Being" that the alchemists made use of a 
great deal, and based on which they built up, and developed their cosmological 
speculations: "the idea of the harmony and unity of the universe, 'One is A l l , and A l l is 
One', led to the belief that the universal spirit could somehow be pressed into service [ . . . ] 
by concentrating it, so to speak, in a particular piece of matter — the philosophers' 
stone." (Holmyard 1990: 23) In fact, this fundamental principle postulating the unity of 
the world, in the particular form of an unseen cosmic chain penetrating and 
interconnecting it, as well as conferring it a certain identity, homogeneity and continuity, 
could be recognized even in what is believed to be the first and most important alchemic 
writing, namely Tabula Smaragdina, a short Hermetic text attributed to the mythical 
founder of alchemy, Hermes Trismegistus: 
True it is, without falsehood, certain and most true. That which is above is 
like to which is below, and that which is below is like to that which is 
above, to accomplish the miracles of one thing. And as all things were by 
the contemplation of one, so all things arose from one thing by a single act 
of adaptation. (/I/wo'Holmyard 1990: 97) 
A l l the subsequent developments, however sophisticated, all the exotic speculations and 
countless refinements of the alchemic theories throughout the centuries did nothing but to 
echo this original principle. To the point that any definition of alchemy today must take 
seriously into account the theory of "The Great Chain of Being" as one of its fundamental 
ingredients. Claudia Kren, for example, when trying to offer a quite synthetic description 
of alchemy, says: 
By almost universal agreement, alchemy in Western Europe was one of the 
products of a Hellenistic culture — Hermetic and neoplatonic — where 
the universe was a unified cosmos with all parts interrelated in a web of 
hierarchical correspondences and with all aspects in some way animate 
and active. This complex of semi-religious notions was joined by an 
influential theory which held that the elemental forms of matter were 
convertible one into another. (Kren 1990: vii i) 
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Let me also add that this idea of a chain unifying everything was not, in alchemy, only a 
matter of historical coincidence, some theoretical device that happened to be employed by 
the alchemic authors in their discourse, and without which the alchemy would have 
remained more or less the same. The notion of the "unity of the world" belongs 
structurally and functionally to the alchemic way of thinking. It was not, so to speak, an 
accident, but a real substance. "The unity of matter" was one of the two "a priori 
postulates upon which the deductive reasoning of alchemy was mainly based" (the 
second one being "the existence of a potent transmuting agent"). In the absence of a 
theory firmly postulating the unity and homogeneity of the world, the alchemists would 
have lost one of the main metaphysical and cosmological premises enabling them to 
believe in the very possibility of transmutation and, consequently, in the existence and 
efficacy of their panacea. For from the notion of the unity of matter they derived another 
assumption, namely that the "philosophers' stone", 
the medicine of the base metals, would act also as a medicine of man; 
hence, in the form of the Elixir Vitae or Red Tincture, the stone was 
depicted as an agent for curing all human ills and conferring longevity. 
Herein may perhaps be perceived a Greek influence, emanating from the 
Platonic conception that nothing exist that is not good and from Aristotle's 
dictum that nature strives always towards perfection. (Read 1947: 4 ) ' 3 
4.2.3. "The Great Chain of Being" in Siris 
It is in a strikingly similar manner that Berkeley seeks to explain how is it that such a 
thing as his panacea is possible1 4. As a philosopher, Berkeley did not find it sufficient to 
simply propose his "medicine" and list its magic virtues and qualities, without looking 
into what was behind it. He felt he had to look for a serious philosophical explanation of 
how his panacea was ontologically possible. So that, after describing in detail the mode in 
which tar-water is to be prepared, after listing the various forms of illness and medical 
case histories in which this medicine proved to be successful, and inquiring into the 
chemical properties of the vegetable tar, Berkeley proposed the theory of "The Great 
Chain of Being" as making possible his panacea. This is, in his own words, the theory 
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that there "runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this chain one link 
drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest." (Berkeley 1953: V, 
140) 1 5 
For that purpose he undertakes an ample historical "journey" in search for those, 
whether ancient or modern, thinkers (philosophers, poets, scientists, alchemists, 
physicians, and so forth) supporting, in some way or other, his own ideas regarding "The 
Great Chain of Being". His approach is deeply interdisciplinary, highly speculative and of 
an impressive theoretical openness. As it has been remarked, medicine "leads Berkeley to 
botany, botany to chemistry, chemistry to metaphysics, and Siris finally comes to rest on 
the nature of God." (Walmsley 1990: 144) And he does so by tracing back this topic to 
the most ancient of its sources and promoters, to the mythical and theosophical views 
professed in ancient Egypt, or to the cosmological and metaphysical speculations of the 
early Greek philosophers, not to mention the repeated appeals he makes to Plato, 
Aristotle, Plotinus, or the Renaissance Platonists. He largely, sympathetically summarizes 
the ancient doctrines, at the same time bearing always in mind, and frequently alluding to, 
his own tenets to be strengthened and supported by the dictums, fragments and beliefs of 
the celebrated figures of the past. In a way, as it has been remarked in Chapter Two of 
this dissertation, Siris has a marked character of "intertextuality", and some sort of "joint 
discourse" is involved here: Berkeley's own words are constantly echoed by those of the 
others, just as the others' words are mirrored in his own phrasing: 
I f we may trust the Hermaic writings, the Egyptians thought all things did 
partake of life. [ . . . ] from all the various tones, actions, and passions of the 
universe, they supposed one symphony, one animal act and life to result. 
[ . . . ] It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hertnaic 
writings that all things are One. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, 
Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion 
of to hen, THE ONE, from Egypt. Though that subtle metaphysician 
Parmenides, in his doctrine of hen hestos, seems to have added something 
of his own. [ . . . ] one and the same Mind is the universal principle of order 
and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all its parts, 
and giving unity to the system... (Berkeley 1953: V, 128-34) 
Yet, the relationships between Parmenides, or the Greek philosophers in general, on the 
one hand, and the Egyptians, on the other, is of the same type as the relationships 
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Berkeley himself has with all of them. Their "joint discourse" is reflected within — and 
harmoniously interrelates with — Berkeley's own text, giving birth to a new "joint 
discourse". It is very much like in a process of alchemic transformation, within which 
primary elements are successively combined ("joined") with one another, resulting in 
more and more complicated substances. Let us notice, at the same time, that some of the 
notions that Berkeley borrows in this writing from the ancient philosophers (the world as 
a symphony, the fundamental metaphysical unity behind the multiplicity of the visible 
things, etc.) are closely related to what he had already said in his earlier philosophical 
works: the world as a coherent system of signs, and as a divine "epiphany". Once again, 
in Siris he seems to have pushed to the last consequences and fully developed what in his 
earlier writings was only vaguely alluded or hinted at. 
Berkeley comes, then, to openly use the phrase "Chain or Scale of beings" in the 
proper, traditional sense of the word. He quotes Jamblichus' fragment asserting the 
"world to be one animal", an animal whose 
parts, however distant each from other, are nevertheless related and 
connected by one common nature. [ . . . ] there is no chasm in nature, but a 
Chain or Scale of beings rising by gentle uninterrupted gradations from the 
lowest to the highest, each nature being informed and perfected by the 
participation of a higher. As air becomes igneous, so the purest fire 
becomes animal, and the animal soul becomes intellectual: [ . . . ] each lower 
nature being, according to those philosophers, as it were a receptacle or 
subject for the next above it to reside and act in. (Ibid.: 129) 
What is interesting and original enough at this point is that, in Berkeley, this chain is not 
only of a cosmic nature, animating, unifying and interrelating the outside world, but it is 
also a chain unifying our own minds, and conferring upon them orderliness, unity and 
identity. This "chain" also functions as an "inner chain" connecting and interrelating our 
faculties and making them work properly. As a true mirror of the cosmos, the human 
mind reproduces for itself, on a much smaller scale, "The Great Chain of Being"; the 
human mind is of such a nature that it reflects the hidden architecture of the universe: 
By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of 
the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent, we 
arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become 
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subjects for fancy to work upon. Reason considers and judges of the 
imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects to the 
understanding. In this scale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one 
above it. (Ibid.: 140) 
And it is precisely through this inner chain that, in Berkeley's view, we have access to 
divinity. He believes, in an Augustinian manner, that the divine is precisely what we 
discover at the end of the "inner ascension": "the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity, 
which is... the object of intellectual knowledge" (Ibid:. 140) Almost needless to mention, 
this "dual chain", manifesting itself both in the cosmic realm and in ourselves, points to 
the ancient Hermetic analogy between macrocosm and microcosm, an analogy which 
plays a fundamental role within any alchemic tradition: 
As the Platonists held the intellect to be lodged in soul, and soul in aether; 
so it passeth for a doctrine of Trismegistus [ . . . ] , that mind is clothed by 
soul, and soul by spirit. Therefore, as the animal spirit o f man, being subtle 
and luminous, is the immediate tegument of the human soul, or that 
wherein and whereby she acts; even so the spirit of the world, that active 
fiery ethereal substance of light, that permeates and animates the whole 
system, is supposed to clothe the soul, which clothes the mind of the 
universe. (Ibid.: 91) 
Now, keeping in mind that "luminous spirit lodged and detained in the native balsam of 
pines and firs" (Ibid.: 105), "tar" appears as a secretion of the vegetal realm coming to 
play a quite special role within the cosmic chain. A. D. Ritchie even says that the choice 
of tar is, in itself, another alchemic "trace" in Siris: "I t was one of the alchemic doctrines 
that the 'essence' of plants is to be found in aromatic or sweet-smelling constituents, 
especially when these are volatile and can be concentrated by distillation." (Ritchie: 
1954: 50) Nevertheless, there are authors who believe that the choice of the "vegetable 
tar" is quite circumstantial. 1 6 
But how does it happen that tar proves to be so important a link within the cosmic 
chain? What precisely makes tar play such an important role? Why tar and not something 
else? 
At a given moment in his historical (as well as cosmological) "journey", Berkeley 
come to talk about "a certain pure heat or fire, which had somewhat divine in it, by the 
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participation whereof men became allied to the gods". This fire is not at all what we 
commonly designate by the word, but it has a definite metaphysical significance, having 
been the object of philosophical speculations from the ancient Greeks to, say, the 
Renaissance Platonists. This fire is the 
purest and most excellent fire, that is heaven, saith Ficinus. And again, the 
hidden fire that everyone exerts itself, he calls celestial. He represents fire 
as most powerful and active, dividing all things, abhorring all composition 
or mixture with other bodies... This is the general source of life, spirit, and 
strength, and therefore of health to all animals [ . . . ] . The same spirit, 
imprisoned in food and medicines, is conveyed into the stomach, the 
bowels, the lacteals, circulated and secreted by the several ducts, and 
distributed throughout the system. {Ibid.: 104) 
And it is precisely the tar that, in Berkeley's opinion, best "serve[s] as a vehicle to this 
spirit" (Ibid.: 106). In a manner clearly reminding us of the alchemic speculations on lapis 
philosophorum, and of its complex religious symbolism, Berkeley sees the vegetable tar 
as having a special "affinity" with the solar light, that is, with "the general source of life", 
as it grasps and concentrates light, conveying to the animal body its regenerating powers: 
"light attracted, secreted, and detained in tar [ . . . ] is not a violent and sudden medicine 
[ . . . ] but a safe and mild alterative, which penetrates the whole system, opens, heals, and 
strengthens, the remote vessels, alters and propels their contents, and enters the minutest 
capillaries..." (Ibid.: 68) In virtue of the special relationship it bears with the 
metaphysical substratum of the world (the celestial fire), tar, once properly prepared and 
consumed in appropriate dozes, necessarily brings in us a fundamental "restoration". 
Thanks specifically to this characteristic of the tar, our bodies are healthily and 
harmoniously re-linked to the whole of the cosmic chain. 
In short, for Berkeley tar functions as a special link within the cosmic chain due 
particularly to its peculiar capacity to retain, storage and transform light: "This balsam 
[ . . . ] abides the action of the sun, and, attracting the sunbeams, is thereby exalted and 
enriched, so as to become a most noble medicine: such is the last product of a tree, 
perfectly maturated by time and sun." (Ibid.: 44) In other words, tar has the wonderful 
capacity to successfully "transmute" light into life. 
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Finally, it is the symbolism of light and fire, the dream of our "restoration" and of 
a redeeming "renewal" of our bodies, the notion of a smooth and harmonious 
reintegration of the human within the cosmic realm that, once again, strengthens the 
relationship between Berkeley and the alchemic tradition. 
4.3. Alchemy as a "perennial wisdom" 
4.3.1. The alchemy revisited 
Even though the alchemists strongly believed that what they were doing was "science"'7 
— that is, a sincere and determined attempt at understanding nature as it is in itself — 
alchemy as such appears today as dramatically "outdated"; it definitely belongs to the 
history of science, rather to the science proper. Nevertheless, however outdated or even 
un-serious alchemy might seem, on a deeper analysis and placed within a broader context, 
alchemy proves to be, as it is more and more recognized by today's scholars, a 
meaningful practice, a significant part of human's "cultural behaviour". Alchemy betrays 
a serious need for transcendence, a drive for human perfection and moral betterment, 
which confers upon it a certain perennial mark. As Jung has put it, "[t]here are very 
modern problems in alchemy, though they lie outside the province of chemistry." (Jung 
1953: 267) Alchemy is of course "wrong", but this does not makes it less interesting as a 
cultural and historical phenomenon. 
There is a certain sense in which, as some historians of alchemy point out, the 
alchemist might be regarded as an exemplary person. His approaches to, and ways of 
considering, the world around acquire, with the passing of time, some paradigmatic 
character: " I I y a dans l'alchimie une representation du Moi qui est exactement et 
precisement 1'image d'une certaine facon de connaltre et de travailler que nous avons 
subconsciemment mais pas moins rationnellement ecartee. Cette facon n'est qu'une 
interference et cette interference n'est audible que dans 1'histoire." (Crisciani & 
Gagnonl980: 79) There is in this "facon de connaitre et de travailler" of the alchemist a 
greatness and meaningfulness that can never become "outdated". I have chosen to deal 
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here, very briefly, with three general features of the alchemic approach to the world, 
features which I think confer upon alchemy a character of "perennial wisdom". 
First of all, alchemy is characterized by a certain "therapeutic" view of the world. 
Moreover, not only of the natural world, but also of the human world, and, within it, not 
only in bodily terms, but also in terms of intellectual renewal, moral betterment, and 
ultimately in soteriological terms (alchemy seen as a search for "eternal salvation"). In a 
very particular sense, the alchemists might be said to have been the first "ecologists" as 
they heartily cared about the state of the material world around, and tried as it were to 
"heal" it: 
In alchemy imperfect metals, often considered as i l l , were helped to 
perfection and an ideal internal balance by the medicine of the elixir. 
Alchemy teaches "the restoral (restituere) of all fallen and inform bodies 
and how to bring them back to a true balance (temperamentum) and the 
best of health". (Roberts 1994: 37) 
Among other factors, it is the vivid sense of tenderness and attentiveness towards the 
surrounding world that, from our retrospective point of view, makes alchemy so 
appealing. The alchemists held a generous view of the natural world, and conceived of it 
as driven by a perpetual search for perfection and "redemption". As one anonymous 
English alchemic writer said: "1 must tel you, that nature alwaies intendeth and striveth to 
the perfection of Gold". (Apud Read 1947: 6) Naturally, the alchemist's current 
relationships to his immediate environment (natura) were marked by a certain form of 
anthropomorphosis; as it is proved by numerous pieces of evidence, he did not consider it 
in terms of a radical ontological alteritas, but he saw nature as being constituted, 
structured, and made operational in purely human terms: "To give to the combination of 
the two substances to make a third the name or symbol o f ' a marriage and birth' was to f i t 
the phenomenon into his world and so to make sense of it. He would then act on the 
principle that the phenomenon was a marriage and birth." (Taylor 1951: 158) And this 
was only a first step the alchemist took: both natura and anthropon were to be eventually 
considered, within the alchemic view, in terms of some grand divine scenarios (of 
sacrifice, redemption, rebirth, etc.). 
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Secondly, alchemy essentially presuposses a unified conception on nature, man, 
and God. The significant role that the notion of "The Great Chain of Being" played in 
alchemy was discussed in some detail earlier on in this chapter. From an epistemological 
point of view, the most important consequence of the idea that there is an unseen chain 
pervading the entire cosmos is that the entire knowledge of reality must be (kept) unified 
and homogeneous, that basically there is only one scientia mundi making possible and 
explaining every piece of "local knowledge", and guaranteeing its validity. Moreover, 
alchemy is not only about science. The alchemists, through all their writings, speculations 
and curious undertakings, tried to advance a bold and refreshing synthesis of science, 
religion and philosophy. They based their approach on the supposition that there was (or 
had to be) some form of pre-established harmony between the objectives of science, 
man's need for understanding the world surrounding him and for reflexive attitudes, and, 
so to say, the fundamnental thirst of immortality inherent to every human being. As one 
said, 
Alchemy has suffered the misfortune of being classed as a science from a 
modern point of view [ . . . ] . Scientific it certainly was when it first reached 
the West sometime late in the twelfth century, but in thoroughly medieval 
sense, in which nothing, science least of all, could be separated from 
ethics, morals, and religion. For i f science could not substantiate man's 
claim on immortality, what use was it? (Lee Stavenhagen in Morienus 
1974:66) 
Finally, the alchemic tradition is the historical expression of a drive towards human 
perfection and moral betterment — ultimately, it is the expression of man's need for 
transcendence, and this fact makes alchemy, to some extent, perennial. The soteriological 
dimension of alchemy, which was discussed above, is to be necessarily taken into account 
when dealing with its history. For "l'alchimie se designe immemorialement: art royal et 
sacerdotal. Elle n'a pas d'histoire, son histoire etant celle de la vie, de la mort, de la 
resurrection de l'univers en chaque homme". (Robert Marteau apud Crisciani & Gagnon 
1980: 23) Beyond any sophisticated practicalities involved, beyond the numerous arcane 
technicalities one encounters when reading an alchemic text, alchemy might be ultimately 
seen as a discourse on the eternal human search for a conciliation between the many 
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(often divergent) forms of being in history. In its strict details, an alchemic approach 
might be wrong and even seem "funny", especially i f judged by the standards of modern 
science, but — once considered in its spirit, and in a broader cultural and historic context 
— it proves to be a quite impressive atempt at offering a complex and integrated image 
of the human condition. 
4.3.2. Berkeley's use of alchemy 
It is not difficult to see that, in Siris, Berkeley uses extensively alchemic terminology, 
notions and ideas18, quoting richly not only such late alchemists (or early chemists) as 
Paracelsus, Homberg, Van Helmont, and others, but also a celebrated "founding father" 
of the alchemic tradition such as Hermes Trismegistus, or the Renaissance Platonists, 
who openly placed themselves within the alchemic tradition. 
Moreover, what is quite amazing from this point of view is the fact that Berkeley 
seems to have literally believed in the possibility of "alchemic transmutation", of 
transforming base metals into gold. Interestingly, he did so by placing the transmutation, 
technically, within the proper theoretical and historical framework that the alchemists 
themselves used. Thus, at a given point in his demonstration in Siris, Berkeley brings 
forward, in support of the idea that "bodies attract and f ix the light", the results of what 
obviously was a transmuting experiment performed by the French alchemist Homberg: 
Of this there cannot be a better proof than the experiment of Monsieur 
Homberg, who made gold of mercury by introducing light into its pores 
[ . . . ] . By this junction of light and mercury both bodies became fixed, and 
produced a third different from either, to wit, real gold. [ . . . ] This seems to 
have been not altogether unknown to former philosophers; Marsilius 
Ficinus [ . . . ] and others likewise before him, regarding mercury as the 
mother, and sulphur as the father of metals; and Plato himself, in his 
Timaeus, describing gold to be a dense fluid with a shining yellow light, 
which well suits a composition of light and mercury. (Berkeley 1953: V, 
97-8) 
However puzzling, even embarrassing, this belief of Berkeley (in the possibility of 
making gold out of base metals) might appear to a today's reader, it has nevertheless the 
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merit of signaling Berkeley's commitment to a worldview whose fundamental tenets and 
suppositions functioned also as the theoretical justification of what the alchemists were 
doing. But alchemy was not primarily about making gold. Some modern historians of 
alchemy are even inclined to believe that the gold-making side of alchemy was actually a 
form of disguise, something behind which they pursued their real interests, which were 
philosophical and spiritual in essence19. As a matter of fact, as it was shown above, what 
Berkeley took from alchemy was first of all the medical component, the belief in the 
existence of an ontologically privileged substance — along with the supporting 
arguments — based on which our bodies can be "healed" and restored. More than that, 
there is a sense in which Berkeley went beyond the strict medical technicalities, and 
shared with the alchemists some important spiritual affinities: the belief in a supreme 
principle of order ("The Great Chain of Being") in virtue of which everything "in Heaven 
and on Earth" is secretly united and interconnected, the belief in the possibility of a 
cosmic restoration, either at a macro- or micro-level, the conception of the world as a 
symphony in which every single detail is meaningful and has its own role to play, the felt 
need for transcendence and betterment. 
On the other hand, Berkeley's case, a case in which the "medical science" in the 
traditional, Hermetic sense coexisted with the philosophical modernity, whose brilliant 
representative Berkeley certainly was, proves sufficiently how difficult is to postulate 
some radical and unbridgeable gap between the traditional (medieval) and the modern. 
After a life dedicated primarily to promoting such fundamental ideals of European 
philosophical modernity as the constant appeal to experience, common sense and critical, 
rational argumentation, and so forth, Berkeley is, in Siris, "quitting science for venerable 
metaphysics, where he all but blends his own original philosophy with the theosophical 
theories of ancient Greece and the yet more ancient Middle East." (T. E. Jessop in 
Berkeley 1953: V, 7 ) 2 0 
This is undoubtedly a very interesting step on his part, and should probably be 
considered by commentators otherwise than with embarrassment, regret or retrospective 
apologies. Berkeley took this step at a time when he had reached his ful l intellectual and 
existential maturity, after a life ful l of scholarly, literary and public accomplishments, 
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various private experiences (fortunate or unfortunate), etc. That is why, I believe, this was 
a deeply symbolical gesture on the side of the philosopher, betraying some fundamental 
shift in his way of considering philosophy: a shift from philosophy considered as an 
impersonal, so to say "objectivist" approach towards philosophy as a more personal, 
private exercise: i f not openly as some sort of religious or "soteriological technique". 
Siris is undoubtedly about things or facts of the external world, it is a "chain" of 
cosmological, physical, chemical, medical, etc. speculations, but — exactly as in an 
alchemic approach — behind all these concerns, there is a very personal need for 
overcoming, or reconciliation with, the fragile, limited "human condition" in view of its 
ultimate role within a cosmic-divine story. 
Berkeley's conviction that God is permanently speaking to us have now acquired 
a higher degree of specificity. As it were, the message that Siris sends might read: i f we 
are attentive enough to the world around — that is, to what God is telling us — we wi l l 
learn more than simply how to deal in general with this world: we wi l l learn specific arts 
and techniques through which this world shall be kept in order, and our passage through it 
made smoother and healthier. 
Notes: 
' "Tar is a black and sticky substance with none too good a name in letters, and the very idea o f a bishop 
discarding his white lawn sleeves and handling it and extracting a nasty medicine from it is too much for our 
sense of gravity, and Berkeley's tar-water has become a jest." (Luce 1949: 197) 
2 Nevertheless, besides the Bermuda Project, Siris was, as I already mentioned, one o f the main sources o f 
Berkeley's popularity during his lifetime, and even after his death: "Berkeley's philosophical writings have 
suffered a curious fate. In his own day the earlier works, such as his Principles of Human Knowledge, were 
little read and had even less influence, but his Siris enjoyed great popularity; i f not for the philosophy, at 
least for the tar-water." (Ritchie: 1954: 41) 
3 " In his last work Siris, he reverted to earlier modes o f thought, to those o f the seventeenth century, so far 
as it had not yet come under the influence o f Descartes, Hobbes and Locke." (Ritchie: 1954: 41) 
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4 "One alchemist complained that, falling under this suspicion [that he had discovered the secret o f the 
Elixir Vitae] because he had happened to effect some rather spectacular cures during an epidemic, he had to 
disguise himself, shave o f f his beard, and put on a wig before he was able to escape, under a false name, 
f rom a mob howling for his elixir". (Holmyard 1990: 16) 
3 One o f Paracelsus' most important alchemic works is even entitled De vita longa. 
6 See, for example, Lee Stavenhagen's commentary on Morienus' Testament of Alchemy: "While Greek 
writers on this topic were inclined to employ allegory as their main technique, the great Islamic theorists 
generally moved in a more experimental direction, ingeniously combining astrology and number magic with 
patterns observed in metallurgical reactions". (Lee Stavenhagen in Morienus 1974: 64-5) 
7 This is, o f course, a rather simplified view of the medieval alchemist for the sake o f the argument. 
Actually, he played several social roles, and, as historians show, had a polymorphous, though picturesque 
appearance: " A u XIVe siecle, de tout facon, I'alchimiste presente des aspects divers: i l y a le medicin de 
cour, le franciscain dissident, les operateurs presents a la cour anglaise, le savant specialise qui se croit 
digne, puisque sa recherche rentre entre les sciences {scientiae), de s'inserer dans I'institution 
universitaire". (Crisciani & Gagnonl980: 73) 
8 Quia istam rem, quam tit din quesivisti, non poterit aliquis perpetrare nee perfectare, nee potuerit ad 
istam applicare ab aliquo sapiente nisi per dilectionem et humilitatem molliciem et amorem perfectum 
atque verum. Et est ista res quam dens adducit suis fidelibus quibus Mam adducere disposuit cum 
fortitudine maiori usquedum sibi parat hominem a quo earn sciat et earn sibi detegat a suis secretis. Nec 
ista res aliquid est nisi donum dei, qui earn cui vult ex suis servis demonstrat, qui sibi sunt humiles et in 
omnibus sub did. (Morienus 1974: 10) 
9 "St. Ambrose called the transformed [transsubstantiated] bread medicina. It is the pharmakon athanasias, 
the drug o f immortality, which, in the act o f communion, reveals its characteristic effect in and on the 
believer - the effect o f uniting the body with the soul. This takes the form of a healing o f the soul {et 
sanabitur anima mea) and a reformatio o f the body {et mirabilius reformasti)" (Jung 1953: 297-8) 
1 0 " In this aspect o f the alchemic enterprise (sometimes reffered to as <esoteric> alchemy), the would-be 
adept considered his materials and apparatus as elements in a spiritual metaphor, an inner process brought 
to a successful fruit ion only by those with no crass motive such as personal gain." (Kren 1990: v i i ) 
" " [L]e lapis est presque la deification du projet de salut, au point que dans de nombreux textes de 
I'alchimie latine il est presente comme Panalogue du Christ. Le lapis est aussi le lieu ou s'apaisent les 
hierarchies (i l est unique, independant, sans genealogie); il ne rentre pas dans les hierarchies et les efface. 
La fonction du lapis apparit claire si Ton observe le langage qu' i l produit: il est sans nom et par consequent 
11 peut prendre touts les noms possibles: il supporte toute predication parce qu'aucune le referme dans une 
definition univoque; i l est le seul possible predicat de soi-meme dans une tautologie representative de son 
etre universel et particulier a la fois, etant parole de Dieu incarnee." (Crisciani & Gagnon 1980: 50) 
1 2 For example, T. E. Jessop, Siris's editor, says in his "Introduction": " In claiming that it was probably a 
panacea [ . . . ] , he belonged to his age: in his time even physicians o f standing had their 'catholicons,' and 
there was very little science against them, and the old alchemistic faith behind them." (T. E. Jessop in 
Berkeley 1953: V, v i - i i ) 
It is exactly what an unknown alchemic writer, quoted by Read himself, says: " I must tel you, that nature 
alwaies intendeth and striveth to the perfection o f Gold." {apud Read 1947: 6) 
1 4 As a matter o f fact, A. D. Ritchie makes exactly the same point: "One o f the most ancient and widespread 
types o f cosmological system is the theory o f the Great Chain o f Being. The central doctrine, in the form in 
which it is the basis o f alchemy. Is summarized in a sentence quoted by Berkeley from one o f the Hermetic 
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works: ' A l l parts o f the world vegetate by a fine subtle aether which acts as an engine or instrument subject 
to the wi l l o f the supreme God. '" (Ritchie: 1954: 46-7) Once again, what is regrettable with his article is 
that he did not develop the idea as much as he could, just as he did not follow sufficiently its consequences. 
1 3 As A. D. Ritchie suggests, Berkeley possibly had some sort of personal affinities with this particular 
theory: "The fundamental tenet o f the Great Chain Theory is that all things in heaven and earth are 
interconnected. Whatever else Berkeley may or may not have believed, that he believed with all his heart. 
His favourite text was "In God we live and move and have our being.'" (Ritchie: 1954: 41) 
1 6 It is the case o f T. E. Jessop, who, in his "Introduction" to Siris says: "The lowest link could have been 
anything in the sensible world, but at the time of writing Berkeley was thinking much o f vegetable tar, and it 
is f rom this that he follows the chain to the Trinity - starting with empiric medicine, seeking a theory for it 
in vegetable and animal physiology old and new, finding the physical Aether as the quickening force in all 
things..." (T. E. Jessop in Berkeley 1953: V, 6-7) 
1 7 "Judged in the light o f the then prevailing concepts the alchemists were engaged in an exact science, 
basing as they did their assumptions on the teaching o f Aristotle. According to him all substances are but 
differing forms o f one and the same prime matter, and it was thus theoretically possible to change one 
substance into another. This possibility seemed close at hand, as was the splitting o f the atom in the early 
decades o f our century, for Aristotle's teachings were as axiomatic in those days as is the theory o f relativity 
today. [ . . . ] This is one o f the main reasons alchemy enjoyed such long l i fe ." (Federman 1969: 4) 
1 8 Let us take only an example: "Mr . Homberg, the famous modern chemist, who brought that art to so great 
perfection, holds the substance of light or fire to be the true chemic principle sulphur, and to extend itself 
throughout the whole universe. It is his opinion that this is the only active principle; that mixed with various 
things it formeth several sorts of natural productions; with salt making oi l , with earth bitumen, with mercury 
metal; that this principle, fire, or substance of light, is in itself imperceptible, and only becomes sensible as 
it is joined with some other principle. . ." (Berkeley 1953: V, 95) 
1 9 C. G. Jung, for example, advocates this view. 
2 0 "To make the mental journey with him is to leave the screeching o f this bustling age, and to enjoy the 
effortless movement o f one o f our rarest minds gently expanding its practiced powers, carrying strange 
learning lightly, oscillating with ease between minute observations o f natural history and the large visions o f 
cosmology and theology, rising and falling freely through the several dimensions o f reality and thought — 
such was the charm of this voyaging mind — insufflating the narrative o f it all with a breadth as aromatic as 
the balsam with which it began." (T. E. Jessop in Berkeley 1953: V, 7) 
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Chapter Five: 
Philosophy as Apologetics 
As I showed in Chapter Two, God plays a central role in Berkeley's philosophy, as He is 
the supreme Perceiver of the world, which means that it is only thanks to him that things 
exist in the fullest sense of the word. Yet, God cannot remain an abstraction. He does not 
exist only in metaphysics, but also in history: there are always concrete modalities 
through which God pervades people's lives, conferring upon them meaning, and through 
which people worship God and seek to approach him. Hence religion. Berkeley was not 
content with simply postulating God as the supreme Author of the world, but he also did 
a great deal of philosophizing on religion and its importance in people's lives. 
In this context, the present chapter is an attempt at considering Berkeley's thought 
from the standpoint of the Christian apologetic tradition, and its objective is to show that 
one of the roots of Berkeley's thought could be found precisely in this tradition. Though 
this is not a chapter dedicated to what might be called Berkeley's theology1, references 
wi l l nevertheless be made here and there to some of Berkeley's theological ideas and 
arguments; it is not even possible to deal properly with an apologetic gesture without 
constantly taking into account the specific theological suppositions on which this is 
based, and whose visible and social expression that gesture is. The chapter has two large 
parts: 1) the first part is dedicated to delineating the theoretical framework within which 
the discussion of Berkeley's apologetics is to be placed, and, then, to the special 
relationship that theism bears, in Berkeley's system, to his immaterialism; and 2) the 
second part deals with Alciphron as an apologetic writing, in an attempt to place this book 
in the tradition of Christian apologetics. This part also discusses some of the rhetorical 
tools employed by Berkeley against free-thinkers, and the pragmatism of Berkeley's 
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apologetics: that is, the beneficial practical effects that the adoption of an active Christian 
attitude might have upon people's morality and social life are seen as an argument for the 
Christian faith. 
5.1. Fighting against atheism2 
5.1.1. In search for a framework: the relationship philosophy-religion 
It is almost a truism to say that, historically, philosophy has overlapped with religion. Yet, 
not only in a historical — which is to say, genetic — sense do many philosophical 
traditions seem to "emerge" from certain developments occurring in the sphere of 
mythology and religion (or religious thought), but there is also a structural sense in which 
philosophy is sometimes related to the religious. In this structural sense, there is 
something in the nature of philosophical exercise itself that has at bottom a certain 
religious character; in some way or other, explicitly or implicitly, much of philosophy has 
aimed at providing "ultimate explanations", which at the same time is one of the 
distinctive marks of any mature religion. And it is this situation that gives birth 
sometimes to a certain rivalry between philosophers and theologians. As Frederick 
Copleston has remarked, 
It seems evident.... that as far as doctrines and theories are concerned, 
philosophies can overlap with religions. Both may provide frameworks for 
life-orientation and doctrines about God and man's relation to him. And 
for this reason it is understandable i f some theologians are inclined to look 
on metaphysical systems as rivals to divine revelation and as offering an 
ersatz religion. (Copleston 1974: 5) 
To put it differently, just as some of the important philosophical questions are also 
problems with which theologians are concerned (even i f they look at them from a 
different angle), so some of the theological problems happen to be common currency in 
certain areas of philosophy. It is probably this fundamental "impurity" of philosophy, in 
the sense of its being sometimes "contaminated" by certain religious aspirations and 
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claims of "ultimate explanations", that confers upon it the tremendous cultural prestige it 
has enjoyed over the centuries, and still enjoys, among other humanistic disciplines — i f 
not even a certain "superiority of principle" over them. That the value, or quality, of a 
philosophy proves to be below one's expectations is not relevant in this case: what is 
relevant is that that philosophy, by its mere existence, is an expression of man's 
fundamental need for self-understanding, and for understanding the world within which 
he has found himself. As Frederick Copleston says, 
philosophical systems have in the past been inspired by a felt need which 
can properly be described as religious. Moreover, whether the philosopher 
is or is not the proper person to meet the need, the need has hardly 
vanished. [. . . .] This need is based on man himself, on man as existing in a 
historical situation in which... he has to act in view of end or goals. Hence 
it seems to me untrue to say that the idea of a religious promise or 
religious a priori is outmoded. (Copleston 1974: 8) 
Needless to say, the fact that philosophy and religion address similar fundamental 
questions does not mean at all that the answers, or solutions, they wil l bring forth are the 
same. Sometimes they might have something in common, just as sometimes they might 
differ radically. Theism, deism, atheism, agnosticism, various forms of religious/cultural 
relativism and skepticism — each of them is a particular manner (with its own principles, 
suppositions, and methods) of addressing the same set of interrogations, at which both 
philosophy and religion ultimately arrive. But it is not my intention here to deal in detail 
with the complex and multifaceted interdisciplinary situation resulted from the 
overlapping between philosophy and religion, however fascinating its investigation might 
be. What I am mainly concerned with is only to delineate, even i f in a sketchy manner, the 
theoretical framework within which a discussion of Berkeley's apologetic philosophy is 
to be placed. This is why I wi l l in the following focus only on few aspects of theistic 
(Christian) philosophy. 
One of the first things that a Christian philosopher has to do — qua philosopher 
— is undoubtedly to attain a proper rapport between faith and understanding. To put it 
very schematically, just as faith without understanding would rule him out as a 
philosopher, so understanding without faith would rule him out as a Christian. As a 
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consequence, a Christian philosopher wi l l look, whether knowingly or unknowingly, for 
the most harmonious possible relationship between the two. Of course, even within a 
non-religious context, faith and understanding are not completely independent from each 
other: there is always a complex dialectics operating here, and a subtle interdependence 
between the two terms, as any intellectual exercise presupposes, in he who does it, "faith" 
in a certain set of (logical, methodological, etc.) axioms, rules and principles, just as any 
act of faith has a certain "understanding" behind it, completely "blind faith" being an 
impossibility. 
But it is in the sphere of religious philosophy that this dialectical relationship 
between faith and understanding reaches its highest degree of complexity. St. Anselm 
expressed the fact most poignantly in his Proslogion: " I do not seek to understand that I 
may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe — that unless I 
believed I should not understand." (Anselm 1962: 6-7) In Anselm's view, the act of faith 
must necessarily buttress any attempt at understanding the divine and discoursing about 
it; without the existence of faith such attempts would be not only a hubris (unforgivable 
arrogance) in ethical/spiritual terms, but they would also be completely fruitless in strictly 
epistemic terms. Not that St. Anselm initiated this debate, or "invented" the problem (the 
issue at stake had been present in Christianity from its beginning, and Augustine, for 
example, dedicated a great deal of thinking to it), but it was Anselm who fully and acutely 
realized the crucial importance that the relationship faith-understanding might have for 
the idea of a specifically Christian philosophy. As a matter of fact, as Copleston has 
rightly noticed, once the process through which faith seeks self-understanding has made 
its debut, the emergence of a coherent system of Christian metaphysical thought is, in a 
way, unavoidable: "the process of faith seeking understanding of itself must lead at some 
point or other to what can be reasonably be described as metaphysical reflection." 
(Copleston 1974: 53). The notion of fides quaerens intellectum wi l l become one of the 
distinctive marks of the Christian theism, defining it as a distinctive form of 
philosophizing. Of course, within such a context, philosophy had what we would call 
today an "instrumental value": it was not in general pursued "for its own sake", as it 
seems to be today, but all its undertakings, approaches, and "discoveries" were overtly 
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put into the service of that supreme end: "the faith seeking understanding of i tsel f . I f we 
prefer, we might say that philosophy was "subordinated" to religion — that is, to an end 
alien to philosophy itself. But, I suppose, that language belongs to our own anachronisms, 
to our own projections onto the past, rather than to what medieval thinkers themselves 
thought of what they were doing. When one reads medieval philosophical texts one never 
comes across the frustration that a "subordination", or "enslavement", of philosophy 
should normally bring forth. On the contrary, one of the commonest notes of these texts 
seems to be a certain gladness of mind, intellectual enjoyment and visionary delight on 
the side of their authors. They simply seem to take what this form of "subordinated" 
philosophizing might bring to them as the supreme good one can attain in one's lifetime: 
"Since I conceive of the understanding to which we can attain in this life as a middle term 
between faith and the [beatific] vision, I judge that, the more anyone attains to it, the 
closer he comes to the vision to which we all aspire" (Anselm 1962: 178 [Cur Deus 
homo]) 
Although faith has to support understanding, it nevertheless does not interfere 
with the intellect's specific approaches. Anselm explains that what he aims at in the 
Monologion is to explain things in such a way that 
nothing from Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, 
but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should 
declare to be true, should, in an unadorned style, with common proofs and 
with a single argument, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and 
plainly expounded in the light of truth. (Anselm 1962: 35 
This is possible thanks to the fact that one of the fundamental principles upon which 
theism is based is that truth does not result from any human imposition, interpretation, 
negotiation, etc., but truth is the Truth, one of God's names. Truth is what both faith and 
understanding incessantly look for, each in its own way. "The order of faith" and the 
"order of understanding" are only different modalities of approaching one and the same 
thing. Truth, in this theological acceptance, is precisely what makes possible various 
"truths", in philosophy, in sciences or even in everyday life; at the same time, it is what 
confers upon one's faith certitude and firmness. That being said, within such a system of 
thought, it would be practically impossible for a mind to arrive at something contrary to 
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what faith asserts, as long as that mind has been well instructed and conducted, and the 
faith has been a "right" faith. The existence of Truth is the supreme "principle of order" 
conferring upon the believer's life meaning, integrity and direction. As Stephen Clark 
expressively remarked with regard to the case of the Christian theism, 
Christian theists acknowledge that there is a Truth wider than our 
conception of It, which demands our worshipful attention; that Its nature is 
such that It needs no further explanation; that It is such that we can 
reasonably think we might find out about It; that It is One, and therefore 
immaterial; that It must actually and entirely be what, intermittently, we 
are — that is, conscious; that it contains the standards for each finite 
being; that there must somewhere be something that is at once completely 
human and completely God. (Clark 1998: v i i i - ix ) 3 
One of the interesting ironies about the relationship theism-atheism is that, as it has been 
repeatedly remarked, atheism is massively dependent on theism. This dependence is in 
terms of vocabulary4, arguments, historical contexts, "techniques of persuasion", but it is 
also dependent in a deeper and more serious sense: its existence depends upon what 
occurs in the sphere of theistic thinking. Michael Buckley, in his monumental At the 
Origins of Modern Atheism, undertakes a systematic study of atheism in light of its 
"necessary" dependence on theistic thinking: " I f the emergent atheism simply reveals 
dialectically the internal contradiction which was lodged within the content of theism 
itself, then the understanding of atheism is possible only through the understanding of its 
generating matrix, theism. One issues from the other; one cannot make sense unless the 
other does." (Buckley 1987: 16) As a result, any investigation of the history of atheism, in 
its various shapes, should take as its starting point a thorough study of the tradition of 
theistic philosophy: 
Any attention to the origins of atheism in the West must attend as much — 
i f not more — to the theism of the theologians and the philosophers as to 
the atheism of their adversaries. Atheism must be seen not as a collation of 
ideas which happened to arise in Western thought but as a transition 
whose meaning is spelled out by the process and whose existence is 
accounted for in terms of the ideas which preceded it. (Buckley 1987: 16) 
I f Buckley considers atheism dependent on theism in a rather genetic sense — that is, in 
terms of vocabulary, historical contexts, influences, etc. — Stephen Clark takes a step 
further and considers this dependence in a structural sense: an atheistic thinking would 
not even be able to formulate itself, and make itself intelligible, in the absence of those 
principles of intelligibility postulated and advocated by theism. As a result, in the process 
of contesting the theistic world-view, the atheist is actually confirming the doctrine he 
opposes: 
even atheists, as long as they are rational ones, rely on Christian axioms, 
on theorems that would not be true i f Christian theism — or something 
very like it — weren't. [ . . . ] I f rational discourse is only possible in a God-
directed universe, it follows that rational atheists must actually rely upon 
the truth of theism even to argue against it: this is not to say that atheists 
are incapable of rational thought, but only that — perhaps forgivably — 
they miss the implication of their own practice. (Clark 1998: vii i) 
To Clark a theistic philosophy seems to be "the safest option" (Clark 1998: 134), and his 
ultimate idea is that, given our particular ontological make up, and the type of 
relationships we can establish with each other, with the world and with the past, the best 
thing we can do — here and now — is to philosophically resort to faith5. 
5.1.2. The philosopher's mission 
The first two editions (1713 and 1725) of George Berkeley's Three Dialogues between 
Hylas and Philonous bore the following long subtitle: The design of which is plainly to 
demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the 
soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. 
Also to open a method for rendering the Sciences more easy, useful and compendious. 
When Berkeley published the third edition (1734) of the Dialogues, he shortened this 
subtitle, and left only this phrase: In opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Yet, even in its 
shortened form, the subtitle makes it clear that Berkeley took as his supreme mission in 
the Dialogues (which, one might say, is a "translation" of the Principles into a more 
accessible and agreeable language) to fight and silence what he saw then as the 
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increasingly influential groups of atheists, sceptics, and free-thinkers, and in so doing he 
took his immaterialist philosophy as his main weapon. He knowingly "subordinated" his 
philosophical enterprise to a non-philosophical end, but he seemed particularly happy in 
doing so. 
It should be emphasised at this stage that Berkeley's notion of philosophy as a 
form of modern apologetics lies at the heart of his thinking. In other words, his intention 
was not, among other things, to silence the atheists with the arguments provided by his 
philosophy, but this was precisely his main intention, and he did everything in his power 
to accomplish it. He knowingly designed his immaterialist philosophy as a means of 
countering what the atheists and free-thinking were saying, and i f one overpasses this fact 
there are chances that one wi l l seriously misrepresent the essence of Berkeley's 
immaterialist philosophy. 
In the "Introduction" to the Dialogues Berkeley voices what he considered to be 
the main aim of writing this book: namely, an "utter destruction of atheism and 
scepticism". He believes that this wi l l take place simply as a logical consequence of his 
new philosophical principles being accepted by the public: 
I f the principles, which I here endeavour to propagate, are admitted for 
true; the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence, are, that 
atheism and scepticism wil l be utterly destroyed, many intricate points 
made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of science 
retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from 
paradoxes to common sense. (Berkeley 1949: I I , 168) 
It was his ardent hope that, as a result of a proper public assimilation and dissemination 
of his philosophy, not only would such intellectual diseases as scepticism and atheism 
disappear, but many of the current problems, theoretical difficulties and puzzles in the 
sciences wil l be solved for ever, as it were, as long as commonsense wil l triumph over 
paradoxes. As Berkeley saw it, his immaterialism had a certain therapeutic value. He wi l l 
say in Alciphron: "as bodily distempers are cured by physic, those of the mind are cured 
by philosophy" (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 139 [Crito speaks]). This manner of seeing 
philosophy in terms of medical metaphors has a long history behind it, with Buddha, 
Socrates and Plato at the beginning, and with a list of brilliant representatives. 
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Then, in the same "Introduction" to the Dialogues a crucial passage occurs in 
which Berkeley confesses his philosophical creed that "the sublime notion of a God, and 
the comfortable expectation of immortality, do naturally arise from a close and 
methodical application of thought" (Berkeley 1949: I I , 168). In a manner that definitely 
places him in the tradition of theistic Christian philosophy I discussed very briefly above, 
Berkeley comes to see the contemplation of God as a natural end of all the mind's 
pursuits: i f well and carefully conducted ("a close and methodical application of 
thought"), the human mind cannot but arrive at the sphere of the divine, enjoying the 
prospect of immortality and eternal peace. In other words, according to this line of 
thought, there is in us a fundamental natural inclination that makes us always direct all 
our desires, interests and actions towards what is eternal and changeless: "Among all 
these things... those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as 
eternal and unchangeable." (Augustine 1877: 18) If, in reality, the situation is different 
and we find ourselves sometimes desiring perishable or insignificant things, this happens 
— we wil l be advised — only because we are temporarily alienated. 
5.1.3. Either God or matter 
It was Berkeley's most profound conviction that the best way in which he could serve the 
cause of theism was to deny the existence of matter and of the material world. As it has 
been remarked, this was one of his earliest philosophical insights: even "as a teenager, 
Berkeley was already convinced that the notion of matter was incoherent, superfluous, at 
odds with common sense, and dangerous." (Cooper 1996: 260) At the beginning of his 
philosophical career, at a time when he was writing his Commonplace Book, he observed: 
"Matter once allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter." (Berkeley 1948: I , 
77) In a certain sense, all what he was going to do after that, through all his writings, was 
an incessant and laborious attempt at confirming that early intuition. In another chapter of 
this dissertation I wil l be trying to propose a look at Berkeley's immaterial ism from the 
point of view of the Cathar doctrines about matter, and to show how Berkeley's intuition 
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of the nonexistence of matter reflects at bottom a certain anxiety, on his side, of a Gnostic 
and Dualistic nature. But for the time being I wi l l only try to see how his immaterialism 
functions as a form of apologetic philosophy. 
First of all, there is no need for matter. Not only is matter unintelligible — we 
cannot, properly speaking, say that we perceive matter — but there is no reason 
whatsoever for accepting matter even as a problematic notion, to accept matter as, say, 
some "hypothetical notion" we might provisionally employ for "the sake of the 
argument", as it were. The acceptance of matter would bring us no theoretical benefits 
simply because there cannot be benefits, of any kind, that acceptance of matter might 
bring about. Philosophically speaking, matter is unnecessary and superfluous. God is 
more than sufficient as a source of meaning and (causal) explanation: all things have their 
"roots" in God, and it is in God that we can easily find their ultimate cause and 
explanation. God is what makes every explanation possible, meaningful and — above all 
— God is what confers upon any explanation completeness. Then, having no reason for 
accepting the existence of matter, only one reasonable solution remains — its complete 
denial: 
it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful 
is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of Nature. But as 
for the inert senseless matter, nothing that 1 perceive has any the least 
connection with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see 
anyone explain any the meanest phenomenon in Nature by it, or shew 
any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he 
can have for its existence ; or even make any tolerable sense or meaning 
of that supposition. (Berkeley 1949, II [Principles. ..§ 72]) 
Berkeley becomes concerned with the unhealthy effects that the acceptance of the 
existence of matter might have upon our minds, and upon the notions, theories, systems 
of interpretation we incessantly resort to in our attempts at making sense of the world we 
live in. Berkeley's thesis is that the acceptance of existence of matter is not an innocent 
thing at all. Although superfluous, the belief that matter exists, once given a place within 
our world-views, tends to corrupt our native common sense, and induce in us various 
pernicious notions and unhealthy theories. Chief among them is atheism. For Berkeley 
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atheism is one of the likely consequences of the acceptance of matter. An atheist is 
someone who gets the (wrong) idea that the world he finds himself in is the only world, 
the only reality; he is, as it were, "blinded" by what he encounters, and thus put in a 
position from which he cannot see anything beyond the cause of his blindness. And then 
he names this blinding world "matter". As Berkeley puts it, it was precisely upon the 
doctrine of matter or corporeal substance that 
have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion. Nay 
so great a difficulty hath it been thought, to conceive matter produced 
out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient 
philosophers... have thought matter to be uncreated and coeternal with 
him. [ . . . ] A l l their [the atheists'] monstrous systems have so visible and 
necessary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once 
removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; 
insomuch that it is no longer worth while, to bestow a particular 
consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of atheists. {Ibid. 
I I [Principles... § 92]) 6 
According to Berkeley's line of thought, not only are the atheists wrong: what is worst in 
their case is that they mistake their intellectual disease for an excellent health, and, as i f 
this misfortune would not be enough, they seek to propagate and widely disseminate their 
disease among others. For, as it has been observed, militant atheism "trades on exactly the 
same conviction as any proselytizing creed: that those who don't align themselves with 
Truth are lost, and must — for their own sake — be disabused of all their false 
conceptions, even i f it kills them" (Clark 1998: 44) 7. 
As such, the only solution lies in a systematic attempt at "healing" these "sick" 
people — the atheists. And this is precisely what Berkeley tries to do by the means of his 
philosophical writings. The fact that he decided to "translate" the philosophical substance 
contained in The Principles into a more accessible and friendly language in the Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous witnesses to the impressive determination that 
Berkeley invested in this project. Berkeley was deeply "disturbed at the remoteness of the 
'God of the philosophers' from the intimate God of simpler belief." (Cooper 1996: 260), 
and he was convinced that a solution for bridging this gap between the "two Gods" would 
consist in expelling the notion of matter out of the sphere of philosophy, arts and 
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sciences. For Berkeley, this would have as a result a replacement o f — to use the famous 
Pascalian phrasing — le Dieu des philosophes et des savants with the true God of 
Religion, le Dieu d'Abraham, d'lsaac, et de Jacob, le Dieu de Jesus-Christ. God wi l l be 
then resorted to as our ultimate source of metaphysical and existential meaning, and, as a 
result, some magna restauratio wil l necessarily take place in all branches of knowledge, 
with tremendously beneficial effects upon the future state of affairs of the mankind: 
Matter being expelled out of Nature, drags with it so many sceptical and 
impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling 
questions, which have been thorns in the sides of the divines, as well as 
philosophers...; that i f the arguments we have produced against it, are 
not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem) yet I am 
sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion, have reasons to wish 
they were. (Berkeley 1949, II [Principles...], § 96) 8 
5.2. Fighting against free-thinking 
5.2.1. Alciphron 
In 1732, some twenty years after he published his first writings of speculative philosophy, 
by means of which he was trying to fight against atheism, Berkeley published his longest 
work, in the shape of seven philosophical and apologetic dialogues. Its ful l title is: 
Alciphron: or, the Minute Philosopher. In Seven Dialogues containing An Apology for 
the Christian Religion, against those who are called Free-Thinkers. From some points of 
view, Alciphron is significantly different from Berkeley's previous writings, with perhaps 
the exception of the Three Dialogues. The difference is in terms of length, contents, types 
of argumentation, reliance upon authorities, style, literary devices and rhetorical 
techniques employed, and perhaps even in terms of the audience intended. The fact that 
his early philosophical writings had not enjoyed the success Berkeley expected, or even 
some form of acceptance among the public, had probably something to say about why 
Alciphron differs so much from them. 
123 
First of all, from a literary point of view, Alciphron is almost unanimously 
recognized as one of the major accomplishments in the English language: "as a work of 
art it stands supreme in the whole body of our English literature of philosophy, and 
perhaps supreme also in our literature of religious apologetics" (Jessop 1950: 2). 
Berkeley's writing had always been elegant and highly expressive, but with Alciphron the 
artistry and literary qualities of Berkeley's writing came to occupy a central position, 
functioning as a distinct means of persuasion and as an important weapon in disputes 
with free-thinkers and atheists. T. E. Jessop, one of Alciphron's modern editors, placed 
Berkeley's Alciphron in a tradition of the dialogical form in philosophy whose history 
could be traced as far back as the Platonic dialogues. Actually, when reading Alciphron, 
one cannot help thinking that Berkeley wrote this work constantly bearing in mind the 
Platonic art of the philosophical dialogue: 
his model was clearly Plato, from whom he learned more than anyone else 
has done the art of writing philosophical dialogue. After his master, only 
he has produced dialogues that are at once good philosophy and eminent 
literature. Some of his passages read as though they were transcripts of a 
Socratic conversation in a new Attic tongue. Outside Plato there is nothing 
in this genre to compare Alciphron with, except Berkeley's own Three 
Dialogues. (Ibid.: 2) 
Both Crito and Euphranor, the two characters standing for Berkeley's own position in the 
confrontation (Crito's "knowledgeable, sarcastic, and witty interventions express one side 
of Berkeley's mind; Euphranor's simple sincerity expresses the other side" [Ibid. AS]), 
make abundant use of Socratic irony, sarcasm, pretended ignorance and other techniques 
of puzzling and silencing the opponents. (More wi l l be said about this later on in the 
chapter.) 
In the second place, Alciphron differs from Berkeley's other writings in the sense 
that it is conceived of as an apologetic writing, and has to follow the specific rules of the 
genre to which it belongs. "Apologetic is... the defence of a cause or party supposed to be 
of paramount importance to the speaker. I t . . . is distinguished from polemic (which need 
not assume any previous attack by the opponent) and from merely epideictic or occasional 
orations." (Edwards et al. 1999: 1). As such, when writing Alciphron Berkeley was not 
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supposed to simply state his own position and then support it with arguments and various 
forms of evidence. The fundamental requirement that an apologist has to meet is to cope 
successfully with what his opponents claim against his position, to counter their claims by 
showing, as well as he can, that the counter-arguments brought against the position he 
defends are flawed in some way or other: "apologetics address outsiders, and must deal 
with the views of their own group and others' misconceptions of them" (Price 1999: 106) 
More than that: not only does he have to perform all these things, but he has to do so in 
such an elegant, persuasive, and compelling manner that the current opponent should 
"mysteriously" become some day a supporter of the apologist's position. As a result, what 
we should expect to find in Alciphron is not a systematic presentation of the Christian 
philosophy, but a solid refutation of what free-thinkers then thought about Christianity. 
And, indeed, as has been remarked, in Alciphron "Christian beliefs are stated defensively, 
not in the order required by their own logic, but with a shape and emphasis devised to 
meet the contemporary objections of intellect and mood. The philosophy in it is 
subservient to that aim." (Jessop 1950: 4) 9 
In the third place, Alciphron is specifically and vigorously directed against a 
certain social and intellectual group, or "sect", increasingly more influential in Berkeley's 
time, namely, the free-thinkers: "The author's design being to consider the free-thinker in 
the various lights of atheist, libertine, enthusiast, scorner, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, 
and sceptic" (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 23 [Advertisement]). Of course, as we have seen above, 
in a way Berkeley's all philosophical writings were conceived of as means of silencing 
the atheists, sceptics, and free-thinkers. Yet, whereas in his previous writings he dealt 
with the theoretical principles on which he thought atheism was founded (the doctrine of 
matter, for example), and brought forth speculative arguments against these principles, in 
Alciphron Berkeley addresses free-thinking as a (pathologic) social and cultural 
phenomenon: 
Free-thinking was rampant in drawing-rooms, coffee-houses and taverns, 
and there it was less decent than it was in books. To call that a cult of 
reason would be cant, and to stigmatize Berkeley's satire as overdrawn 
would be to take our picture of the life of his day from its published 
documents. He rightly makes his characters... remind us that free-thinking 
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as a social fact was to be found most in conversation. [ . . . ] He was dealing 
less with a theory... than with a fashionable attitude, one that regarded 
religious people, and most of all the clergy, as stupid, inelegant, and either 
sycophantic or tyrannical... (Jessop 1950: 6) 
The necessity that Berkeley stringently felt of "healing" his neighbours' minds and 
morals, of immediately expelling the intellectual disease of free-thinking out of society, 
requires that the emphasis in Alciphron be placed not so much on the would-be 
philosophical doctrines behind the free-thinking (although a great deal is dedicated to 
tracing their sources and to showing their flaws) as on warning against, describing in 
detail, and combating the extremely pernicious effects that these doctrines might have on 
public and private morality, on the civic life and well-being of the community: " I f any 
man wishes to enslave his country, nothing is a fitter preparative than vice; and nothing 
leads to vice so surely as irreligion." (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 104 [Crito speaks}); "all those 
who write either explicitly or by insinuation against the dignity, freedom, and immortality 
of the human soul, may so far forth be justly said to unhinge the principles of morality, 
and destroy the means of making men reasonably virtuous." (Ibid.: 23 [Advertisement])}0 
As a matter of fact, this was the wisest solution that Berkeley could arrive at. One 
of the reasons why it is so difficult to counter and fight efficiently against atheism is that 
there are so many ambiguities about it. As Michael Buckley said, 
The problem with atheism is that it is not a problem. It is a situation, an 
atmosphere, a confused history whose assertions can be identical in 
expression and positively contradictory in sense. The ambiguity which 
marks such terms as god and atheism can be discovered in almost every 
critical proposition about this situation. (Buckley 1987: 13-4) 
Thus, realizing that metaphysical argumentation against materialism, and abstract 
disputes with atheists, might in fact be of no practical use (the fortune of his earlier 
writings might have convinced him sufficiently of that), Berkeley decided to change his 
modalities of expression, employ new types of argumentation, and resort to some novel, 
more efficient weaponry. More specifically, he resorted to some of the weapons used by 
his own opponents. 
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5.2.2. Approaching free-thinking a la Voltaire 
One of the most interesting and refreshing things about Alciphron is probably the fact 
that the two characters standing for Christian apologists (Crito and Euphranor) make — 
in defending their Christian faith and refuting the claims advanced by the free-thinkers — 
an extensive and impressive use of rhetorical tools traditionally attributed to the free-
thinkers themselves: irony, caustic satire, arguments based on the reductio ad absurdum, 
sophisticated derision, humour, and so on. Obviously, Alciphron is not only that: it 
contains a great deal of theological, historical, ethical and philosophical materials, but — 
besides all these — there is in this book a distinct element of devastating irony and 
supremely artful satire directed against free-thinkers. This wi l l make Berkeley's free-
thinkers be defeated, as it were, in a purely Voltairian manner". 
It goes without saying that Berkeley used this rhetorical procedure deliberately, 
and expected from its employment certain results in terms of persuading the audience and 
gaining their approval and support: "Like all satire, Alciphron is designed to encourage 
and direct our feelings of contempt and resentment." (Walmsley 1990: 115) Once he 
becomes "caught up" within the carefully woven narrative, the reader of Berkeley's book 
ceases to be an impartial and detached observer, but — thanks to, again, the admirable 
artistry, refined rhetoric and sophisticated techniques of persuasion Berkeley employed — 
he feels that he has to make a certain choice: namely, to side with the cause of Christian 
theism. And he wil l do that for the simple reason that siding with the free-thinkers would 
go against his deepest emotions and feelings caused by the internalisation o f the book. In 
fact, this was exactly what was supposed to happen as satire (and Alciphron is an 
admirable satire) in a means of providing an "emotive constraint on the vicious man, 
playing upon his fears of rejection. But satire also appeals widely to public spirit, stirring 
our anger against those who threaten the status quo.'" {Ibid.: 115) 
The two free-thinkers are portrayed only sketchily at the beginning, and as the 
dialogues progress, they are made to reveal themselves in their entirety. "They are both 
men of fashion, and would be agreeable enough, i f they did not fancy themselves free-
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thinkers. But this, to speak the truth, has given them a certain air and manner which a 
little too visibly declare they think themselves wiser than the rest of the world." (Berkeley 
1950: 33 [Crito speaks]) A first hint is thus dropped that what is called "free-thinking" is 
not in fact something existing positively and substantially, but it just happens that there 
are some eccentric people who decide to "fancy themselves" free-thinkers. As it were, 
free-thinking is merely a word some people use in order to ennoble their eccentricity or 
desire to epater le bourgeois. The elder free-thinker, Alciphron, "is above forty, and no 
stranger either to men or books". He is well traveled ("through the polite parts of 
Europe") and since his return from le grand tour "he hath lived in the amusements of the 
town, which being grown stale and tasteless to his palate, have flung him into a sort of 
splenetic indolence" {Ibid.: 32 [Crito speaks]). In a sense, Alciphron is (depicted as) a 
honest and commonsensical person, having become an atheist only as a result of a 
sequence of skeptical crises'2. Due to the numerous prejudices that free-thinkers are, 
according to Berkeley, particularly predisposed to, he was not able to overcome these 
crises and chose to "fancy himself a free-thinker". Lysicles, instead, is much more 
interesting a case, and Berkeley abundantly exercises his irony when portraying him. 
"The young gentleman...is ...one of lively parts and a general insight into letters, who, 
after having passed the forms of education and seen a little of the world, fell into an 
intimacy with men of pleasure and free-thinkers, I am afraid much to the damage of his 
constitution and his fortune." {Ibid.: 32 [Crito speaks]) Lysicles is cynical, stubborn and 
sophistical; as Walmsley says, he "is a philosopher only so far as he may use reason to 
undermine those laws, human and divine, which threaten to rob him of his pleasure." 
(Walmsley 1990: 111) Crito is somewhat exaggerating when saying about Lysicles that 
he has a "general insight into letters": Lysicles himself confesses later on in the course of 
the dialogues that, caught up as he was in the demanding practice of free-thinking, he 
could not find the time, in his university years, to "mind the books" l 3 . Otherwise, he does 
not have anything to reproach the university with: "For my part, I find no fault with 
universities. A l l 1 know is that I had the spending three hundred pounds a year in one of 
them, and think it the cheerfulest time of my life. As for their books and style, 1 had no 
leisure to mind them." (Berkeley 1950: 197 [Lysicles speaks])^. 
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One of the recurrent ideas in Alciphron is that there is a fundamental duplicity in 
the current behaviour of the free-thinkers, and that using double standards is one of their 
favorite tricks. Not only are free-thinkers destroyers of the morality proper (as upholders, 
among other things, of the "private vices, publick benefits" theory), but, suggests 
Berkeley, by the way in which they behave in debates and intellectual confrontations, they 
break fundamental rules of the "ethics of knowledge": "To me it seems the minute 
philosophers, when they appeal to reason and common sense, mean only the sense of their 
own party." (Ibid.: 243 [Crito speaks]) Thanks to their compulsive desire to epater le 
bourgeois, free-thinkers often come to place themselves in, to say the least, very 
embarrassing situations: 
When one of them has got a ring of disciples round him, his method is to 
exclaim against prejudice, and recommend thinking and reasoning, giving 
to understand that himself is a man of deep researches and close 
argument.... The same man, in other company, i f he chance to be pressed 
with reason, shall laugh at logic, and assume the lazy supine airs of a fine 
gentleman, a wit, a railleur, to avoid the dryness of a regular and exact 
enquiry. This double face of the minute philosopher is of no small use to 
propagate and maintain his notions. (Ibid.: 158 [Crito speaks]) 
The free-thinker is too much an actor to be an authentic and honest thinker. His behaviour 
is dictated primarily by the imperative of pleasing, provoking, or wooing various 
audiences. The free-thinker, as portrayed in Alciphron, does not feel any need for self-
coherence or intellectual honesty: " I f Mahometan ism were established by authority, I 
make no doubt those very free-thinkers, who at present applaud Turkish maxims and 
manners to that degree you'd think them ready to turn Turks, would then be the first to 
exclaim against them." (Ibid.: 193 [Crito speaks]). What they pursue is not the truth, but 
what happens to be fashionable at a given moment or considered scandalous in 
conservative circles. Yes, they make frequent references to common sense, experience, 
and nature — "O nature! Thou art the fountain, original, and pattern of all that is good 
and wise." (Ibid.: 62 [Alciphron speaks]) — , but it is obvious enough that as soon as the 
common sense, nature and experience wil l infirm their claims, they wi l l call any appeal to 
them "prejudice" and "obscurantism". Thanks to their lack of seriousness and intellectual 
honesty, to their duplicity, thirsty of social success, thanks to their permanent eagerness to 
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epater le bourgeois, Berkeley's free-thinkers are very much like some of the ancient 
sophists, as Plato depicted them in his dialogues, and, one might add, like some upholders 
of today's postmodernism, multiculturalism, etc. The free-thinkers' enjoyment is not one 
derived from some deeper intellectual satisfaction, but it is one coming from the childlike 
pleasure of doing things "for the sake of the game". This makes Euphranor advance, very 
ironically, the idea of a certain "resemblance between fox-hunters and free-thinkers; the 
former exerting their animal faculties in pursuit of game, as you gentlemen employ your 
intellectuals in the pursuit of truth. The kind of amusement is the same, although the 
object is different." {Ibid. : 175 [Euphanor speaks]). As a result, irresponsible as they are, 
they are never prepared to accept the logical outcome of what they have been saying or 
assenting to l D . I f the definition of prejudice is to take as a starting point what can only be 
attained through argumentation, and to refuse to accept what has been attained through 
argumentation, then the two free-thinkers are simply caught in flagrant delit of gross 
prejudice: 
Alciphron: I have been drawn into some concessions you won't like. 
Lysicles: Let me know what they are. 
Alciphron: Why, that there is such a thing as a God, and that His existence 
is very certain. 
Lysicles: Bless me! How came you to entertain so wild a notion?" {Ibid.: 
162) 
One of the supremely humorous events in Alciphron occurs when Crito openly accuses 
free-thinking o f bigotry. This is exactly the type accusation that we expect the least to be 
brought to free-thinkers1 6. To draw a contemporary comparison, it is as though some 
feminist activist would be openly accused of macho attitudes: 
it has been often remarked by observing men that there are no greater 
bigots than infidels. [ . . . ] 1 see a bigot wherever I see a man overbearing 
and positive without knowing why, laying the greatest stress on points of 
smallest moments, hasty to judge of the conscience, thoughts, and inward 
views of other men, impatient of reasoning against his own opinions..., 
and attached to mean authorities. {Ibid.: 283 [Crito speaks]) 
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This peculiar bigotry, their histrionics, playfulness and lack of any deeper intellectual 
commitment are exactly what undermine the free-thinkers' approaches most seriously. 
They cannot succeed in proving God's nonexistence because, properly speaking, they 
have decided not to do so. A l l they mainly wish to do is to draw people's attention to 
them, by shocking those who happen to listen to them. As a result, their atheistic claims, 
i f taken seriously, seem to the two Christian apologists so weakly supported by arguments 
and evidence that Crito simply exclaims: " I cannot help thinking there are points 
sufficiently plain, and clear, and fu l l , whereon a man may ground a reasonable faith in 
Christ: but that the attacks of minute philosophers against this faith are grounded upon 
darkness, ignorance, and presumption." {Ibid.: 280 [Crito speaks]) 
Behind Berkeley's humorous attack is the serious point that, according to some 
authors, "there are more difficulties than atheistical commentators... suppose in 
conceiving a truly godless universe in which it would still be reasonable to prefer one 
outcome to another" (Clark 1998: 14). Thus, the crucial existential advantage that the 
recognition of God's existence might confer upon the one who makes the theistic claim is 
that, in making this claim, he is thoroughly self-consistent. As it were, according to this 
line of thought: God exists, He is the Logos, the ultimate principle upon which human 
reason itself is based, and without which no meaningful utterances would ever be 
possible. Therefore, the fact itself that one is saying "God exists" is, in a way, a proof of 
God's existence. The possibility of a meaningful utterance is based on the fact that there 
is a Meaning. Of course, from a logical point of view, this might be seen as circular, but 
the theist might well answer this objection by pointing to the fundamental circularity that 
generally characterizes our discourses. Stephen Clark, who is an upholder o f this point of 
view, says: "The rules and axioms of free-thinkers are also taken upon trust, and are less 
acceptable than religious rules and axioms just because they claim that nothing should be 
taken upon trust." (Clark 1998: 130) Ironically, free-thinkers, despite their "holy war" 
against prejudices of any kind, come to rely on various prejudices themselves: 
self-styled free-thinkers who spoke out against "religious prejudice" 
necessarily relied on prejudice themselves, while simultaneously denying 
themselves the right to do so. Those who say there is no inner light at all, 
cannot coherently trust their own judgment; those who say that testimony 
131 
and inherited opinion must all be abandoned condemn themselves to an 
incorrigible ignorance. (Ibid.: 129) 
This is, of course, too complex a situation to be dealt with here, in a chapter not 
specifically dedicated to the problem of atheism. A l l what I wished to point to was the 
larger context within which Berkeley's discussion of free-thinking should be placed. 
5.2.3 "The holy all iance" 
One of the important means by which Crito and Euphranor constantly support their 
theistic claims consists in the resort to a perennial tradition of wisdom, to sayings of 
various Oriental sages, ancient thinkers and other authoritative figures, in order to 
validate their claims. This wi l l be, in fact, Berkeley's main working method in Siris (see 
Chapter 2, especially the section 2.2), but he uses this technique to a great extent in 
Alciphron, too. I f the arguments brought forth by Crito or Euphranor for accepting such 
and such an opinion, however strong they might be, are nevertheless deemed 
insufficiently compelling by their opponents, then a reference is made to some past 
venerated figures who held the same, or a similar, opinion. The supposition behind the 
use of such a techniques is that — human reason being one and the same everywhere and 
at all times — by accepting theism, one in fact accepts what is only natural for reason to 
accept, that, in other words, theism in nothing but the most reasonable philosophy, or the 
healthiest doctrine, of mankind, having been confirmed again and again over the 
centuries, not only in Europe, but also in China or Persia, not only by Christians, but also 
by Heathens or Jews: 
Reason is the same, and rightly applied wil l lead to the same conclusions, 
in all times and places. Socrates, two thousand years ago, seems to have 
reasoned himself into the same notion of a God which is entertained by the 
philosophers of our days, i f you wi l l allow that name to any who are not of 
your sect. And the remark o f Confucius, that a man should guard in his 
youth against lust, in manhood against faction, and in old age against 
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covetousness, is as current morality in Europe as in China. (Berkeley 
1950: I I I , 58-9 [Euphranor speaks]) 
Not that we should accept unconditionally all that comes from authorities. This would be 
simply prejudice and laziness of mind. But the point is that, in those cases in which, after 
we have been given reasonable arguments that a certain doctrine is true, and — more than 
that — had it endorsed by the wise men of the past, there is no reason left why not to 
accept it. 
The resort to the wisdom of the past centuries functions in Alciphron as another 
test that the notions advanced by the two free-thinkers have to pass. And the fact that 
these notions fail to pass this test is one more proof that the free-thinkers are mistaken. Of 
course, there were sufficient logical and philosophical arguments against the free-
thinkers' notions, but Berkeley, through his mouthpieces Crito and Euphranor, wants us 
to see even more clearly not only that free-thinking is unnatural to our reason, but that it 
has been so all over the mankind's history. 
Let us see how this testing works. Crito explains how the free-thinkers have taken 
a course contrary 
to all the great philosophers of former ages, who made it their endeavour 
to raise and refine human-kind, and remove it as far as possible from the 
brute; to moderate and subdue men's appetites; ...and direct them to the 
noblest objects; to possess men's minds with a high sense of the 
Divinity. . . and the immortality of the soul. [ . . . ] But... our minute 
philosophers act the reverse of all other wise ...men; it being their end... 
to erase the principles of all that is great and good...; to unhinge all order 
of civil life, to undermine the foundations of morality, and... to bring us 
down to the maxims and way of thinking of the most uneducated and 
barbarous nations, and even to degrade human-kind to a level with the 
brute beasts. (Ibid.: 54 [Crito speaks]) 
The past is not dead, nor vanished, but it constantly comes into the present to give it 
shape, more coherence and self-understanding. What has been significant and valuable in 
the past is now condensed, or embodied, in various forms, and in our current dealings 
with the world, or in our dealings with ourselves, we cannot simply pass over these 
embodiments of the past. Just as one person has his own heritage of private memories, 
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stories, and personal histories, a heritage that actually shapes his present life, conferring 
upon it coherence and identity, so a community — be it a village, a city or a nation •— has 
its own storage of stories and historical memories that certainly shapes its present, and 
future, life. In other words, not only do we have to just "take into account" our past, but 
— more importantly — we have to know how to make the best use of it. 
The use that Berkeley made of the "wisdom of the Heathens", and of the other 
"past authorities" is in fact a feature that Berkeley shares with the entire Christian 
apologetic tradition. From its very beginning, Christian apologetics showed a marked 
tendency to appeal to, and make use of, non-Christian elements in order to support its 
own claims. These non-Christian elements were put together and made to work in 
harmony. Needless to say, what was overtly contrary to the principles of the Christian 
faith was left aside and even refuted, following the advice o f St. Justin Martyr: "Reason 
dictates that those who are truly pious and philosophers should honour and love only the 
truth, declining to follow the opinions of the ancients, i f they are worthless" (Justin 1997: 
23). But there were still enough elements of the classical culture that the early Christian 
philosophers and apologists could safely take aboard and use in their interest17. And so 
they did: "The leading apologists [of the first Christian centuries] are almost unanimous 
in opting for a synthesis of Biblical faith with classical culture. They take over many of 
the characteristic theses of Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry." (Dulles 1971: 71) 
Especially the classical Greek philosophy was highly regarded by the early Christian 
authors, and they made every effort to take over its "healthy" part and to incorporate its 
into Christianity. Not only was Greek philosophy (particularly the Platonic tradition, as 
Aristotle was to become fashionable among Christians much later) "in agreement" with 
some of the fundamental tenets of the Christianity, but some of the early Christian authors 
developed the interesting notion that it was particularly through their philosophy that the 
ancients were in fact preparing Christ's coming. 
With writers such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
Eusebius of Caesarea, we find the notion of philosophy as the instrument 
by which the Logos, which illuminates every man who comes in to the 
world, prepared the minds of the Gentiles for the gospel of Christ. The 
Jews were prepared by the Law and the prophets, the Gentiles by 
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philosophy. The Christian revelation was the fulfillment of both. 
(Copleston 1974: 25) 
The early Christians saw Plato as, so to speak, a "Christian before Christ". For 
philosophy, at its best, cannot be but work is the service of Logos; one cannot do 
philosophy without being, at the same time, a worshiper of the true God, a lover of the 
divine Wisdom. Jesus Christ was revealed to the Jews personally, in flesh and blood, but 
to the Greeks philosophically, as philosophical logos. In St. Justin Martyr's words: "not 
only among the Greeks through Socrates were these things revealed by reason [logos], but 
also among the Barbarians were they revealed by logos personally, when He had taken 
shape, and become man, and was called Jesus Christ." (Justin 1997: 26). 
Not only did this borrowing from the ancients simply take place, but we can even 
find in St. Augustine a sophisticated theory about the Christians' "right" to take over, 
incorporate and use what was valid in the past: in his own words, it is a taking over "from 
those who have unlawful possession of it". Reading analogically the story of the Jews' 
flight from Egypt, Augustine offers an excellent and powerful sample of Christian 
philosophising about history, about deaths and births of civilisations, and about ways of 
using the past: 
i f those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have 
said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are... to claim it 
for our own use from those who have unlawful possession o f it. For, as the 
Egyptians had not only the idols and heavy burdens which the people of 
Israel hated and fled from, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and 
silver,... which the same people when going out of Egypt appropriated to 
themselves, designing them for a better use..., in the same way all 
branches of heathen learning... contain also liberal instruction which is 
better adapted to the use of the truth, and some most excellent precepts of 
morality; and some truths in regard even to the worship of the One God 
are found among them. Now these are, so to speak, their gold and silver... 
These... the Christian... ought to take away from them, and to devote to 
their proper use in preaching the gospel. (Augustine 1877: 75-6) 
As we can see, the past was not dead at all for these authors, and they knew how to make 
the best use of it. 
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5.2.4. The argument from utility 
Since the "visual language argument" for God's existence that George Berkeley brings 
forth in Alciphron makes the object of another chapter in this dissertation (Chapter II I , 
especially the section 3.2.), I wil l in the following deal only with what might be called 
"the argument from utility" that Berkeley provides in this writing for God's existence. 
The two Christian apologetics in Alciphron, after having brought a great deal of 
logical, philosophical, historical, authoritative arguments and evidence in support of their 
claim that Christian theism is the best option, arrived at a point where they employed a 
series or pragmatic arguments for accepting the Christian faith. In other words, i f the 
previous arguments are not to be considered compelling enough, then there still remains 
the possibility that one should accept Christianity for reasons of utility. The extremely 
beneficial effects that accepting Christianity have over the centuries had on people's 
lives, morals and well-being, the wonderful "works" that Christianity have constantly 
performed in terms of making people better, wiser, happier, more virtuous and readier to 
help their neighbours, the social peace, general harmony and public reconciliation that 
living by Christian standards brings always about — all of these are undeniable proofs 
that this religion is the right choice, and that anyone, i f he is to be a man of sense, has to 
accept it immediately: 
one great mark of the truth of the Christianity is, in my mind, its tendency 
to do good, which seems the north star to conduct our judgment in moral 
matters, and in all things of a practic nature; moral and practical truths 
being ever connected with universal benefit. [ . . . ] the Christian religion, 
considered as a fountain of light and joy, and peace, as a source of faith, 
and hope, and charity..., must needs be a principle of happiness and virtue. 
(Berkeley 1950: I I I , 178 [Crito speaks]) 
In his "natural state", man is a rather gross, rude and unpleasant creature. His reason is 
weak, and untrained, his feelings are elementary and brutal, and his opinions uncertain 
and shapeless. His aspirations are reduced to merely survival, meeting the elementary 
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needs of life and sheer absence of suffering. In this context, it is religion that helps him 
rise from this state of brutality and become a creature "in the image and likeness of God". 
Particularly, Christian religion, in those places in which it has come to prevail, has proven 
to be an invaluable means of civilizing and bettering people's lives. In order to illustrate 
this argument, Berkeley gives a number of concrete examples. One of them regards the 
formation of the English people under the guidance and stimulation of the Christian faith. 
He takes it as an "invincible p roo f of the "power and excellency of the Christian 
religion" that, "without the help of those civil institutions and incentives to glory, it 
should be able to inspire a phlegmatic people with the noblest sentiments, and soften the 
manners of the northern boors into gentleness and humanity." (Ibid.: 184-5 [Crito 
speaks]) Berkeley is not saying that this was a miracle, but the note of enthusiasm of 
these and other passages implies that we could safely use here the term "miracle" at least 
in a metaphorical sense. 
Fascinated as he was with the world of the South, which produced — among other 
good things — Greek and Roman classic antiquity, Berkeley thought that it was only 
thanks to the tremendous civilizing efforts the Christianity constantly made over the 
centuries that modern English culture was now able to raise itself to the same level of 
sophistication, refinement and good taste as that of the ancient Greeks. Given the 
particular circumstances under which the Northern peoples lived, they had to do through 
great effort what the ancient Greeks did simply in virtue of their natural inclinations: 
what but religion could kindle and preserve a spirit towards learning in 
such a northern rough people? Greece produced men of active and subtle 
genius; and their natural curiosity was amused and excited by learned 
conversations, in their public walks and gardens and porticos. Our genius 
leads to amusements of a grosser kind: we breath a grosser and a colder 
air; and that curiosity which was general in the Athenians... is among our 
people of fashion treated like affectation. (Ibid. : 201 [Crito speaks]) 
Obviously, this is not only a fact belonging to British history. Wherever and whenever 
Christianity has been accepted and left to guide people's lives, its practical effects have 
always been impressive. In times of crisis and uncertainty, the Church has been the only 
stable ground, the only hope for those who were seeking hope. I f there still was in Europe 
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a sense of what classical antiquity meant, that was due mainly to Christianity. The 
transmission itself of the classical heritage to the modern times was only possible through 
the important efforts made by the Church; Christian authors (and authorities) have always 
paid a special attention to the preservation and encouragement of the classical learning: 
But who are they that encouraged and produced the restoration of arts and 
polite learning? What share had the minute philosophers in this affair? 
Matthias Corvinus King of Hungary, Alphonsus King of Naples, Cosmus 
de Medicis, Picus of Mirandola,... famous for learning themselves, and for 
encouraging it in others with a munificent liberality, were neither Turks, 
nor Gentiles, nor minute philosophers. Who was it that transplanted and 
revived the Greek language and authors, and with them all polite arts and 
literature, in the West? Was it not chiefly Bessarion a cardinal, Marcus 
Musurus an archbishop, Theodore Gaza a private clergyman? (Ibid.: 203 
[Crito speaks]) 
Finally, we should not take the utility argument as being concerned only with social, 
historical, civilizational and cultural aspects. In addition, there is also a deeper sense in 
which accepting the points of Christian theism would have significantly beneficial effects 
upon our inner life. For being a Christian means not only performing certain rites and 
observing a certain set of moral rules, but also a certain way of looking at, of 
understanding and making sense of the world in which one has found himself. For, in 
Berkeley's view, it is precisely by adopting a Christian theistic position that we are given 
a key to the ultimate beauty, harmony, and orderliness of this world: 
In a system of spirits, subordinate to the w i l l , and the direction of the 
Father of spirits, governing them by laws and conducting them by methods 
suitable to wise and good ends, there wi l l be great beauty. But in an 
incoherent fortuitous system, governed by chance, or in a blind system, 
governed by fate, or in a system where Providence doth not preside, how 
can beauty be, which cannot be without order, which cannot be without 
design? (Ibid.: 129-30 [Crito speaks]) 
It is worth observing that Berkeley's pragmatism in matters apologetical was not at all his 
own invention. In fact, in employing the arguments from utility he was actually placing 
himself in a long tradition of Christian thinkers, theologians and apologists who have in 
the past made a similar use of the utility arguments. Pointing to the beneficial effects that 
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accepting the Christian faith could have on one's social, moral and intellectual life had 
been a method used by apologists since the beginnings of Christianity. For example, in 
his First Apology, St. Justin Martyr explains how the idea of an all-knowing and all-
seeing God makes Christians necessarily improve their moral lives: "...not only our 
deeds, but also our thoughts are open before God. And many, both men and women, who 
have been Christ's disciples from childhood, have preserved their purity at the age of 
sixty or seventy years. [ . . . ] what shall we say then of the countless multitude of those 
who have turned away from intemperance...?" (Justin 1997: 32) Origen draws a sharp 
comparison between the social behaviour of various communities of Christians 
("Churches of God") and the behaviour of their fellow-citizens. The Christian way of life 
definitely helps the former live a more decent and virtuous life than the latter do: 
The Church of God, say, at Athens is meek and quiet, since it desires to 
please God. But the assembly of the Athenians is riotous and in no way 
comparable to the Church of God there. [ . . . ] I f the man who hears this has 
an open mind, and examines the facts with a desire to find the truth, he 
wi l l be amazed at the one who both planned and had the power to carry 
into effect the establishment o f the Churches of God in all places. (Origen 
1953:147) 
Origen then observes how those Christians who are in positions of authority or charged 
with public responsibilities, due to their virtuous private lives and their "improved" 
natures, show a tendency to serve better their communities, and to be better rulers than 
the non-Christians: "compare the ruler of the Church in each city with the ruler o f the 
citizens, and you wi l l understand how... there is a superior progress towards the virtues 
surpassing the character of those who are councillors and rulers in the cities." (Ibid.: 148) 
In short, there are numberless practical points of view from which adopting Christianity 
can be seen as the best, the safest and most profitable solution. 
The special role that the performance of miracles might play in inspiring people's 
faith and in converting them to Christianity might also be considered in connection with 
this pragmatic apologetics. In his De Civitate Dei St. Augustine 1 8 talks of three 
"incredibilities" revealed by Jesus' life and the subsequent expansion of Christianity: 
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It is incredible that Christ should have risen in His flesh and, with His 
flesh, have ascended into heaven; it is incredible that the world should 
have believed a thing so incredible; it is incredible that men so rude and 
lowly, so few and unaccomplished, should have convinced the world, 
including men of learning, of something so incredible and have convinced 
men so conclusively. 1 9 
St. Augustine does not explicitly see the rapid expansion of Christianity as a miracle, but 
he seems to suggest i t 2 0 . As it were, everything was — by common human standards — 
so incredible and beyond any reasonable expectations that only through the secret 
intervention of the divine might we explain why this happened in the way in which it did. 
The issue wi l l be taken over by St. Thomas Aquinas, who wi l l overtly consider 
the successful conversion of large communities of people as a "miracle", a "sign" that 
God is sending us as a means by which we could learn even more about the truth, 
rightfulness and providentiality of the Christian religion. As St. Thomas puts is, 
This wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is the 
clearest witness of the signs given in the past; so that they should be 
further repeated, since they appear most clearly in their effect. For it would 
be truly more wonderful than all signs i f the world had been led by simple 
and humble men to believe such lofty truths, to accomplish such difficult 
actions, and to have such high hopes. Yet it is also a fact that, even in our 
own time, God does not cease to work miracles through his Saints and for 
the confirmation of the faith. (Aquinas 1955: 1, 72-3 [Summa contra 
Gentiles]) 
But this is, obviously, another story. The only reason why 1 have made here these 
references to some of the figures of the Christian apologetics was to offer an intelligible 
historical framework within which to place Berkeley's pragmatic arguments for the 
Christian faith in his Alciphron. 
Notes: 
For the theological dimension o f Berkeley's thought see, for example, Stephen Clark's God, Religion and 
Reality, specially the chapter "Communities o f Faith" (Clark 1998: 123-134), Edward Sillen's George 
Berkeley and the Proofs for the Existence of God (Sillen 1957), and Hedenius' Sensationalism and 
Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy (Hedenius 1936) 
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2 Some o f the ideas contained in this section might slightly overlap with what has been already said in the 
chapter "Berkeley and the Platonic tradition" or elsewhere. 
J One o f the major theoretical consequences that the existence o f such a metaphysical supposition has upon 
a theistic philosophy consists in the advantage " o f principle", so to say, that it has over an atheistic one in 
offering much "bolder", more comprehensive and more synthetic explanations, or, as is has been said, "a 
greater coordinating and synthesizing power" (Copleston 1974: 69). A theistic philosopher may — safely 
and self-consistently — cluster around his notion o f God a whole system o f suppositions and hypotheses 
based on which he would be able to make sense of things otherwise very diff icul t to explain: "a theistic 
world-view is capable o f accommodating within itself the forms of human experience and the aspects o f 
reality which other world-visions take account of, and that, in addition, it makes better sense of certain 
forms o f experience, such as religious experience, than can be made by a non-theistic world-vision." 
(Copleston 1974: 88) 
4 "Atheism is necessarily dependent upon theism for its vocabulary, its meanings, and its embodiments. 
Atheism has often been dependent upon theism for its evocation and its existence." (Buckley 1987: 17) 
5 " I t is reasonable to believe what we cannot 'prove'; it is even reasonable to believe, and feel, what we 
can't understand. Both theses depend upon a further 'religious' axiom, that the Origin is to be trusted. I f we 
could not sensibly believe the testimony o f ages, nor trust our common sense or 'natural taste', we should 
have no escape f rom chaos. To that extent, we must live on faith. I f we could not sensibly believe that what 
is now obscure may still have a solution, and may guide our hearts, we must remain 'minute philosophers'." 
(Clark 1998: 132) 
6 The corresponding fragment in Three Dialogues reads as follows: "But allowing matter to exist, and the 
notion o f [its] absolute existence to be as clear as light; yet was this ever known to make the Creation more 
credible? Nay hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels o f all ages, with the most plausible argument 
against a Creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds o f 
spirits, should be produced out o f nothing by the mere wil l o f a spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so 
contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but 
even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought matter coeternal with the Deity. Lay these 
things together, and then judge you whether materialism disposes men to believe the creation o f things. 
(Berkeley 1949: I I , 256 [Three Dialogues...]) 
7 In Alciphron, when a the central debate is agreed upon Crito remarks about the two free-thinkers: "they 
wi l l please themselves with the prospect o f leaving a convert behind them, even in a country village." 
(Berkeley 1950: I I I , 33) 
8 More wi l l be said about George Berkeley's denial o f the existence o f matter in Chapter V I I in the present 
dissertation. 
9 Moreover, "Alciphron is a model o f the psychology and logic o f controversy, and to a large degree o f the 
ethics o f it too. No other apologetic work known to me has stated the objections to Christianity so ful ly , 
cogently and pungently, met them so directly, and kept the logical principles of decent discussion so clearly 
to the fore." (Jessop 1950: 8) 
1 0 I f free-thought had lost some o f its novelty by the time Berkeley wrote Alciphron, its proponents had lost 
none o f their energy. Both Collins's Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony and the second volume o f 
Mandeville's Fable were first published in 1729, and in 1730 Tindal's exhaustive Christianity as Old as 
Creation appeared. Berkeley's satiric purpose in Alciphron is the exposure o f this social phenomenon; 
Lysicles and Alciphron are not just reflections o f the moral and religious ideas they propound, but 
renderings o f a recognizable social type." (Walmsley 1990: 110) 
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" "While Euphranor's method seems radically different from Crito's, its effect is surprisingly similar - and 
ironic rereading o f the free-thinkers' words. As with Crito's parodies, the end is a comic self-negation in 
which the voice o f free-thought is made to contradict itself." (Walmsley 1990: 114) 
1 2 "[HJaving observed several sects and subdivisions o f sects espousing very' different and contrary 
opinions, and yet all professing Christianity, I rejected those points wherein they differed, retaining only 
that which was agreed to by all, and so become a Latitudinarian. Having afterwards, upon a more enlarged 
view o f things, perceived that Christians, Jews, and Mahometans had each their different system o f faith, 
agreeing only in the belief o f one God, I became a deist. Lastly, extending my view to all the other various 
notions which inhabit this globe, and finding they agreed in no one point o f faith, but differed one from 
another, as well as from the forementioned sects, even in the notion o f God, in which there is as great 
diversity as in the methods o f worship, I thereupon became an atheist." (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 43-4 [Alciphron 
speaks]) 
1 3 As a matter o f fact, the most enlightened among free-thinkers are not people who have dedicated 
themselves to the academic study: "Our philosophers... are o f a very different kind from those awkward 
students who think to come at knowledge by poring on dead languages and old authors, or by sequestering 
themselves from the cares o f the world to meditate in solitude and retirement. They are the best bred men o f 
the age, men who know the world, men o f pleasure, men of fashion, and fine gentlemen." (Berkeley 1950: 
I I I , 47 [Alciphron speaks]) 
1 4 For the proper education o f the free-thinker the crucial thing is not to attend universities, but to find out a 
"good company". Finding a "good company" is the key to every successful education, as only by the means 
of such a company does the free-thinker's formation properly take place: "much is to be got by conversing 
with ingenious men, which is short way to knowledge, that saves a man the drudgery o f reading and 
thinking" (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 165 [Lysicles speaks]) But where precisely do these sages teach their 
learning? Where can these embodiments o f wisdom be found and attended? The answer comes from Crito: 
"in a drawing-room, a coffee-house, a chocolate-house, at the tavern, or groom's porter. In these and the 
like fashionable places o f resort, it is the custom for polite persons to speak freely on all subjects, religious 
moral, or political. [ . . . ] Three or four sentences from a man of quality, spoke with a good air, make more 
impression and convey more knowledge than a dozen dissertation in a dry academic way." (Berkeley 1950: 
I I I , 48 [Crito speaks]) 
1 5 "Your free-thinkers... seem to mistake your talent. They imagine strongly, but reason weakly; mighty at 
exaggeration, and jejune in argument." (Berkeley 1950: I I I , 209 [Crito speaks]) 
1 6 "Those who think o f themselves as 'scientists', and especially those who most despise the dogmas o f 
religion, are often wi l l fu l ly dogmatic." (Clark 1998: 131) 
1 7 " [ I ] n the process o f faith seeking understanding o f itself — in the development, that is to say, o f 
theological reflection — use was made o f concepts, or at any rate o f terms, taken from the philosophy of the 
ancient world." (Copleston 1974: 26) 
1 8 Actually, one o f the writings o f St. Augustine is called On the Usefulness of Belief. 
1 9 Quoted by Dulles (Dulles 1971: 64) 
2 0 See Dulles for this discussion (Dulles 1971: 64) 
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Chapter Six: 
George Berkeley's "Bermuda Scheme" 
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, I would like to show that not only were 
Berkeley's ways of philosophizing rooted, as it has been shown in the previous chapters, 
in some ancient and medieval traditions of thought, but also even when designing such a 
practical project as the "Bermuda scheme" Berkeley was, in a serious way, under the 
modeling influence of the past. More precisely, the present chapter purports to offer a 
discussion of Berkeley's project to build a theology college in the Islands of Bermuda (the 
so-called "Bermuda Scheme") in terms of symbolic geography and Utopian projections, 
and in light of some traditions and patterns of thought governing the Western 
representations of the "happy islands", "earthly paradise", Utopia, and eschaton. In the 
second place, I would like to point to a certain relationship that might be established 
between the substance of Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy and the Utopian character 
of his "Bermuda project". 
The chapter has three parts: 1) In the first part 1 wi l l try to place Berkeley's 
idealized representation of the Islands of Bermuda in the tradition of the search for the 
"earthly paradise", as it has been traditionally described in the ancient and medieval 
literature. Then, I wi l l show how Berkeley's project might be regarded as occupying a 
place in the history of educational Utopias. 2) In the second part I wi l l be showing that 
Berkeley's American Project is hardly understandable without taking seriously into 
account its Messianism; and 3) The third part wi l l be dedicated to following a certain 
parallel between Berkeley's philosophy and theoretical commitments, on the one hand, 
and some facts of his biography, especially the Bermuda affair, on the other. 
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6.1. Between "earthly paradise" and educational Utopia 
6.1.1. Berkeley's "happy island" 
It was in 1725 that Berkeley published a paper titled — not particularly concisely — "A 
Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, and for 
Converting the Savage Americans, to Christianity, By a College to be erected in the 
Summer Islands, otherwise called The Isles of Bermuda." (Berkeley 1955: V I I , 343-60) 
This title is in fact describing almost the whole project. Prior to that, the philosopher, 
since about March 1722, had written several private letters to friends and acquaintances 
on the same topic, each of them containing enthusiastic descriptions of the Bermuda 
islands. The letter to Lord Percival, dated March 4 t h 1722 (Berkeley 1956: VI I I 127-9), is 
of special interest, as in it Berkeley announces for the first time his intention to establish a 
theology and fine arts college in those remote islands, and — more than that — to spend 
there all the rest of his life ("It is now about ten months since I have determined with 
myself to spend the residue of my days in the Island of Bermuda, where I trust in 
Providence I may be the mean instrument of doing good to mankind." [Ibid.: 127])'. 
Finally, there are of course those famous stanzas by Berkeley dedicated to the project, 
confessing his lack of satisfaction, i f not disappointment, with the Old World, and 
announcing that "Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way". (Berkeley 1955: V I I 
373 [Verses on America]) 
Despite the fact that he had never travelled to Bermuda (and, ironically, he would 
never do so), Berkeley offered in both his letter to Percival mentioned above and his 
Proposal an amazingly detailed description of the islands, of their natural landscapes, 
beauties, resources, richness, prosperity, of their inhabitants (emphasising, for example, 
the purity and innocence of their manners), and so forth. Berkeley's literary talent helps 
him to portray the islands magnificently, compensating for the absence of a direct 
familiarisation with them. Since the description itself is an excellent piece of writing and 
plays a significant role in my argument, I wi l l reproduce below some excerpts from it: 
The climate is by far the healthiest and most serene, and... the most f i t for 
study. [ . . . ] There is the greatest abundance of all the necessary provisions 
for life, which is much to be considered in a place for education. [ . . . ] It is 
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the securest spot in the universe, being environed round with rocks all but 
one narrow entrance, guarded by seven forts, which render it inaccessible 
[ . . . ] The inhabitants have the greatest simplicity of manners, more 
innocence, honesty, and good nature, than any of our other planters. 
(Berkeley 1956: VIII 128 [Letter to Percival}) 
On the other hand, although the Proposal is written some years after this letter, it still 
retains the same enthusiasm and idealization as does his letter to Percival. Everything 
about those islands was as perfect as something could possibly be in this world: 
no Part of the World enjoys a purer Air, or a more temperate Climate, the 
great Ocean which environs them, at once moderating the Heat of the 
South Winds, and the Severity of the North-West. [ . . . ] the Air of Bermuda 
is perpetually fanned and kept cool by Sea-breezes, which render the 
Weather the most healthy and delightful that could be wished, being... of 
one equal Tenour almost throughout the whole Year, like the latter End of 
a fine May. (Berkeley 1955: VI I 351) 
A crucial part of the description is that in which the numberless natural "beauties of 
Bermuda" are listed. The islands seem unusually ful l of wonders and blessings, 
abundantly supplied with lots of natural resources as useful as beautiful. On Bermudas 
the whole of nature conspired to produce one of the most beautiful places in the universe. 
The fact that the island was a "chosen" place for unusual spiritual accomplishments was, 
as it were, beyond any reasonable doubt. The only thing one can do is just to admire 
unreservedly what one "encounters" there: 
the summers refreshed with constant cool breezes, the winters as mild as 
our May, the sky as light and blue as a sapphire, the ever green pastures, 
the earth eternally crowned with fruits and flowers. The woods of cedars, 
palmettos, myrtles, oranges & c, always fresh and blooming. The 
beautiful situations and prospects of hills, vales, promontories, rocks, lakes 
and sinuses of the sea. The great variety, plenty, and perfection of fish, 
fowl , vegetables of all kinds, and... the must excellent butter, beef, veal, 
pork, and mutton. But above all, that uninterrupted health and alacrity of 
spirit, which is the result of the finest weather and gentlest climate in the 
world. (Berkeley 1956: VI I I 128 [Letter to Percival}) 
Now, one of the first ideas occurring in one's mind when reading such a description is 
that the way in which Berkeley describes the Islands of Bermuda is strikingly similar to 
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those in which the "earthly paradise" has traditionally been described and represented 
within the medieval mirabilia, in the medieval, Renaissance and early modern travel 
literature, and various other "amazing" accounts of "Happy Islands". And one of the 
striking things about the portrait of his islands is that behind his detailed description of 
them does not actually lie any actual documentation or "field research", but only the 
primordial phantasm, so to speak, of a wonderful, innocent and uncorrupted world. In a 
way, Berkeley did not even need to go and see the islands in order to be able to describe 
them: he apparently found them, with all their wonderful paradisiacal appearance, in the 
repertoire of his own inner intellectual world. On writing these texts, Berkeley seemed to 
be driven by a strong tendency towards "idealization", or "sacralization", of something 
otherwise quite profane. He ends up attributing to a neutral group of Atlantic islands 
almost all the ennobling characteristics of the "earthly paradise", as it had traditionally 
been imagined since the Greco-Roman antiquity2. 
First of all, it is the very notion of island that confers on the whole story a special 
character3. An island is not a place like any other; an island is a clearly privileged space, a 
space that — thanks to its isolation, remoteness and difficult accessibility, to its 
mysteriousness and autonomy — has acquired a particular cultural-symbolical dignity 
from the very outset of the human culture4. The sophisticated interplay between water and 
land, the agonic and complex dialectics between these two primordial elements 
(stoicheia) gave birth eventually to a new, intermediary entity: the island. The island is 
more than land-and-water, it acquires something that neither land nor water has: the 
capacity to cause in us a greater fascination and curiosity. As Claude Kappler excellently 
put it, i f there are "any places that have a special appeal for imagination it is islands. [ . . . ] 
an island is by its nature a place where marvels exist for their own sake outside the laws 
that generally prevail... Ever since Greek antiquity, islands have been favorite places for 
the most astounding human and divine adventures." (Qtd. in Delumeau 1995: 98) 5 This 
makes islands have an impressive metaphorical value. Like mountains, for example, they 
are often involved in several forms of the intellectual discourse: literary, poetical, 
theological, mythological, Utopian, political, etc. An island could be made to signify, from 
case to case: hope, survival, salvation, firm ground, freedom, independence, regeneration, 
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una vita nuova, certitude, and so on. No wonder then that the "earthly paradise" itself has 
often come to be located somewhere on an island: "Dante ...gave the earthly paradise the 
characteristics of an island, and in many medieval travel stories, especially Mandeville's, 
the kingdom of Prester John is located on an island. According to Mandeville, mysterious 
India is 'divided into isles on account of the great rivers which flow out of Paradise."' 
(Delumeau 1995: 98) 
The usual name under which the "earthly paradise" islands have been traditionally 
known is that of "Happy Island(s)". Why this particular name? Medieval scholars had a 
particular way of explaining it. Pierre d 'Ail ly , for example, says that the "name 'Happy 
Isles' means that these islands contain all good things. It is the fruitfulness of the soil that 
makes people believe that paradise was located in these islands..." (Qtd. in Delumeau 
1995: 99) In fact, as Jean Delumeau has showed, this explanation was borrowed from 
Isidore of Seville, and it was widely spread throughout Middle Ages. In his Etymologiae, 
Isidore states that: "The name 'Happy Isles' means that they produce all sorts of good 
things; that they enjoy a quasi-blessedness and have the advantage of happy abundance. 
By their very nature they give birth to precious trees and fruits. The slopes of the hills are 
naturally covered with vines. Instead of grass the soil for the most part yields crops and 
vegetables." (Qtd. in Delumeau 1995 99) 
This repetition, in several cases, of the same explanation, emphasizing the same 
factors (abundance of goods, ideal climate, wonderful landscapes, etc.) certainly 
contributed to the strengthening of the tradition, and confirms that the "Happy Island" 
was not an isolated and marginal topos at all, but a deeply rooted and long lasting one. 
They played an essential part in the formation and dissemination of a symbolic 
geography, one which, as we wil l see later on in this chapter, would massively shape the 
conceptions and representations of the Western discoverers and travelers: 
the Happy Islands stand in a Greco-Roman poetic tradition that is based on 
passages in Homer, Hesiod, and Plutarch. According to this tradition, 
beyond the towering Atlas there lie islands with enchanted gardens, a 
constant temperate climate, and fragrant breezes, where human beings 
have no need to work. In the Christian era Isidore of Seville gave this 
belief a new popularity by assigning it a place in his geography, which 
then exerted a lasting influence on Western culture. (Delumeau 99) 
147 
What is interesting at this stage is that Berkeley himself, in another private letter, uses 
openly the term: he came to talk about "that happy Island" (Berkeley 1956: VII I 156) with 
explicit reference to his Bermuda project. As it is known, he was also a lecturer in Greek 
and Latin and had an impressive classical training. So that it is reasonable to suppose that 
he knew something about this tradition of the insula pomorwn que fortunata vocatur (the 
island of apples that is called the happy island), as Geoffrey of Monmouth (d. 1154) 
describes it in his Vita Merlini, as well as about the various ways in which the "earthly 
paradise" had been searched for, described and eulogized in the European world ever 
since classic antiquity. 
In consequence, based on the (imaginary) account that Berkeley gives of the 
Island(s) of Bermuda, and on the various similar accounts by ancient, medieval or early 
modern authors, of which some were referred to above, it can safely be suggested that 
Berkeley's representation of the location and settings of his future theology and arts 
college was deeply marked by a certain nostalgia for an "earthly paradise". It was 
probably the religious substance of this feeling that gave him an extraordinary strength 
and determination to pursue his project for so many years, and overcome all the criticisms 
it encountered from the side of the more practical politicians and "technicians" of the day. 
It may have been this "nostalgia" for the "earthly paradise" that made him be so 
wonderfully enthusiastic6 and, as we shall see below, particularly unrealistic about the 
real situation of, and problems with, those islands (the poverty and immorality of the 
inhabitants, unstable climate, strong winds, etc.). Quite expectedly, the project eventually 
failed, Berkeley being much laughed at, and even considered mad, by some London wits 
of that time 7 . Nevertheless, despite its failure, this project has something significant to say 
not only about Berkeley's personality, but also about the deeper intellectual perspectives 
that nourished his philosophy and understanding of the world around, as well as about his 
rapport with the past. 
The natural place of Berkeley's enthusiastic description of the Bermudas — with 
all their countless wonders and amazing resources and paradisiacal landscapes, with their 
perfect situation, the "gentlest climate in the world", "the securest spot in the universe" 
— is simply on one of those "detailed maps from the end of the Middle Ages [which] still 
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teaches" us that "there exist in the West paradisal islands 'that abound in all good things'. 
These islands combine most of the elements that make for an earthly paradise: pleasant 
warmth, perpetual spring, delicious and fragrant fruits." (Delumeau 1995: 100-102) Even 
i f Berkeley's Bermudas cannot possibly exist in terms of actual geography, they certainly 
have an important role to play in the history of symbolic geography. Needless to say, it is 
not a very common thing for a philosopher, the less so for a promoter of the "new 
philosophy", to deal with such "un-serious" and speculative things as the "earthly 
paradise". But this is maybe what makes Berkeley so interesting: his being a truly 
uncommon philosopher. 
6.1.2. Berkeley's Utopia 
The nostalgia for an "earthly paradise" revealed by Berkeley's Bermuda project is only 
one of the facets of Berkeley's "Bermuda Scheme". The "happy island" is only the 
"spatial" framework within which something (important) is going to take place, the item 
of symbolic geography based on which his project is going to be put into practice. 
Therefore, there must be another element of this scheme we have to deal with: it is, 
namely, its Utopian dimension. Berkeley's project, far from being an isolated attempt, a 
personal and incomprehensible caprice, might be coherently placed in the long tradition 
of the "educational Utopias". Since his main intention was to establish a college there, a 
place dedicated to learning and the cultivation of sciences, an investigation of Berkeley's 
"Bermuda project" precisely in light of the Utopian tradition would cast, I think, a better 
view on the entire affair. Let me mention at this stage that I am not the only one to use 
this term in relation to his Bermuda project. One hundred years ago, dealing with 
Berkeley's educational project, A. C. Fraser came to talk about Bermuda as "a region 
whose idyllic bliss poets had sung, and from which Christian civilisation might radiate 
over the Utopia of a New World, with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of 
the human race." (Fraser 1901: IV 343) 
As Northrop Frye once put it, any Utopia is ultimately a discourse about education. 
I f not in their explicit purposes and statements, Utopian authors presuppose — at least 
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implicitly — a consideration of education as a decisive factor in transforming 
(improving) their fellow-humans. Indeed, in Frye's view, this has a certain Platonic 
component, whether or not the Utopian writers are Platonists themselves: 
And though not all utopia-writers are Platonists, nearly all of them make 
their Utopias depend on education for their permanent establishment. It 
seems that the literary convention of an ideal state is really a by-product of 
a systematic view of education. That is, education, considered as a unified 
view of reality, grasps society by its intelligible rather than its actual form, 
and the Utopia is a projection of the ability to see society, not as an 
aggregate of buildings and bodies, but as a structure of arts and sciences. 
(Frye 1965: 37-8) 
Of course, Berkeley's Utopia is, in a rigorous sense, only an incomplete, partial Utopia. 
So to speak, it is not a hard, but a soft Utopia. More than the ambitious ideal state 
envisaged in Plato's Republic, Berkeley's Bermuda resembles to some extent, for 
example, that Bildungsprovinz described in Herman Hesse's Das Glasperlenspiel: an 
ideal scholarly society, dedicated to cultivating superior arts and sciences, located in some 
privileged space, clearly separated from the corrupted and corrupting outside world, and 
designed to embody, preserve and convey the noblest values and virtues of the 
humankind. The island becomes in such a case a spatial symbol of salvation and 
regeneration through learning, science and fine arts. 
The notion of (Utopian) separation from the outside (profane) world 8 , of self-
protection and inaccessibility is clearly expressed several times by Berkeley: "The Group 
of Isles ...walled round with Rocks, which render them inaccessible to Pirates or 
Enemies; there being put two narrow Entrances, both well guarded by Forts. It would 
therefore be impossible to find any where, a more secure Retreat for Students." (Berkeley 
1955: VI I 352) Berkeley's strong emphasis on this aspect of his project is perfectly 
justified when considered in light of the Utopian tradition: remoteness, difficulty of access 
and isolation are necessary not only for keeping young innocent students safe from the 
corrupting profane world, or for preventing it from interfering with the normal course of 
the academic/utopian affairs, but also for conferring a high prestige and esteem, on this 
scholarly community. For the strength of such an ideal scholarly community does not 
consist only in the intrinsic nature, in the volume and quality of its learning or in its 
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scientific accomplishments, but also — maybe more importantly — in its publicly and 
socially recognized image. 
Once all the specific requirements are met, Berkeley's "soft" Utopia is ready to 
make its debut: 
Among a People [the inhabitants of Bermuda] of this Character, and in a 
Situation thus circumstantiated, it would seem that a Seminary of Religion 
and Learning might very fit ly be placed. The Correspondence with other 
Parts of America, the Goodness of the Air, the Plenty and Security of the 
Place, the Frugality and Innocence of the Inhabitants, all conspiring to 
favour such a Design. Thus much at least is evident, that young Students 
would be there less liable to be corrupted in their Morals; and the 
governing Part would be easier, and better contented with a small Stipend, 
and a retired academical Life, in a Corner from whence Avarice and 
Luxury are excluded. (Ibid.: 353) 
As it appears, life — of course, private life included — in such an "ideal community" is 
dominated by a certain form of artificiality: as it were, life is not allowed to take its 
natural course, but it is very carefully and in detail "regulated", ordered, surveyed, 
controlled, kept far away from any possible "un-natural" vices and temptations — in 
short, life is thoroughly rationalized. As has been said, "Utopias are necessary for many 
reasons. One reason is that there is always a need to accommodate the excess of private 
desires to the public good, politics to ethics, moderation to freedom." (Mazzotta 2001: 
60) 
This process of "rationalization" is an essential characteristic of any Utopian 
organization, starting with its very outset: recruitment of its members. As has been 
remarked about the recruitment of new members in Hesse's Das Glasperlenspiel, "an 
exchange between Castalian institutions and their surroundings persists: since all 
Castalians are celibate men and since they do not have any alternative form of 
perpetuating their ascetic community (immortality, regeneration, cloning, etc.), lay 
children are recruited on the basis of their intellectual and artistic performance by 
thoroughly combing the schools of the real world." (Antohi 2000: xi) Similarly, 
Berkeley's ideal scholarly society needs regularly new members. Its main intention is to 
produce worthy priests and missionaries who are to be involved in the propagation of 
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Gospel and conversion of Indians; consequently, there is a need for an established way of 
replacing them and permanently renewing the Utopian community. 
It is at this point that Berkeley's system differs significantly from that envisaged 
by Hesse. For, while the new members of Castalia were "elected", being invited to join 
the Utopian community only after an extremely difficult process of selection, in 
Berkeley's Bermuda among the toughest procedures are those related to the recruitment 
of future members of the scholarly community. Basically, 
The young Americans necessary for this Purpose, may in the beginning be 
procured, either by peaceable Methods from those savage Nations, which 
border on our Colonies, and are in Friendship with us, or by taking captive 
the Children of our Enemies. (Berkeley 1955: V I I 347) 
This controversial aspect of Berkeley's Bermuda scheme has long been discussed among 
Berkeley scholars. David Berman openly regards this violent solution as "chilling" and, 
despite his constant sympathetical consideration of Berkeley, he cannot help being very 
sarcastic at this point: "The Indian children are to be kidnapped. Why? No doubt, for their 
spiritual advantage." (Berman 1994: 132-3) On the other hand, Harry Bracken advances 
an interesting millennialist hypothesis which I wi l l be examining later on in this chapter. 
Apart from that, there are clear and detailed regulations with regard to the 
schooling itself. As in other Utopias, for example in Plato's Republic, there are similarly 
rationalized and detailed procedures regarding access to the Utopian community, starting 
age, precise subject matters to be taught, and so on: 
It is proposed to admit into the aforesaid College only such Savages as are 
under ten Years of Age, before evil Habits have taken a deep root; and yet 
not so early as to prevent retaining their Mother Language, which should 
be preserved by Intercourse among themselves. 
It is further proposed, to ground these young Americans thoroughly 
in Religion and Morality, and to give them a good Tincture of other 
Learning; particularly of Eloquence, History and practical Mathematics; to 
which it may not be improper to add some skill in Physics. (Berkeley 
1955: VI I 347-8) 
This is the only reference Berkeley makes to the curriculum to be used in his college. Had 
he got the necessary funds from the British authorities, he would have of course had to 
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offer a much more detailed curriculum, and an ampler description of the academic 
programs to be undertaken in the college. Sketchy as it is, the Proposal does not go into 
more detail about Berkeley's educational doctrines. It is interesting to notice at this point 
that Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy does not play any role in shaping his Utopian 
project. He did not built up his Utopian project on principles derived from his own 
philosophical system, but he simply followed the traditional Utopian way of thinking. The 
details he provides in his Proposal are derived not from such and such Berkeleian 
immaterialist theses, but from the inner logic of utopianism itself. 
Some of Berkeley's commentators and admirers have been seriously embarrassed 
coming across such tough things in his writings. The conventional image of the "good 
Bishop" would rather exclude all these unpleasant procedures, regulations or 
"brutalities". It seems to me at this point that, in light of the utopia-based hypothesis 
announced above, such procedures, however cruel or "totalitarian" they might appear, are 
to some extent understandable, or at least made intelligible: they belong to a certain 
pattern of Utopian thought, to a particular way of considering the relationship private life-
public life, and — in the mind of their upholders — such procedures tend to lose their 
seeming "cruelty" and "totalitarianism" i f considered as mere means for obtaining a much 
greater good: an obvious improvement, or transfiguration, of the fellow-humans' ways of 
life. According to such a line of thought, which can be easily followed from Plato to 
Marx, the impressive, overwhelming "advantages" that such a transfiguration would 
bring about are much greater and more important than the possible "local 
inconveniences" it might cause to those who happen to be involved. Eventually, it is the 
benevolence, noble motivations and generosity of the Utopian projects that result in these 
unpleasant side-effects. 
Obviously, it is not here a matter of agreement or disagreement with these violent 
procedures: I am simply trying to place them in a wider context of traditions of Utopian 
thought, and see how are they derived, explained and justified. For, insofar as it is 
possible to talk about a "perennial Utopian theme", as Frank Manuel has put it (Manuel 
1965: 70), I think that Berkeley's Bermuda project could be better understood i f regarded 
as belonging to the long tradition of those similar projects through which this Utopian 
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theme has been approached, developed, and made famous. A l l these detailed and 
unpleasant provisions, regulations and tough measures Berkeley envisaged are, as it were, 
born out of an ardent genuine desire to see his neighbours happier, less distressed and 
more virtuous, just as in any other Utopian project. Besides, Berkeley lived in a rather 
"innocent" age, one that had not witnessed any real attempts at putting Utopian projects 
into practice. 
6.1.3. The "incongruity" 
I f a "state of mind is Utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which 
it occurs" (Mannheim 1936: 192), then Berkeley's state of mind when conceiving of and 
proposing his Bermuda project was certainly Utopian. The huge and unbridgeable gap (or 
"incongruity", in Mannheim's terminology) between the real (geographical, natural and 
social) situation of the islands and their ideal situation in Berkeley's mind (i . e., the way 
in which he misrepresented them) is revealed by both some of the contemporary 
opponents to his scheme and — maybe more importantly — by several accounts of the 
real Bermudas from the first colonists there, dated some decades before Berkeley's 
scheme and which are still extant. 
Arthur Aston Luce, who studied thoroughly the whole affair, found that — when 
the project came to be discussed in the British Parliament for obtaining the necessary 
financial support — opposition to Berkeley's "Bermuda scheme" was not all the time 
malevolent or unjustified. There were some realistic people ("enlightened opposition") 
who criticized Berkeley's project on the basis of their own knowledge of the real situation 
of the Islands. Among them, William Byrd of Virginia, for example, "who with local 
knowledge opposed the project, not as undesirable, but as impracticable", brought — in a 
remarkably ironical form — pertinent and solid arguments against Berkeley's project. He 
saw Berkeley as "a Don Quixote in zeal" and his project as a "visionary scheme": 
There is no bread in Bermuda; there is nothing f i t for the sustenance of 
man but onions and cabbages; its inhabitants are healthy, because, 
forsooth, they have so little to eat; the air is pure because swept by storms 
and hurricanes.... There are no Indians in Bermuda, "nor within two 
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hundred leagues of it upon the continent, and it wi l l need the gift of 
miracles to persuade them to leave their country and venture themselves 
upon the great ocean, on the temptation of being converted". The Dean 
must take the French way and dragoon them into Christianity. He must 
take half a dozen regiments, and "make a descent upon the coast of 
Florida, and take as many prisoners as he can." Behind the sarcasm... is 
the assurance of the man with local knowledge. (Luce 1949: 137) 
On the other hand, there are those accounts from the first colonists in Bermuda, mainly 
private letters which were edited some time ago under the title The Rich Papers. Letters 
from Bermuda 1615-1646. Eyewitness Accounts Sent by the Early Colonists to Sir 
Nathaniel Rich, describing both the natural circumstances under which the islands were 
then planted and administrated, but also the numerous other problems, for example 
serious troubles caused by the drunkenness and immorality of the inhabitants. The sharp 
contrast between the poor "state of reality" in Bermuda and Berkeley's too enthusiastic 
"state of mind" is marked at times by such chilling fragments as this one: " I f the 
Adventurers [the company then administrating the islands] send noe clothes to this poore 
people before this time 12 months, many of them wilbe naked i f not dead." (Ives 1984: 
14) Undoubtedly, some of the serious problems might have been solved by Berkeley's 
time, but it is not reasonable to believe that the very unfriendly climate, for example, had 
changed very much in the meantime. 
These accounts depict a small world, with its fortunes and misfortunes, with its 
happy and unhappy events, all of them bearing apparently no resemblance to any "earthly 
paradise". At least not more than any other corner (island) of the known world. Life in 
Bermuda was taking its course in a more or less bearable manner, but sometimes there 
were events so terrific that seemed to seriously jeopardize the very minimal conditions of 
living there. For example, as it is recorded, one such event was a tremendous invasion of 
rats: 
Rattes have been and are a great judgement of God upon us. A l l the Hands 
have been in a manner like so many Cunny [coney, rabbit] warrens, which 
did put the people much out of heart. It is incredible how they did swimme 
from Hand to Hand, and suddainly like an armie of men did invade the 
Hands from one end to an other, devouring the fruites of the earth in 
strange manner. (Ibid.: 14)9 
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As for the morals of the inhabitants, highly praised by Berkeley, they were not, at the time 
of writing of these accounts, as exemplary as one could wish. For example, some of the 
Bermudans seem to have often resorted to the virtues of wine. To the extent that, far from 
being overwhelmed by innocence, moderation, and other noble virtues, some of them had 
come to be seriously fond of drinking. A Bermuda priest wrote once to Sir Nathaniel 
Rich: 
Good sir, for God sake do what you can to send hither godly preachers, 
before sinne hath got the upper hand. It is lamentable to see how sinne 
aboundeth every day more and more as the people do increase. I am not 
able to expresse the abhominable drunkeness, loathsome spuing [spewing, 
vomiting] swearing, swaggering and quarrelling, while the ship is in 
harbour with any wine or strong waters in her. {Ibid.: 161-2) 
6.2. Eschatology 
6.2.1. The Millenarist context 
It is worth recalling that Berkeley's college was not designed as an end in itself, but 
simply as a means. Its ultimate mission was to produce worthy priests and theologians, 
"missionaries" able to persuade the "savage Indians" to accept Christianity — which 
mission had at that time some special connotations. More precisely, I suggest that, in 
closed connection with the topics of the "earthly paradise" and utopianism discussed 
above, a consideration of Berkeley's Proposal within the context of the religious 
(apocalyptic, millennialist and eschatological) ideas and attitudes that lay behind the early 
transoceanic voyages of discovery (and then of colonization) of America would be of 
great importance for a better understanding of his project. As both Mircea Eliade and 
especially Harry M . Bracken and David Berman have shown, Berkeley's American 
Project is hardly understandable without taking seriously into account its messianism. 
Bracken has even published an interesting paper titled "Bishop Berkeley's Messianism" 
(Bracken 1988: 65-80)'°. To put it very briefly, Bracken suggests that Berkeley embraced 
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the then popular analogy between the "'Lost Tribes of the Israel", whose conversion 
would have had a special value according to St. Paul, and the American Indians. Hence 
Berkeley's eagerness to convert those Indians might be regarded as an attempt to prepare 
for the Second Coming. And it is precisely this messianic feature of Berkeley's project 
that is much indebted to the religious and theological background against which the first 
transatlantic voyages occurred. How so? 
There is some agreement among many historians and religious scientists 
nowadays that a crucial factor in realizing the new geographic discoveries was in fact, as 
Mircea Eliade has put it, "the nostalgia for the earthly paradise that the ancestors of the 
American nations had crossed the Atlantic to f ind." (Eliade 1965: 261) According to such 
a line of thought, the deeper causes and motivations of the transatlantic voyages 
undertaken by the early discoverers and colonists are not only of an economic or political 
nature, but they have also something to do with a certain religious atmosphere 
characterizing the European world towards the end of the Middle Ages. More precisely: 
an atmosphere marked by eschatological expectations, millennialist dreams and by some 
need for a radical "moral transformation" and "regeneration". And it was within "this 
messianic and apocalyptic atmosphere that the transoceanic expeditions and the 
geographic discoveries that radically shook and transformed Western Europe took place. 
Throughout Europe people believed in an imminent regeneration of the world." {Ibid.: 
262) Mircea Eliade and Jean Delumeau are among the historians supporting this line of 
thought, and in doing so they exhibit an impressive knowledge and a deep understanding 
of the whole cultural, religious, and intellectual context of that wonderfully confused and 
multifaceted age: 
Scholars have long pointed out how the search for paradisal islands was an 
important stimulus to voyages of discovery from the fourteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries. Nostalgia for the garden of Eden; the conviction of 
Christopher Columbus and missionaries that the end time was at hand; the 
wil l to bring religion to new lands; and the desire to find gold, precious 
stones, and other rare commodities: all these combined to spur travelers, 
religious, sailors, and conquerors on to new horizons. Their culture and the 
dreams it brought with it led them, at least in the beginning, to see in the 
strange lands opening up before them the characteristics of those blessed 
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countries that had haunted the Western imagination since antiquity. 
(Delumeau 109-10) 
An easy way of illustrating Eliade's and Delumeau's interpretations would be to try to 
find out what the discoverers and first colonists themselves thought about what they were 
then doing, seeing, experiencing, etc. 
We can thus see how, in a letter sent by Amerigo Vespucci to Lorenzo de Medici, 
sometime between 1499-1502, the famous navigator talks about 
the friendly land, covered with countless very tall trees that do not lose 
their leaves and emit sweet and fragrant odors and are loaded with tasty 
fruits that promote the body's health; the fields of thick grass that are filled 
with flowers which have a wonderfully delightful perfume; the great 
throng of birds of various species, whose feathers, colors, and songs defy 
description. [ . . . ] For myself, I thought I was near the earthly paradise. 
(Qtd. in Delumeau 110) 
I f in the case of Vespucci these things were veiled in a poetical and somewhat vague 
form, Christopher Columbus openly considered his transoceanic enterprise in terms of 
Sacred History, and saw his "mission" as definitely belonging to a divine plan. He "did 
not doubt that he had come near the Earthly Paradise" and consequently — however 
strange this might appear today — he considered his adventurous navigation in 
theological and mystical rather than secular terms: 
He believed that the fresh water currents he encountered in the Gulf of 
Paria originated in the four rivers of the Garden of Eden. [ . . . ] The New 
World represented more than a new continent open to the propagation of 
the Gospel. The very fact of its discovery had an eschatological 
implication. [ . . . ] Columbus was persuaded that the prophecy concerning 
the diffusion of the Gospel throughout the whole world had to be realized 
before the end of the world — which was not far off. In his Book of 
Prophecies, Columbus affirmed that this event, namely, the end of the 
world, would be preceded by the conquest of the new continent, the 
conversion of the heathen, and the destruction of the Antichrist. (Eliade 
1965:262) 
Then, what is equally important is that such a state of mind not only persisted even after 
the establishment of the colonies, but it also increased in intensity, developed and spread 
widely throughout America". The first colonists' dreams and phantasms proved to be so 
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intense that it was as i f what they found out after crossing the ocean actually confirmed 
all their eschatological expectations and millenarist ideas: "the most popular religious 
doctrine in the Colonies was that America had been chosen among all the nations of the 
earth as the place of the Second Coming of Christ, and the millennium, though essentially 
of a spiritual nature, would be accompanied by a paradisiacal transformation of the earth, 
as an outer sign of an inner perfection." (Ibid. : 264) Thus, the awareness of their being 
"chosen", the sense of their blessing, election and mission — and the corresponding 
"responsibilities" — made them feel in some way "associates" or "partners" of God, 
trustful implementers of His plans. As it were, theirs were not simply human enterprises, 
their doings were not facts of social history, but they perceived themselves as being 
deeply involved in some apocalyptic and divine affairs: 
The first English colonists in America considered themselves chosen by 
Providence to establish a "City on a Mountain" that would serve as an 
example of the true Reformation for all Europe. They had followed the 
path of the sun toward the Far West, continuing and prolonging in a 
prodigious fashion the traditional passing of religion and culture from East 
to West. [ . . . ] The first pioneers did not doubt that the final drama of moral 
regeneration and universal salvation would begin with them, since they 
were the first to follow the sun in its course toward the paradisiacal 
gardens of the West. {Ibid. : 264) 
Broadly speaking, this was the religious context within which Berkeley's Proposal 
emerged. Keeping this fact in mind when considering the "boldness", "savagery" or 
"unrealistic" character of his project would be, I think, of some help. 
6.2.2. Berkeley's messianism 
Since one of the main aims of his projected college was to supply the colonies with 
virtuous, well-prepared priests and missionaries12, some commentators — based also on 
the last stanza of that famous poem that Berkeley dedicated to America — concluded that 
his motivation in initiating and pursuing the project was ultimately one of an 
eschatological and millennialist nature. The poem is called America or the Muse's 
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Refuge. A Prophecy, and is an excellent piece of poetry that he disseminated about in 
order to get more support for his scheme. At the beginning, it was circulated 
anonymously, but eventually Berkeley published it in the Miscellany (1752) under his 
own name. David Berman discusses in some detail "the eschatological aspect of 
Berkeley's poem and project" in his book on Berkeley (Berman 1994: 116), and one of 
his conclusions is that it is "evident that his poem is apocalyptic and eschatological." 
{Ibid.: 118). As a matter of fact, Berman follows in general Bracken's interpretation that 1 
wi l l be summarizing below. (Let me also add that Mircea Eliade has a rather similar 
interpretation of this poem, but without going into too much detail.) 
I reproduce here only the last stanza of the poem, namely, that which has received 
special interest from commentators: 
Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way, 
The four first Acts already past. 
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day, 
Time's noblest offspring is the last. 
(Berkeley 1955: V I I , 370) 
In trying to interpret the symbolism of the five acts Bracken resorts to the Old Testament, 
namely, to Daniel. He says: " I take the symbolism of the final stanza, the four plus one 
Acts, to be from Daniel, chapter 2, where the four kingdoms, usually taken to be Babylon, 
Persia, Greece and Rome, shall be succeeded by a fifth: 'And in the days of these kings 
shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed...' (2: 44)" 
(Bracken 1988: 71) Given the complex millennialist and apocalyptic context depicted 
above, with all its great expectations, intensely religious feelings of — and preparations 
for — the Millennium, an interpretation like this acquires a certain degree of 
reasonableness. Bracken epitomizes his demonstration with a decisive Scriptural 
argument. According to him, "the key to this extraordinary proposal is that Berkeley 
accepts the [then] popular view that the American Indians are the Lost Tribes o f Israel. As 
Jews, their conversion is especially dear to God and each conversion promises, as Paul 
tells us in Romans xi, to bring closer the Second Coming." (73) Then, he undertakes a 
detailed research of some of the beliefs then current in America, beliefs according to 
which the American Indians were — in some way or other — of Jewish origin. Of course, 
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it is not the truthfulness of those beliefs that I am concerned with here, but simply their 
sheer existence, and Berkeley's encounter with them. 
As it were, following Bracken's hypothesis, by converting the Indians the 
graduates from Berkeley's college would have converted the Lost Tribes of the Israel, 
which — according to St. Paul — was a clear sign of the much expected, triumphal end 
of the world: the Apocalypsis. Thus, in Berkeley's mind the propagation of Gospel in 
America and the conversion of the Indians living there would have had a highly spiritual 
value as they would have been at the same time preparations for, and signs of, the 
approaching Second Coming. Hence the ardent necessity of building a missionary college 
in Bermuda: "Given what we know about Berkeley, we must find a reason not only for 
his committing himself so completely to his American dream, but especially for the 
savagery he was prepared to inflict on Indian children." (Bracken 1988: 80) 
Bracken's tempting and documented interpretation, even i f one does not accept it 
entirely , has the merit ot underlining the complexity of the Bermuda project, and 
suggesting some ways of explaining several of the confused aspects of Berkeley's 
enterprise. More than that, it is perfectly consistent with the complex religious context 
presented above. Almost needless to say, Bracken's interpretation fits pretty well with — 
and, to a great extent, is supported by — my own attempt, earlier on in this chapter, at 
placing Berkeley in the tradition of the search for an "earthly paradise" and of the 
educational Utopias. His reconstruction of Berkeley's way of thinking as far as this 
particular problem is concerned could be applied to the way in which a lot of his 
contemporaries were then thinking. For, as it has been said, in "the eyes of the English 
...the colonization of America merely prolonged and perfected a Sacred History begun at 
the outset of the Reformation. Indeed, the push of the pioneers toward the West continued 
the triumphal march of Wisdom and the True Religion from East to West. For some time 
already, Protestant theologians had been inclined to identify the West with spiritual and 
moral progress." (Eliade 1965: 263) 
As it appears, at least two fundamental Christian ideas were inextricably 
interwoven in Berkeley's "Bermuda Scheme": a nostalgia for an "earthly paradise" and 
the "the expectation of a kingdom of happiness that is to be established on our earth and 
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to last for a millennium" (Delumeau 1995: 1). The "happy island", despite its imaginary, 
Utopian nature — i f not simply because of that — has been the chosen space for such an 
enterprise, its privileged environment. It has played a central role in this story. Its 
isolation from the outside world, its purity (as it is surrounded by the water of the endless 
ocean), its difficult accessibility, exoticism, paradisiacal appearance, beauties, innocence 
of its inhabitants, etc. — all these are attributes enabling us to consider that island as 
some un-earthly or un-natural place, a place where the marvels or such supernatural 
events as the Second Coming and Millennium are at any time possible. 
Then, the millennialist interpretation of Berkeley's Bermuda scheme presented 
above adds to his Utopia a character somehow different from that of a simply 
political/social Utopian project. Of course, Berkeley's Utopia remains an Utopia in the 
tradition of Plato, Campanella, Thomas More or Herman Hesse, but — in addition to that 
— it is also characterized by certain chiliastic elements. Berkeley's is a religiously 
modeled Utopia, an "educational Utopia" with a certain soteriological mission. Even i f the 
main emphasis is not placed, in his project, upon Messianism, the chiliastic features are 
present and have something to say about the ultimate specificity of the "Bermuda 
scheme". To be more precise, the Messianism belongs not so much to the project itself 
(explicitly and essentially) as to its unspoken presuppositions, to the intellectual and 
religious background against which it was conceived of. As it were, the Millennium is 
rapidly approaching: under such circumstances, getting ready (praeparatio) is the crucial 
and most urgent thing to do. Hence the imperative necessity of preparing a body of 
worthy, well trained and dedicated people, ready to prepare, in turn, their neighbours for 
the great event, which is to say, to save their souls in aeternum. Or, instructing such 
special people is an extremely difficult and demanding job. Actually, a job that is made 
possible only within the firm boundaries of a highly disciplined "educational Utopia". 
And this is where Berkeley's project is making its debut. 
6.3. Making some (philosophical) sense of the "Bermuda Scheme" 
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6.3.1. Philosophy and biography 
There is a remark about Berkeley, made by Bishop Atterbury, that, I think, has something 
significant to say about the way in which Berkeley was perceived by some of his 
contemporaries, and I would like to quote it here: "So much understanding, so much 
knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of 
any but angels t i l l I saw this gentleman." (Qtd. in Luce 1949: 63) Based on Bishop 
Atterbury's generous remark, as well as on other similar ones, I think it would be 
interesting to see Berkeley's biography as being driven by a certain form of angelism{A. 
By Berkeley's "angelism" I mean here a dominant tendency, manifest throughout his life, 
toward seeing the best in people, toward an idealization of real facts and situations, 
toward generosity, benevolence and even self-sacrifice — a tendency easily recognizable 
in Berkeley' s everyday behaviour, as well as in his initiatives, projects, undertakings, 
deeds, etc. There is a sense in which Berkeley's biography, un-subdued to the strict 
"necessities of life", was touchingly marked by various dreams of universal salvation and 
idealistic enterprises: the tar-water and Bermuda episodes, dealt with in some detail in 
this thesis, being only the most famous of them. There are numerous records, writings and 
documents witnessing to Berkeley's "unusual generosity", kindness, philanthropy, good 
nature, benevolence, and so forth. I just quoted above Bishop Atterbury's eulogy. 
Similarly, in a poem, Pope wrote that famous line: "To Berkeley, ev'ry virtue under 
heav'n" (Qtd. in Berman 1994: 120), Johnson called him a "profound scholar and a man 
of fine imagination", just as A. A. Luce's Life of George Berkeley — probably the most 
important biography of Berkeley ever written — ends in this vein: "He was clearly 
something of a saint." (Luce 1949: 225) 
The most touching and detailed account of this kind, revealing to an admirable 
extent the "angelism" of his character, comes from Berkeley's widow. Of course, there 
was something personal involved in her confession, and we should consider it with some 
caution. Yet, beyond the personal character of this confession, one can easily discover a 
realistic and believable portrait of Berkeley. In a letter to one of their sons, she remembers 
how Berkeley's "instructive conversation was delicate" and when he dealt directly with 
religion he 
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did it in so masterly a manner, that it made a deep and lasting impression. 
You never heard him give his tongue the liberty of speaking evil. Never 
did he reveal the fault or secret of a friend. [ . . . ] an universal knowledge of 
men, things, and books prevented the greatest wit of his age from being at 
a loss for subjects of conversation; but had he been as dull as he was 
bright, his conscience and good nature would have kept close the door of 
his lips rather than to have opened them to v i l i fy or lessen his brother. [ . . . ] 
Now he was not born to all this, no more than others are, but in his own 
words, his industry was greater; he struck a light at twelve to rise and 
study and pray, for he was very pious; and his studies ware not barren 
speculations, for he loved God and man... (Qtd. in Luce 1949: 181-2) 1 5 
The most important thing that a confession like this conveys is, I think, the sense of 
continuity, and the admirable consistency, between what Berkeley professed as a 
philosopher, and the way in which he lived his life. As his wife's letter suggests, there is 
no gap, no "incongruity" between Berkeley's thinking and his way of life: his religious 
and ethical thought pervaded his entire biography, conferring upon it greatness and 
exemplarity. What is more important: "he was not born to all this", but he had to make 
efforts and painstakingly fight with himself in order to attain such a state of ethical 
transparency. 
Now, Berkeley's "Bermuda scheme", as it was presented in detail above, might 
serve as a good illustration of the notion of a Berkeleian "angelism" that I am trying to 
advance here. The American Project, failed as it was, was deeply marked precisely by the 
tendency toward seeing the best in people, towards idealization of real situations and state 
of affairs 1 6 that I mentioned above when defining the notion of Berkeley's "angelism". 
Berkeley's "Bermuda project" represented, in a sense, the culmination of his "angelism", 
being its most remarkable and expressive embodiment. It was precisely in this project that 
all his idealistic pursuits and Utopian dreams were put at work. Before this daring 
enterprise there had been numerous occasions on which Berkeley's outstanding character 
manifested itself, but the Bermuda affair played an essential role in the formation and 
dissemination of Berkeley's renown as a "modern apostle"1 7. To the extent that, at a 
given moment, some of his contemporaries knew him not as a philosopher, but first o f all 
as the eccentric promoter of the Bermuda scheme, while others were certain that his 
philosophy would be in the future decisively overshadowed by the significance of his 
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missionary enterprises: "His eminent Talents, by which he shines in the learned World, 
wi l l not give him so much Lustre and Distinction in the annals of future Times, as that 
Apostolic Zeal which he is so confessedly endowed", wrote an anonymous author (Qtd. 
in Berman 1994: 105). 
Based on much of what has been said above about Berkeley's enthusiastic 
commitment to the Utopian ways of thinking, and on his readiness to put the rest of his 
life into the service of a missionary cause, 1 would suggest here that Berkeley's "Bermuda 
scheme" might be seen as a remarkable instantiation of the ancient conception of 
philosophy as a way o f l i f e n . In other words, a conception of philosophy whose aim is an 
existential transformation taking place within the philosopher himself. Berkeley's whole 
project, even i f failed, points to the fact that he regarded philosophy not only as simply an 
academic discipline to be taught in schools and discussed in specialist writings or 
journals, but rather as a reflexive exercise that must result in some improvement in 
people's lives: first, a self-improvement occurring in the philosopher himself, and, then, 
an improvement of his neighbours' lives. Berkeley's design of, and then enthusiastic 
embarking on, the "Bermuda project" suggests that, at a given point in life, he felt that it 
was not enough for him to teach philosophy at Trinity College, and that he had to make 
his philosophical preoccupations, in some way or other, useful for life, useful in some 
broader terms and for a larger community of people than simply the group of scholars 
involved. It must have been something of Berkeley's conception of philosophy as a form 
of (ascetic) life that his friend Jonathan Swift meant when saying that he was "an absolute 
philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power." (Qtd. in Luce 1949: 100) 
My view here that Berkeley's "Bermuda project" betrays a commitment to a 
conception of philosophy as a way of life is supported, among other Berkeley scholars, by 
David Berman, who even draws a more specific parallel between the "Bermuda project" 
and Berkeley's theological writings (especially Alciphron, discussed in the previous 
chapter): 
The benevolent Bermuda project of 1724-31 and the theological writings 
of 1732-5 fi t and support each other perfectly, especially i f one subscribes 
...to the orthodox view on the connection between religion and morality. 
...the fact that Berkeley himself was one of the most zealous adherents of 
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this position helped to complete the picture. Dean Berkeley could therefore 
be seen as an almost perfect instantiation of the orthodox position. As 
Marcus Aurelius is often seen as the exemplification of the ideal Stoic 
sage, so Berkeley came to be seen as a paradigmatic Christian: perfectly 
moral and religious. (Berman 1994: 122) 
Berman's reference, in this context, to the Stoics, with their constant emphasis upon the 
"utility for l i fe" that must characterize any philosophical exercise, confirms my 
interpretation. Another confirmation I find in the above quoted letter of Berkeley's 
widow. At a given moment, she makes this remarkable statement: "Humility, tenderness, 
patience, generosity, charity to men's souls and bodies, was the sole end of all his 
projects, and the business of his life." (Qtd. in Luce 1949: 182) When a philosopher 
decides to embrace a worldview according to which "charity to men's souls and bodies" 
is "the business of his life", this is a sign that he wants to leave in the world not only the 
books he writes, but some other "traces" as well. And the safest way of influencing 
others' lives, and leaving "traces" upon their souls, is by one's own example: i f one 
succeeds in guiding his own life according to what one teaches, this is the best validation 
of one's philosophy. 
6.3.2. Immaterialism and utopianism 
Finally, 1 ask whether it would not be possible to talk about an even more specific, i f 
somehow speculative, parallel between certain features of Berkeley's "Bermuda project" 
and certain tenets of his philosophy. More precisely, my question is: to what extent is 
such an Utopian and, so to say, un-earthly mode of thinking as that revealed by the 
"Bermuda project" consistent, or even kindred, with the immaterialist character of his 
philosophy? In other words, to what extent is it possible to follow some deeper 
continuities, some common patterns of thought, connecting his Utopian propensities to the 
essence of his main philosophical message? This is, of course, too large and complex a 
topic to be dealt with exhaustively here. It is not my intention to do so now, at the end of 
this chapter, but simply to point to the possibility of such a questioning. 
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An Utopia would be, according to such a tempting analogy, an immaterialism 
"applied" to the social order, some sort of practical idealism. To put it otherwise, the 
utopianism of Berkeley's "Bermuda project" would be with regard to social things the 
mirror of what his immaterialism is with regards to natural things. Just as Berkeley's 
natural world lacks solid and dense materiality, so his Utopian project lacks those basic 
features that generally characterize "realistic" projects. Just as, in Berkeley's 
immaterialism, the cosmos we see around is but the sophisticated interplay between our 
mind and God's, our "conversation" with God, articulated according to a certain 
grammar, so Berkeley's Utopia is a careful rational construction, a complex "narrative" 
woven according to certain rules established in the course of the Utopian tradition. Just as 
the ontological precariousness of the things in the world is compensated for by their being 
perceived, and "cared for", by God himself, so the fragility of the social actors is 
compensated for, on the Utopian island, by their playing a part in a redeeming whole. As 
it were, Berkeley's being a "dreamer" in social affairs might well be associated with his 
being an immaterialist in philosophical matters. And his Utopian "impossible" proposals 
might be regarded as some social or civic reflection of, say, his paradoxical claims that 
matter does not exist, and only spirits and minds exist. It is basically the same 
dissatisfaction with the current states of (both natural and social) affairs, and the same 
tendency toward replacing the existent state of things with an ideal one, that might be 
seen as manifest in both cases. Let me add that A. C. Fraser even uses the term "social 
idealism" with reference to Berkeley's project: "It [The Proposal] is the lamentation of an 
ardent social idealist over the corrupt civilization of Britain and the Old World. Soon 
after a social enterprise of romantic benevolence presented itself to his imagination." 
(Fraser 1901: IV 342) In some connection with this possible paralleling, William Butler 
Yeats insightfully realized that Berkeley's world is ultimately dependent on our 
"dreaming" it: 
God-appointed Berkeley that proved all things 
a dream, 
That this pragmatical, preposterous pig of a world, 
its farrow that so solid seem 
Must vanish on the instant i f the mind but changes its theme 
(Yeats 1965: 268) 
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Notes: 
"For whatever reasons, Berkeley seems to have lost confidence in the Old World and was looking 
hopefully to America. For it was probably in the early months of 1722 that he conceived his plan for a 
missionary and art college in Bermuda, which was to engage him for the next decade." (Berman 100) 
2 Of course, he says several times that he was informed about the islands by very trustful persons ("the best 
Information I could get"), but, as we shall see below, his description did not fit the real situation of the 
islands at all. He was either misinformed or — more probably — the trustful persons conveyed to him 
something of the popular medieval view of the "paradisiacal islands". 
3 It is true, later on, when the project had already started to fail, Berkeley showed himself ready to build the 
college somewhere in the American mainland. But what I am particularly interested in here is his first, 
genuine, impulse and intention, as recorded in the letters mentioned and the Proposal. 
4 "Distance lends enchantment, and isolation preserves things in existence. Later on, many 'Utopias', among 
them that of Thomas More, would be located on islands." (Delumeau 98) 
5 Kappler's book, cited by Delumeau, is Monstres, demons et marveilles a la fin du Moyen Age, Paris: 
Payot, 1980) 
6 Sometimes his enthusiasm infected others. For example, one of his contemporaries said: "Young and old, 
learned and rich, all desirous of retiring to enjoy peace of mind and health of body, and of restoring the 
golden age in that corner of the world." (a contemporary [Dan Dering] Qtd. in Luce 97) [emphasis added] 
7 Many people "found the entire enterprise absurd. ...those with first-hand experience of the American 
Church or educational scenes were profoundly distressed with Berkeley's ignorance. It is clear that for 
many years, Berkeley was seen as something of a nut." (Bracken 68) 
8 According to some authors, this remoteness of the island from the American mainland was in fact one of 
the main causes of the failure of the entire project. A. Luce, for example, considers that "the tragedy of the 
Bermuda project was just Bermuda. Six hundred miles of ocean separate it from the nearest point of the 
mainland. Students might have come sixty miles, but not six hundred. The romance of Bermuda won 
support for the scheme, the facts of Bermuda killed it." (Luce 99) 
9 Then, far from being "the best air in the world", as Berkeley said in a private letter (Berkeley VIII 156), 
Bermuda's air was often violently agitated by "terrible winds", causing much trouble and many falls to the 
Bermudans: "Mr Lewis [a settler]... hath taken a greate hurt by a fall, which hath bruised him much, and his 
[he is] att this instant very weake, the force of the wind beeing soe terrible. Att the same tyme the like was 
never seen. Mr Lewis, goeing to the governors, the wind beeing so stronge that it bente hime to the ground. 
And the same day there were many of our howses blowne downe. We have hadd a very unseasonable 
summer and winter that it hath hinred [hindered] much labour, which otherwise might hadd been 
performed." (Ives 1984: 85) 
1 0 And, as Bracken openly recognizes, this is not only the case with Berkeley. Even if for different reasons, 
"there is hardly a single great mind of the period which is not involved in millennial thinking. Henry More, 
Sir Isaac Newton, and Sir Robert Boyle may be the names best known to academic philosophers." (Bracken 
78) 
1 1 "[Cjertain pioneers already saw Paradise in the various regions of America. Traveling along the coast of 
New England in 1614, John Smith compared it to Eden: 'heaven and earth never agreed better to frame a 
place for man's habitation... we chanced in a lande, even as God made it.' George Alsop presents Maryland 
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as the only place seeming to be the 'Earthly Paradise'. Its trees, its plants, its fruits, its flowers, he wrote, 
speak in 'Hieroglyphicks of our Adamitical or Primitive situation.' Another writer discovered the 'future 
Eden' in Georgia - a region located on the same latitude as Palestine: 'That promis'd Canaan, which was 
pointed out by God's own choice, to bless the Labours of a favorite People.' For Edward Johnson, 
Massachusetts was the place 'where the Lord will create a new Heaven and a new Earth.' Likewise, the 
Boston Puritan, John Cotton, informed those preparing to set sail from England for Massachusetts that they 
were granted a privilege of Heaven, thanks to 'the grand charter given to Adam and his posterity in 
Paradise.'" (Mircea Eliade 264-5) 
1 2 "[T]o provide, in the first Place, a constant Supply of worthy Clergymen for the English Churches in 
those Parts; and in the second Place, a like constant Supply of zealous Missionaries, well fitted for 
propagating Christianity among the Savages" (Berkeley VII 345). 
1 3 In general, he is very careful and scrupulous in his analysis. He admits that his is only a partial and 
possible interpretation, with the possibility of other points of view: "if it is granted that Berkeley hoped to 
use the traditional symbolism of Daniel so that he might characterize America in messianic terms then we 
have a partial answer to the point of the American Project." [emphasis added] (Bracken 73) 
1 4 Jacques Maritain, in his book Three Reformers (Maritain 1950) uses this term with reference to 
Descartes. He talks about Descartes' "sin of angelism" ("He turned Knowledge and Thought into a hopeless 
perplexity, and abyss of unrest, because he conceived human Thought after the type of angelic Thought." 
[Maritain 1950: 54]). Needless to say, unlike Maritain, 1 use here the term in a positive and appreciative 
sense. 
1 3 Certainly, some of these phrases belong to a certain degree to the specific rhetoric and general polite 
formulae of the age, but the convergence of so many witnesses, from so many and different people, tends 
nevertheless to confirm and "validate" them. Such a portrait and excellent "public image" could have hardly 
been built up in the absence of a set of actual character traits and biographical facts enabling Berkeley's 
contemporaries to see and describe him in the way in which they did. 
1 6 Not to say that one of the probable reasons why the project eventually failed was Berkeley's tendency 
towards idealizations and his "lack of realism". 
1 7 "Berkeley's moral character had been eulogized before the Bermuda project — by, for example, Richard 
Steele and Bishop Atterbury. But their praise would hardly have been well known. It was, above all, the 
Bermuda project that gave their remarks prominence and substance. ...Bermuda was the river that powered 
Berkeley's moral reputation." (Berman 1994: 120-1) 
1 8 There has been recently some interesting discussions dedicated to this topics. I would give here only two 
examples: Pierre Hadot in his Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault 
(Hadot 1995) and Alexander Nehamas's The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault 
(Nehamas 2000). 
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Chapter Seven: 
George Berkeley and the Catharism 
This (final) chapter purports to undertake a comparative analysis of some of the ideas 
professed by the medieval Dualistic heresies (Catharism in particular), on the one hand, 
and George Berkeley's (philosophically scandalous and controversial) denial o f the 
existence of matter, on the other hand. The central notion around which my present 
comparative approach w i l l be articulated is the idea that, in both cases, matter comes to 
be regarded, in some way or other, as the source of evil. Based on this central insight 
other comparative considerations w i l l be also advanced. What I w i l l be trying to show in 
this chapter is not that Berkeley was some modern Cathar (in his explicit tenets), but that 
his attitudes to matter and the material world echoed certain Cathar theological anxieties 
and patterns of thought. 
The chapter has two parts: 1) the first part offers a very brief historical 
introduction to the problem of Catharism. Then, the Cathar doctrine about the material 
world is briefly presented, in an attempt to offer a new perspective f rom which to look at 
Berkeley's immaterialism; 2) the second part is dedicated to telling the "story" o f 
Berkeley's refutation of the material world, as it appears in light of the Cathar doctrine on 
matter. Finally, both Berkeley's refutation of matter and Catharism are placed within a 
broader theoretical framework, and connected to a recurring archetypal Dualistic pattern 
employed in facing the "evil realm of matter" by other thinkers or artists, l iving in other 
cultural epochs. 
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7.1. The Cathars 
7.1.1. The Cathar heresy 
The reason why, of all the Dualistic heresies, I have chosen Catharism as a comparison 
term in this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, Cathar history and doctrines are 
relatively well known, with a great deal of scholarship dedicated to the subject, and with a 
multitude of approaches: Catharism has preoccupied to various degrees historians o f 
religion, political historians, art historians, historians o f literature, theologians, 
philosophers, and so on. On the other hand, Catharism is the last important (and probably 
the most consequential) embodiment of the Dualistic tendency in Western Christian 
world, marking to a certain extent — directly or indirectly, more or less traceably — 
some of its mentalities, intellectual and emotional perspectives, favourite topics and ways 
of thinking. Catharism did not disappear f rom the European culture along with the last 
occupants of the Montsegur castle: it simply changed its mode of existence, f rom a 
troubling heresy into a fascinating cultural topic, which was to capture many people's 
minds over the next centuries. Thus, as it has been remarked, the disappearance of 
Catharism as a heresy f rom the Western world coincided with the emergence o f a new 
source of inspiration for the European imagination 
the saga of the collision between Catharism and Catholicism has long been 
one o f the most favoured subjects for research, myth-making, romance and 
controversy. The fall of the Cathar citadel o f Montsegur and the ensuing 
mass burning of the Cathar perfecti ... is often deemed to represent what 
Lawrence Durrell called "the Thermopylae o f the Gnostic soul", and the 
Cathars, whether maligned or romanticised, still retain their peculiar 
mystique and long-lasting hold on the European imagination. (Stoyanov 
2000: 292) 
This being said, I am hopeful that, within a broader context o f history of ideas, a 
consideration o f Berkeley in light of the Cathar doctrines on matter might bring about a 
better and more appropriate understanding of his immaterialism. 
In the absence of a comprehensive corpus of Cathar writings it is diff icul t enough 
to establish, when investigating what the Cathars actually professed, which were the 
specifically Cathar beliefs (and not Dualistic in general). This is why, we should rely to a 
great extent on what their Catholic opponents (and especially the Inquisition) attributed to 
them. (In this context, Le Roy Ladurie's book, based on the direct access to the 
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confessions o f the Cathar heretics, in the Inquisition's archives, is o f an invaluable help 
for any researcher of Catharism.) Anyway, as a number of studies suggest, it is reasonable 
to suppose that the core Cathar ideas regarding matter and the material world — and 
which properly form the object of my comparison — are not necessarily the Cathars' 
"invention", but they are somehow derived f rom the mainstream teaching of the Dualistic 
tradition. The persistence of religious Dualism in the Western world over the centuries1, 
even i f influenced f rom time to time by similar ideas coming from the East, is nowadays a 
received fact among many historians and religious scientists: "Western scholars tend to 
stress the existence o f a Dualist tradition in the West throughout the Dark Ages and to 
regard the Balkan influence on the heretical movement, which no one now denies, as 
coming in rather late in the story. Certainly a Western Dualist tradition persisted f rom 
early times; but I believe that it was continually reinforced f rom the East, through Italy, 
where connections wi th the East were always maintained." (Runciman 1982: v i i i ) 
First o f all, Catharism was undoubtedly "a Christian heresy". It appeared in 
France and Italy in the twelfth century, as an attempt at "reforming" the Catholic church. 
The Cathars "considered and proclaimed themselves 'true Christians', 'good Christians', 
as distinct f rom the official Catholic Church which according to them had betrayed the 
genuine doctrine of the Apostles." (Ladurie 1978: v i i i ) There are authors who even 
associate the emergence of Catharism in Europe with some other major developments 
taking place in the Western culture in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Yur i Stoyanov, 
for example, places Catharism within the same context with the Gothic art and 
architecture, and with the new ascetic and reforming movements within the Catholic 
world: "Along with Gothic art and architecture, the renewed ideals o f monasticism, 
asceticism and apostolic life, the advent o f the dualist heresy in the west was symptomatic 
of the religious enthusiasm and permutations of the twelfth century." (Stoyanov 2000: 
184) On the other hand, we should constantly bear in mind that, even i f Catharism was 
born within a Catholic context, it brought with itself numerous heretical elements, 
anyway enough to draw the Church's attention immediately: 
Catharism stood at some distance f rom traditional Christian doctrine, 
which was monotheist. Catharism accepted the (Manichaean) existence 
of two opposite principles, i f not of two deities, one of good and the 
other o f evil. One was God, the other Satan. On the one hand was light, 
on the other dark. On one side was the spiritual world, which was good, 
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and on the other the terrestrial world, which was carnal, physical, 
corrupt. (Ladurie 1978: viii) 
Expectedly enough, in the absence of an established and inflexible corpus of doctrines, 
and of an authority responsible for keeping and monitoring its "orthodoxy," Catharism 
was naturally predisposed to numerous interpretations, deviations and versions. Indeed, it 
was most probably not only the spontaneous and uncontrollable nature of the heresy itself 
that played so important a part in the emergence of these conflicting interpretations, but 
also the natural inclination of Gnosticism — inherent to all these Dualistic movements — 
towards endless speculation, luxuriant imagination and spectacular mythology and 
narratives. Consequently, there is a long and interesting history of the various smaller 
"heresies" having appeared here and there within the Dualistic heresy itself. To the extent 
that, in the tenth century, an ironical remark was made about the Bulgarian Bogomils that 
each of them "invented something for himself (Loos 1974: 133). And this was the case 
with almost all the Dualistic heretics: 
the Benedictine Eckbert reproached the German Cathars for the same 
variety of opinions. Already in the Byzantine world the teaching of the 
sect were constantly enriched by the results of free speculation on the 
texts of the New Testament, and by the creations of the folk-imagination, 
inspired by apocryphal writings. In the West the variety and permutations 
of the dualist doctrines can be traced quite distinctly, although of course 
it is difficult to say what has been taken over from the eastern branches of 
the sect and what is the later contribution of the western Cathar groups. 
{Ibid.: 133) 
Given some of the Cathar accounts of the precise relationships between the two 
principles (God and Devil), historians have retained two main versions, or tendencies, of 
Catharism: a "radical" one (in France) and a "moderate" one (in Italy). As Emmanual Le 
Roy Ladurie has concisely put it: "On the one hand there was absolute dualism, typical of 
Catharism in Languedoc in the twelfth century: this proclaimed the eternal opposition 
between the two principles, good and evil. On the other hand was the modified dualism 
characteristic of Italian Catharism: here God occupies a place which was more eminent 
and more «eternal» than that of the Devil." (Ladurie 1978: viii) These two branches of 
Catharism constantly fought each other, and it is rather ironical that one of the few Cathar 
writings still extant, Liber de duobusprincipiis (Thouzellier: 1973), is in fact a polemical 
"radical" tract directed against the "moderate" Cathars. 
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Yet, for the purposes of the present comparative research, these divisions within 
Catharism do not matter very much. What is really significant about the Cathars, from the 
point of view of my present comparative approach, is the strong contempt they 
permanently and unreservedly showed to all what belonged to the material world. Such a 
contempt was their distinctive feature, and, so to say, le point d' honneur of all Cathar 
adherents: "Al l 'Cathars' — men of the pure life — were united in their revulsion against 
all that binds the human being to his material body." (Loos 1974: 251) And indeed it is 
precisely this feature that makes Catharism so symptomatic, illustrative and appealing as 
to the subsequent inner developments of the European cultural history. They offer a 
radical worldview, a vision of the material world as a corrupted and corrupting realm, 
something from which we could not expect anything positive and should keep safely 
apart. "In this dualist theodicy the cosmos is viewed as the outcome and the battleground 
of two opposed principles, good and evil or light and darkness" (Stoyanov 2000: 2) and it 
is precisely the siding with the principle of light, and putting one's life into its service, 
that confers meaning on one's life. 
Due precisely to its peculiar doctrines about the material world, Catharism, 
despite the terrible and finally fatal prosecutions from the Catholic Church (if not, 
sometimes, simply because of them) has over the centuries come to be considered, in 
many scholarly circles, with great sympathy and interest, and seen as an important 
ingredient of the Western literature, music, arts, and other forms of sensibility or social 
l ife 2 .1 will in the following examine in some detail the Cathar doctrine on matter. 
7.1.2. The "Prince of this world" 
Matter had always troubled thinkers, theologians and scholars (whether ancient or 
medieval) as to the conceivability of its origin, nature, composition, constitution or 
movements, but the Cathar (or, in general, Dualistic) response, by attributing its origin, 
existence and maintenance to the Devil (or the Evil God), was certainly one of the most 
intriguing solutions ever found: characteristically, it was a simple solution and a 
sophisticated one at the same time. Simple, because it appealed to an universal, manifold 
and abstract principle answering a large number of philosophical and theological 
questions3; and it was sophisticated, because, at the psychological and ethical level of the 
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individual, it brought about a terrible complexity: the soul was now regarded as some sort 
of "metaphysical" battlefield between the "ultimate principles" themselves. The 
individual soul was dramatically and uninterruptedly disputed by God and the Devil in 
person: "The battle was fought on a cosmic scale, but also within the human breast. One 
Cathar tract asserted that 'every day the evil god effects great evil against him [the good 
god] ...and the latter god, our god, exercises great power in combating the former one.'" 
(Fichtenau 1998: 161) It was probably this marked sense of self-importance, "election" 
and immense pride that, among other factors, made Catharism so attractive for many 
medieval audiences: at every moment of his life, man felt he was wanted by and fought 
over by God and Devil. Everything in the surrounding world acquired now a new 
significance, just as all his doings could not be indifferent or neutral any longer. 
Consequently, the current setting of his earthly life, that is, the material world around 
(and within) him played a new role: it was an essential datum involved in the cosmic 
"battle," by means of which (more precisely, by the human attitudes adopted to it), he 
could be "rescued" or "lost" for ever. 
It was of little importance for the attitude adopted towards this material 
world whether one or another force created amorphous matter ex nihilo. 
Views on the ultimate origin of the material being might change, the 
decisive point was that the Devil or the evil God had made (fecit) this 
world of ours and all that it contains. This was one of the fundamental 
theses acknowledged by all branches of the sect. ...all that we see 
around us is the work of the Devil; he is the creator and ruler of all 
earthly things; it is he who gave the command to lie with women, to eat 
meat and to drink wine. (Ibid.: 253) 
Now, the notion that the creation of the material world should be attributed precisely to 
the Devil must have been resulted from a process of theological systematisation like the 
following one. First, there is the empirical, everyday-life evidence that there is evil in the 
world. Then, under the circumstances of a peculiar theological sensibility, this evidence 
tends more and more to be perceived as overwhelming, and to result in an argument as 
follows: there is such a consistent, widespread and deeply rooted negative side of our 
earthly world that attributing its creation to God would raise embarrassingly insoluble 
theological problems; there is nothing in the world resembling God, whereas there are a 
lot of things reminiscent of the nature, and the works, of Devil. It must have been this 
very special theological sensibility that explains why Cathars were in general so uneasy 
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and anxious about the (material) world around: "Sorrow and darkness permeate 
everything, the world contains more evil than good, and hence it belongs to the devil 
rather than God. Since our days are also marked by fear, illness, hardship, and misfortune, 
things that we humans must suffer in this life, 'We say that the days of this present world 
are evil."' (Fichtenau 1998: 160) Under such circumstances, attributing the creation and 
maintenance of the material world to the Devil has come to be regarded as a natural 
conclusion. Jesus Christ himself had notoriously named Devil "the Prince of this world". 
Hence the Cathar interpretation of this particular Biblical passage as supporting their own 
beliefs: "this world" is the material world of Devil, and we should make all efforts to 
keep away from it. 
Given the fact that within the medieval Christian frames of the theological (and 
philosophical) conceptualisation, the notion of God always implies a maximum of 
existence (God is always seen as the Supreme Being, or Essence, bearing the positive 
attributes of plenitude, eternity, perfection, etc.), it is self-evident that a principle opposed 
to God, "the principle of darkness", together with all his workings, modalities and agents, 
must be necessarily characterised by a minimum of existence, eventually by "non-
existence." On the other hand, at the personal psychological level and under the 
circumstances of the peculiar theological sensibility mentioned above, the negative terms 
in which Cathars considered the material world (overwhelmed as it was by sorrow, 
darkness, illness, misfortune, suffering, etc.) tend, by contamination, to be associated with 
negativity itself. As a result, it happens that the lack of value tends to be increasingly 
perceived as a lack of real existence. (However "fallacious" and illegitimate such a step 
might appear to us today, within the framework of an intensely religious movement, 
marked by impatience and urgency, it acquires a certain psychological justification: as it 
were, what does not deserve to exist, does not properly and truly exist.) Therefore, the 
next natural step for Cathars to take was to consider this "wicked" material world in 
terms of non-being and nothingness: and they immediately took this step, which they 
gladly did. Here is a fragment from a theological conversation between a Cathar, one 
Peter, and a Catholic, William, who is trying to learn from him as much as he can about 
the Cathar theology: 
A crucial text from the first chapter of St. John's gospel emerged: " A l l 
things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that 
was made." In the vulgate, the term used is nihil, "Sine ipso factum est 
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nihil." Peter followed a tradition of interpreting the nihil to mean visible 
things, turning John's poetic phrase into support for their crucial tenet 
that the visible world was not the creation of the good God. "Visible 
things," he said, "are nothing." (Lambert 1998: 160) 
Peter reveals a great ability in countering his Catholic opponent's opinions, and he does 
so in an interesting, and theologically documented and ingenious, manner. The fragment 
strengthens the idea that Catharism is a Christian heresy, Peter's way of defending his 
opinions being deeply marked by the style of the theological debates of the day. Peter 
"had a clear understanding of the basic Cathar rejection of the whole visible world and 
sexuality as evil" and the ability to refute 
counter-texts which did not support dualism.... When he [William] 
objected the Colossians text "In Him were all things created in heaven 
and earth, visible and invisible," Peter replied "Visible to the heart and 
invisible to the eyes of the flesh." William showed him his hand and 
asked i f his flesh would rise again; Peter struck a wooden post and said, 
"Flesh will not rise again except as a wooden post." (Ibid.: 160) 
Catharism was a rather pessimistic religious movement, but not a completely desperate 
one: however evil the world might be, there is nevertheless a way to escape it, there are 
means for Cathar adherents to "purify" themselves and "save" their souls from the 
corrupted and corrupting world within which they were "incidentally" born and then 
"forced" to live. These means include specific practices (fasts, abstinence from eating 
certain foods — meat, eggs, milk, drinking wine, etc.), rituals (first of all, of course, the 
consolamentum, which is the proper entrance in the rank of the "elect," the Cathar elite) 
and, underlying all these, the comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the Cathar 
doctrines, the acute awareness that the world is created, constituted, and maintained 
precisely in the way in which Cathar theologians say it is. This was a redeeming 
knowledge, which of course betrays, once again, the Gnostic character of Catharism. 
The Gnostic character or ascendant of Catharism has been repeatedly highlighted 
by those religions scientists and historians exploring these topics. Heinrich Fichtenau, to 
take only one recent example, offers an excellent account of the way in which Catharism 
"flows" from Gnosticism, and of their close, "structural" relationships. Fichtenau puts 
together "the Gnostics, Bogomils, and Cathars", and talks about their commitment to the 
theology of the Dualist tradition. In their hands, says Fichtenau, 
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dualism became the key to unlocking the meaning of the universe. It was 
said of the Cathars that "they ...maintain ...there are two ages of the 
world (saecula), a good one and an evil one; similarly, there are two 
worlds (mundos), two realms, two heavens, two earths, and in this way 
they maintain that there are two of everything." While this remark is not 
strictly accurate, it still illustrates a fundamental tendency inherent to 
this ontology. And only a story that did not rest content with the Gnostic 
idea of an emanating good principle could measure up to this view. The 
prosaic Gnostic myth was supplanted by one that played upon human 
emotions to greater dramatic effect, involving as it did the fall of angels, 
imprisonment, liberation, and re-ascendance. (Fichtenau 1998: 161) 
Catharism took over from Gnosticism the notion that we, as spiritual substances, are 
temporarily in this world and have to make every effort to find our way back to the 
"principle of light". Our soul is, in Catharism as well as Gnosticism "a stranger and an 
exile in the body". The Cathars learned from the Gnostics that "the souls of men were 
'precious pearls', divine sparks from this spiritual realm and had descended into the 
wicked material world of the 'howling darkness' to be imprisoned in material bodies and 
could be released only through the redeeming mediation of gnosis" (Stoyanov 2000: 87) 
According to this line of thought, there is nothing, in this life, more important than 
learning how to fight the realm of matter and recover the original lightness of light. 
7.2. Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter 
7.2.1. The problem 
George Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter is not only the most important part of 
his philosophy, but also one of the greatest challenges he left to his commentators, 
whether critical or apologetic. Most of Berkeley scholars have considered his refutation 
of matter in terms of strength or weakness of his rational arguments against the material 
world, paying much attention to his abolition of the then received distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities, his refutation of the Lockean abstract ideas, his detailed 
accounts on the inconceivability, meaningless and superfluity of matter, and so forth. 
There are consequently a lot of excellent and comprehensive monographs and studies on 
Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy, considered from this particular point of view, 
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revealing either the ingenuity and justification of Berkeley's arguments or the 
inconsistencies and weak points he showed in refuting matter (those by J. O. Urmson, A. 
C. Grayling, D. Berman, Ian Tipton, G. Pitcher, J, Dancy or G. J. Warnock being only the 
best known and most influential). 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that, at the present stage of Berkeley studies, some 
shift from the strictly logical and analytical consideration of his argumentation against 
matter to a discussion of it in terms of religious studies, cultural history and history of 
ideas would be as necessary as it is fruitful. Such a shift in Berkeley's scholarly reception 
might happily bring about a supplementation of the current logic-analytical approaches 
with a better and more powerful historical contextualization of the Berkeleian 
immaterialist philosophy, and indeed offer us a deeper and maybe more complete 
understanding of it. My suggestion is that by placing Berkeley within a broader 
framework of religious traditions (a framework in which the Cathar doctrines on matter 
have a certain part to play) would result in the fact that Berkeley's immaterialism would 
make more sense. 
The interesting thing here is that it is George Berkeley himself who, in a way, 
points to the necessity of such an interpretative shift in the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, § 96: 
Matter being expelled out of Nature, drags with it so many sceptical and 
impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling 
questions, which have been thorns in the sides of the divines, as well as 
philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind; that if the 
arguments we have produced against it, are not found equal to 
demonstration (as to me they evidently seem) yet I am sure all friends to 
knowledge, peace, and religion, have reasons to wish they were. 
(Berkeley 1949, II) [emphasis added] 
From such a passage at least two important ideas might be inferred. Firstly, it is obvious 
that there is something that Berkeley considers to be superior to the mere strength or 
soundness of the logical argument(ation): namely, the utility and efficiency of the 
philosophical ideas in terms of some broader existential benefits; that is, by quoting 
Berkeley's own words, in terms of their long-term contribution to the consolidation and 
advancement of "knowledge, peace, and religion". 
Secondly, this fragment implies — it seems to me — that the non-existence of 
matter is not necessarily in Berkeley the logical conclusion, or outcome, of a lengthy 
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reasoning approach, but — perhaps on the contrary — a presupposition, an "intuition" 
that Berkeley had possibly had from the outset of his intellectual enterprise, prior to, and 
independent of, any logical, argumentative procedure. I suggest that the ultimate nature of 
this "intuition" is a theological or religious one, and by the means of his writings George 
Berkeley just tried to justify it logically, and offer it a respectable philosophical, even 
"scientific," appearance. 
As it clearly follows from the passage just quoted, Berkeley's primary aim is to 
supply his philosophical teachings with an immediate character of social and ethical-
practical efficacy. As it were, to him philosophy is not simply a matter of arguing, 
counter-arguing, reasoning or persuading people for its own sake, but it is, so to say, a 
matter of life (and death), of improving and enlarging the conditions of human living, and 
of "healing" others' minds and souls; eventually, philosophy is to look for some practical 
horizon as its real place of manifestation. In other words, Berkeley essentially intended to 
consider his philosophy in terms of public and political (in the original sense of polis) 
relevance, rather than strictly scholarly or academic relevance (although he never 
neglected the scholarly significance and fate of his writings). But I do not want to insist 
anymore on this aspect of Berkeley's work as it was already dealt with in some detail in 
some of the previous chapters. 
7.2.2. Matter and Evil 
Once Berkeley started seeing philosophy as having to be — in some way or other — 
useful for life, his intellectual approach acquired, apart from its specifically metaphysical 
character, a marked religious-practical character. And it is precisely at this point that he 
joins the Cathar (Dualistic, in fact) searching for the "origin of evil." Or, one of the main 
objectives of this chapter is to show that a consideration of Berkeley's refutation of 
matter in view of the Cathar ideas presented above would cast a new and seminal light on 
this most scandalous and provocative of his theses, and contribute substantially to our 
better understanding of it. My central argument for such a consideration is that, by his 
trying to locate the source of his neighbours' alienation (in the shapes of atheism, 
scepticism, unbelief, etc.), Berkeley was in fact asking the same question as the Cathars 
did. The question is, in Tertullian's phrase: Unde malum et qua in re? ("Whence came 
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Evil, and in what does it exist?"). Moreover, my argument is decisively supported by the 
fact that both Berkeley and Cathars gave the ancient question comparatively the same 
answer: matter. In both cases matter is regarded as being related to the source of evil. Of 
course, there might be found numerous elements distinguishing Berkeley's philosophy 
from the Cathar theology, but there are at least these common central ideas: matter is 
regarded as being — in some way or other — the source of evil, this fact being 
accompanied by specific theological anxieties and concerns, and by the arduous desire to 
keep away from the world of matter. 
Almost needless to say, George Berkeley is not a Dualist thinker in the proper and 
full sense of the word, as he clearly and repeatedly says that "only minds and spirits" 
exist. Nevertheless, even i f denied philosophically, there is a sense in which matter has a 
marked (and very interesting) psychological existence in Berkeley's philosophical 
thinking: it embarrasses, troubles and concerns him, and it always puzzles and obsesses 
his mind. Matter occupies an essential position in most of his writings, just as it is 
contained in the very name he gave his philosophy: immaterialism. It would be difficult 
to say about Berkeley, otherwise than metaphorically, that he is a modern Cathar. 
Nevertheless, there is something in his case echoing a set of Cathar attitudes: his 
underlying psychology, his radical refutation of matter and his overall attitudes to the 
material world, his intense anxiety about the intellectual and ethical dangers that the 
recognition of matter brings about, and — above all — his passionate advocacy of the 
spiritual side of human life. All these point to the existence in Berkeley's philosophy of a 
mentality that one always encounters when studying the Cathar phenomenon. 
Although the "gentle Bishop" was in general an example of polite manners and 
mild temper, when coming to talk about the upholders of matter, he could not help using 
a rather "strong language", with adjectives and phrases which are reminiscent of the most 
passionate of the Christian apologists: 
upon the same foundation [the doctrine of matter] have been raised all 
the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion. [...] How great a friend 
material substance hath been to atheists in all ages, were needless to 
relate. Al l their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a 
dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once removed, the 
whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no 
longer worth while, to bestow a particular consideration on the 
absurdities of every wretched sect of atheists. (Berkeley 1949, II 
[Principles...], § 92) 
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A fragment like this, betraying so intense a concern and deep interest on philosopher's 
side, leads us to probably one of the most interesting and spectacular elements revealed 
by a comparison of Catharism and Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter: their 
similar shift from depreciating matter to considering it non-existent. Somehow 
paradoxically, matter, although responsible for so numerous destructive consequences, is 
in fact non-existent; matter, although so particularly dangerous for any human 
knowledge, serenity and virtue, is actually nothing — which means, exactly in the same 
way as in the Cathar case, that the lack of value comes to be perceived as a lack of real 
existence. And it is especially this shift that proves sufficiently the religious nature of 
Berkeley's "intuition" of the non-existence of matter: this paradoxical solution cannot be 
"explained" in logical terms at all, but only as an extreme result of a peculiar theological 
vision of the world, a vision whose inner articulations and ways of manifestation are very 
similar to those of the Cathar theology examined above. There is a fragment in Alciphron 
that bring forth, in a remarkably expressive manner, some of the key features of 
Berkeley's Cathar-like vision: religious pessimism, bitter awareness of the human 
imperfections and weaknesses, and a deep contempt to the earthly world. The fragment 
runs as follows: "To me it seems the man can see neither deep nor far who is not sensible 
of his own misery, sinfulness, and dependence; who doth not perceive that this present 
world is not designed or adapted to make rational souls happy." (Berkeley 1950: III , 178 
[Crito speaks]) And there are, of course, numerous other similar fragments in Berkeley 
attesting to a certain theological sensibility very close to that of the Cathars. 
Berkeley's impatience and ardent desire to offer his neighbours an immediate and 
efficient solution for their uneasiness and alienation make him be extremely hostile to all 
partisans of matter, no matter their epochs, schools or philosophical arguments and 
justifications. In his extreme view, even the slightest recognition of the existence of 
matter makes possible the triumph of materialism, which is more or less the same with 
atheism, which — to him — means the explicit encouragement of immorality, 
selfishness, public corruption, ruin of every human society. In short, to him, materialist 
philosophers attack the very foundations of the Christian faith: 
Nay hath it [matter] not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages, 
with the most plausible argument against a Creation? That a corporeal 
substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, 
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should be produced out of nothing by the mere will of a spirit, hath been 
looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and 
absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even 
divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought matter coeternal 
with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether 
materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things. (Berkeley 
1949: I I [Three Dialogues...], 256) 
Yet, there is a significant difference between Berkeley and the Cathars in their seeing 
matter as the origin of evil. While Catharism considered matter a principle of evil as to 
man's nature (avoidable only through specific religious practices, prayers and ritual 
gestures), Berkeley saw the existence of matter as a source of evil in terms of man's 
culture (avoidable only through the theoretical denial of matter): namely, in religion and 
theology, philosophy, sciences (physics and even mathematics), everyday moral life, and 
so forth. This is probably one of the most important differences between Berkeley's 
"Catharism" and Cathars' ideas. In most of his writings, Berkeley deals not so much with, 
say, the way in which "human condition" is affected by its "materiality", that is, he pays 
comparatively little theoretical attention to the fact that, by its nature, human is essentially 
an "embodied soul", whereas he is very much concerned with the way in which the 
recognition of the existence of matter by philosophers, theologians, scientists and scholars 
in general affects human intellectual products, vitiates sciences, and deadly 
"contaminates" man's beliefs and wisdom. 
In the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, he talks extensively about 
"the great advantages that arise from the belief of immaterialism, both in regard to 
religion and human learning." (Ibid.: I I , 257). These theoretical advantages are numerous, 
impressive and, Berkeley thinks, easily and immediately recognisable. Berkeley traces 
them in various fields, but his fragment actually implies that, beyond any possible 
enumeration, the denial of the existence of matter necessarily brings benefits for any 
imaginable human enterprise. I will give only a few examples. 
In the field of theology, the advantages brought about by the refusal of matter are 
among the greatest. As Berkeley says, the "being of a God", the "incorruptibility of the 
soul", 
those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and 
most immediate evidence? When say the being of a God, I do not mean 
an obscure general cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but 
God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A being whose 
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spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and 
goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of 
which... there is no more reason to doubt, that of our own being. {Ibid.: 
I I , 257) 
Also, in the sphere of physical sciences ("natural philosophy") the refutation of matter 
would produce, however paradoxical this might appear to us, benefits very difficult to 
over-value. Once the existence of matter is denied, a lot of difficult, i f not completely 
insoluble, problems, many scholarly disputes and conflicts would instantly disappear for 
ever. According to Berkeley, it is precisely the embracing of the notion of matter that 
leads natural philosophers into error: 
what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions, hath the belief 
of matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about 
its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, & c. do they 
not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, 
according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend 
how any one body should move another? [...] Can they account by the 
laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours, or for the regular 
course of things? [...] But laying aside matter and corporeal causes, and 
admitting only the efficiency of an all-perfect mind, are not all the 
effects of Nature easy and intelligible? I f the phenomena are nothing 
else but ideas; God is a spirit, but matter an unintelligent, unperceiving 
being. {Ibid: 11,257) 
It is worth noticing at this point that Berkeley can coherently advance an entire system of 
"philosophy of science" without supposing at all the existence of matter. In today's 
Berkeley scholarship this is considered an important and quite original characteristic of 
his thought. As Urmson has pointed out, what makes his philosophy interesting is the fact 
that "that he claims that his ontology is perfectly compatible with both common sense 
and religious beliefs and that [...] he can give a satisfactory account of the nature and 
value of the sciences without invoking the hypothesis of matter." (Urmson 1982: 33) 
The same important advantages one encounters in ethics i f the matter is expelled. 
The immediate presence and manifestation of God, without the useless interposition of 
matter, would be of greatest help in supporting people's moral endeavours. As Berkeley 
says, "the apprehension of a distant Deity, naturally disposes men to negligence in their 
moral actions, which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him 
immediately present, and acting on their minds without the interposition of matter, or 
unthinking second causes." (Berkeley 1949: II [Three Dialogues...], 257) 
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In metaphysics, the notion that matter does not exist, once generally accepted by 
scholars and philosophers, would have wonderful effects for the solving of numerous 
traditional philosophical problems, puzzles and disputes. As a result of the denial of the 
existence of matter, metaphysics would become much sounder, more commonsensical 
and reasonable: 
what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, 
hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and accident, principle 
of individuation, possibility of matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the 
manner how two independent substances so widely different as spirit 
and matter, should mutually operate on each other? What difficulties, I 
say, and endless disquisitions concerning these and innumerable other 
the like points, do we escape by supposing only spirits and ideas? 
{Ibid. : I I 257) 
However strange it might appear, the recognition of matter has disastrous effects even in 
mathematics, and only thanks to its refutation, it would be possible to put an end to the 
numberless paradoxes, perplexities, and intellectual sufferings that matter has always 
caused to mathematicians: "Even the mathematics themselves, i f we take away the 
absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most 
shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences, depending on the infinite 
divisibility of finite extension, which depends on that supposition." (Ibid.: II 257) 
Even the worst and most unimaginable mistakes, fallacies, and sins have had the 
belief in matter as their main cause. As a matter of fact, it would be hard to talk about 
false ideas, prejudices or other dangerous beliefs without immediately noticing the 
recognition of matter as their ultimate source. For example, the ultimate roots of idolatry 
are to be found in the fact that we take the visible things as being material, which is thus 
not only an error in theoretical terms, but also a serious religious offence: 
on the same principle [doctrine of matter] doth idolatry likewise in all 
its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and 
stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations 
in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being 
perceived, doubtless they would never fall down, and worship their own 
ideas; but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind 
which produces and sustain all things. (Berkeley 1949, II [Principles]) 
It is easy to see that matter plays a central role in Berkeley's account of the nature (and 
the forms of manifestation) of evil in the sphere of human culture. From all these 
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fragments just quoted it becomes manifest that Berkeley comes, as it were, to "demonise" 
matter. And it is precisely this "demonization" of the material world that, once again, 
reminds us how close his ideas are to the doctrines of those Cathars who formerly 
thought that the Devil ("father of matter") was the cause of all human unhappiness and 
imperfection. 
7.2.3. A broader framework 
The aim of these final speculative considerations is to place both Catharism and 
Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter within some broader theoretical framework. 
For some of the possible questions an over-critical reader might ask now, once my 
comparative exercise is completed, are: How is it possible to undertake, legitimately, such 
a comparative approach as this one? How justified is the parallel drawn between these 
two phenomena, so remote in space and time, and how can it be sustained theoretically? 
One possible, though somehow speculative, answer to such questions may be 
found in the following considerations. The legitimacy of a comparative approach of this 
nature comes from the fact that both Catharism and Berkeley's "intuition" of the non-
existence of matter might be regarded as deriving from the same unique source. Namely: 
from a fundamental archetypal Dualistic pattern, to which both of them belong, and 
which — it can be further speculated — seems to be recurrent in the religious and 
intellectual history of numerous other cultures. The existence of such an archetypal 
pattern has been observed and discussed — or at least presupposed — by numerous 
historians, religion scientists and theoreticians. Its roots are various: anthropological, 
mythical, social, empirical, etc., just as its manifestations are far from being limited to the 
field of religious life: they are manifest, too, in philosophy, literature, mentalities, visual 
arts. 
Originally, there were a number of fundamental pairs of opposites ("left-right", 
"up-down", "day-night", "life-death", etc.) that, according to some authors (e.g. Cassirer), 
might to some extent have contributed an anthropological Dualistic element to the 
formation of some Weltanschauung or another, beginning with the most primitive 
mythical thought. As Ernst Cassirer said, the development of "the mythical feeling of 
space always starts from the opposition of day and night, light and darkness. The 
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dominant power which this antithesis exerts on the mythical consciousness can be 
followed down to the most highly developed religions." (Cassirer 1955: I I , 96) Thus, 
according to this line of thought, seeing and considering things in a Dualist manner have 
gradually came to stay at the roots of various "cultural behaviours", known under various 
guises and names. A synthetic and precise account of how this archetypal Dualistic 
pattern is originally formed and how it uses different expressions is given by H. 
Fichtenau, who in fact continues Cassirer's approach: 
Whoever perceives the world as a maelstrom of incomprehensible 
phenomena will try to impose some order. The simplest mode of 
organisation is a 'binary' system that characterises things as either "on" or 
"off," being or non-being, or in the dualistic terms common to the 
worldviews and religious concepts of the most divers peoples. (Fichtenau 
1998: 160-1) 
Subsequently, based on the internalisation of such a fundamental anthropological and 
then mythical set of distinctions, more elaborated and divers forms of Dualism were 
brought into being and developed. For example, in philosophy Dualism has played an 
essential role, even from its inception. Philosophical Dualistic tendencies can be traced as 
far back as the Presocratics, but it was in Plato's thought, "with its dualities between the 
mortal body and the immortal soul, or the world perceived by the senses and the world of 
eternal ideas, comprehended by the mind." (Stoyanov 2000: 2), that the philosophical 
dualism was to be given one of its most sophisticated and durable expressions. The 
Platonic dualism would stay at the heart of almost all the subsequent philosophical 
dualisms in Western thought. For the "Platonic type of soul-body duality" enjoyed an 
outstanding posterity. It came to influence 
important Jewish and Christian traditions. A dualist spirit-matter 
opposition along with a rigorous asceticism was cultivated in the esoteric-
initiatory trends of Orphism and Pythagoreanism.... The Orphic-
Pythagorean teaching which explains the physical body as a tomb for the 
divine and immortal soul is shared in the Gnostic type of religiosity with 
its implicit focus on the rescue of the "divine spark" in man from the 
bodily prison... — a preoccupation shared by the medieval Bogomil and 
Cathar heresies. (Ibid.: 5) 
As such, the detailed Gnostic accounts of the nature and origin of man occupied a crucial 
position, and played successfully the role of the source of inspiration for several 
subsequent Dualist religious (and even intellectual) movements4. From this standpoint, 
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the Cathar theology — which we dealt with briefly earlier on in this chapter — almost did 
nothing but take over, clarify and develop some of the main cosmological and 
anthropological ideas professed within the various branches of the ancient Gnosticism. 
An excellent summarisation of the Gnostic accounts of man's nature, fate and 
possibilities of salvation offers Milan Loos. According to him, in Gnosticism, man's soul 
is imprisoned in 
this dungeon of the world, confined in the darkness of matter; but it 
originated in a very different place, in a timeless world, in the bright 
abode of another God of whom the earthly world and its rulers have no 
conception. The soul partakes of the very substance of this Unknown 
God, but in the material world it has lost the consciousness of its identity. 
[...] Only gnosis can awaken it, knowledge which come from above and 
is really only the reviving memory of the soul's origin. (Loos 1974: 21-2) 
Besides its numerous occurrences in the field of religion, theology or (religious) 
philosophy, this archetypal Dualist pattern might also be found in various other areas, 
some of them remote enough from the religious. Indeed, there are several secularised 
forms through which it manifests and reveals itself: Romantic nihilism, to take only a 
modern and better known example, might be to some extent regarded as one of these 
forms. A close and special relationship between the Dualist outlooks and the idea of 
nothingness has been observed both in Catharism and in Berkeley's immaterialism. 
Dualism may presuppose the idea of nothingness as an extreme form of "existence" of 
one of its terms. As such, within the context of this particular relationship, we can see 
how some of the modern European nihilists expressed sometimes views echoing ideas of 
a peculiarly Dualist or Gnostic character, even i f they considered themselves as being 
outside the religious sphere, i f not simply atheists. Here is Giacomo Leopardi's dramatic 
confession: " I was terrified finding myself in the midst of nothingness, and myself 
nothing. I felt as i f I were stifled believing and feeling that everything is nothing, solid 
nothingness." (Qtd in Schenk 1979: 53) 
As a matter of fact, this nihilism is the distinctive mark of a broader modern 
sensibility, whether Romantic or post-Romantic, a sensibility characterising a large 
number of artistic, philosophical and intellectual modern movements. As Hans Georg 
Schenk has excellently showed, Schopenhauer's thought, for instance, might be regarded 
as one of the most significant philosophical embodiments of this sensibility. It is not 
difficult to see how human existence is often associated in Schopenhauer with the idea of 
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meaningless, absurd suffering and useless sacrifice, which is o f course strongly 
reminiscent o f the traditional Dualistic perception of the earthly world as deeply 
corrupted, valueless, and non-deserving to exist: 
As with Leopardi and Senancour, so with Schopenhauer, the idea of 
man's utterly senseless existence produces gloom and despondency [ . . . ] 
From the very start the philosopher's mind is focused on man's torments 
and agonies, which. . . he depicts in all their manifold shapes. Enjoyment 
and happiness, on the other hand are sadly dismissed as a mirage, and 
thus the whole course of life seems to be oscillating between the two 
poles of suffering and ennui. ...the world appears as the worst of 
possible worlds... (Schenk 1979: 5 9 ) 5 
Finally, we might — needless to say — find numerous significant differences between the 
ancient Gnostics or medieval Cathars, on the one hand, and the modern nihilists and 
Schopenhauer, on the other. Nevertheless, despite all these differences, even in the most 
elaborated modern cases, it is often possible to discern some traces o f that primordial 
Dualist tendency to contest the established, commonly received state of things, in an 
attempt at transcending it. For it is ultimately the same fundamental attitude of the 
isolated individual facing the hostile universe that appears either in the form of a need for 
spiritual, religious elevation (and escape from it) or, perhaps more sophisticatedly, in the 
form of a feeling o f nothingness and universal vanity. 
This lengthy divagation is not intended as a part of my main argument in this 
chapter for a possible Cathar reading of Berkeley's immaterialism. The only reason why I 
have advanced here these speculations was the need for pointing to a broader theoretical 
framework within which both Catharism and Berkeley's immaterialism might be safely 
placed, and a comparative approach to them makes more sense, and legitimises itself 
even for an over-critical reader. 
Notes: 
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1 For a discussion o f the "dualists sects" and "dualist religion" in the West, see Stoyanov's book. (Stoyanov 
2000: 287) 
2 To take only an indirect and modern example, the great success that Denis de Rougemont's book L 'amour 
et I'Occident has enjoyed over the years proves this sufficiently. 
Referring to Dualism in general S. Runciman makes relatively the same point: "Dualism, for all its claims, 
does not, any better than Orthodoxy, solve the problem of good and evil . The Orthodox might be unable to 
explain God the Omnipotent should have permitted such a thing as evil to be and to enter into the world o f 
His creation. But the Dualists only answered the question by raising a new diff icul ty . I f Satan created the 
world, how and why did God allow any good to be imprisoned in it? For the Dualists had to admit that Man 
possesses the consciousness o f good; otherwise there could be no such thing as religion at all . To solve this 
problem they had to invent innumerable stories to explain the presence o f good in the wor ld ." (Runciman 
1982: 175) 
4 As far as the influences o f Gnosticism on Western literature are concerned, Harold Bloom, in a recent 
book, talks o f Gnosticism as the "religion o f literature" par excellance: "From Valentinus through the 
German Romantic poet Novalis, the French Romantic Nerval, and the English Wi l l i am Blake, Gnosticism 
has been indistinguishable f rom imaginative genius. I venture... the judgment that it is pragmatically the 
religion of literature" (Bloom 2002: xv i i i ) 
5 Moreover, it is not only in literature or philosophy that this way o f seeing things appears. There are also 
works which belong to the visual arts expressing it. From this point o f view, Schenk has some interesting 
considerations on the way in which the idea o f absurd and meaningless makes itself "visible" in some o f 
Goya's paintings. In some way, devil is, i f not its proper creator, at least the powerful master o f Goya's 
world, echoing, i f you wish, that Cathar association o f the visible material world with the rule o f demon and 
nothingness: "as in Schopenhauer's case, Goya's almost exclusive preoccupation with the dark side o f the 
life helps to produce a diabolical picture o f the world. It has been observed that while Hieronymus Bosch, 
the fifteenth-century Flemish artist, introduces men into his infernal world, Goya introduced the infernal 
into the world o f man. In the end it is no longer human beings, however vile or insane, but gruesome 
monsters that haunt his 'Disparates' and, with a vengeance, his 'Pinturas Negras.' Their inexpressible 
horror, as Aldous Huxley has pointed out, is based on their 'mindlessness, animality and spiritual 
darkness'." (Schenk 1979: 63) 
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Conclusions 
What has been said is sufficient, I hope, for pointing to the possibility of a new way of 
looking at Berkeley's thought, one better articulated historically and more intelligible 
than what today's mainstream Berkeley scholarship offers. It has not been my intention in 
this thesis to "replace" the existing (dominantly analytic) manner of approaching 
Berkeley's philosophy with the manner I propose in this thesis. As I said in the 
introductory chapter, the analytic Berkeley scholars do an excellent job in their constantly 
relating Berkeleian arguments and ideas to important issues in our contemporary debates. 
And this linkage between the needs of the present and the resources that the past 
incessantly offers is a really important factor for the advancement of any form of human 
knowledge. 
Instead, what I have tried to do here was to show that it is not only necessary, but 
also possible to supplement the existing analytically-minded scholarship with a certain 
sense of historical awareness, with an understanding of the remarkable intellectual 
richness and cultural complexity laying behind Berkeley's thinking, and with the notion 
of a much larger framework of cultural and religious-metaphysical traditions, a 
framework within which Berkeley's philosophy is placed in close connection with a 
number of kindred ways of thinking characterizing the European intellectual world. 
Berkeley's philosophy has been systematically dealt with in this thesis as the meeting 
point of a large number of currents of thought, manners of philosophizing, 
religious/theological movements, spiritual/soteriological techniques, traditional topoi and 
various cultural representations. Nevertheless, my objective here has not been to account 
for all these strictly from the point of view of an antiquarian, but to make a deeper sense 
of them by investigating the significance of their presence in Berkeley, and the role they 
191 
played in the constitution of Berkeley's thought. 1 have simply tried to see how 
Berkeley's thought appeared from their perspective. 
For this purpose, in my attempt to discover whence Berkeley's philosophy comes, 
I have constantly endeavored, throughout this thesis, to "bracket" what 1 knew about 
Berkeley's importance for some of today's philosophical debates, and to focus mainly on 
the possible roots of his thought, without even asking whether a discussion of those roots 
is or is not "interesting" from the point of view of the contemporary philosophical 
discussions. I openly acknowledge that, say, showing how Siris was based on an alchemic 
mode of thinking might not contribute a great deal to solving what passes today as 
"genuinely philosophical problems". Nor does placing Berkeley's "Bermuda scheme" in 
the tradition of the search for the "earthly paradise" answer many of our current 
philosophical interrogations. 
What I do nevertheless believe is that there are also other questions, and that my 
approach in the present dissertation offers a proper way of asking and, hopefully, 
answering them: What is Berkeley's relationship with the past? What role does the 
ancient and medieval heritage play in the constitution of his own philosophy? To what 
extent is he indebted to various traditional modes of thinking and to what extent is his 
philosophy "novel"? To what extent was he aware of the modeling influence of the past 
on his own way of philosophizing? Did he try to resist it? Etc. These are important 
questions because they are in fact specific instantiations of a set of other — ampler and 
more difficult — questions, of whose theoretical significance it is difficult to seriously 
doubt, and which my approach hints at, even i f it leaves them eventually unanswered: 
How does a given philosophy articulate itself? To what extent is it possible to escape the 
dominating influence of the past when designing one's own philosophy? Considering this 
influence, why and when is a given philosophy considered "new"? What precisely renders 
it so? How is it that novelty appears against a certain intellectual background? Does 
philosophical novelty consist of proposing new solutions to old problems or, rather, of 
proposing — "inventing" — new problems? And, in general, how is novelty possible in 
the history of philosophy? Is there any philosophia perennisl 
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Yett — it might be asked — do all these questions have any philosophical 
significance whatsoever? My belief, a belief on which the entire design of this thesis has 
been built up, is that the answer hyes. Behind all these questions there is a fundamental 
and perennial need to understand what the past is, and what are the favorite ways through 
which the past is shaping our present lives. In other words, all these questions, and any 
other similar ones, are but instantiations of one and the same fundamental interrogation: 
Whence we came? 
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APPENDIX: 
Waiting for the Eschatom Berkeley's "Bermuda Scheme" between Earthly Paradise 
and Educational Utopia1 
— Article forthcoming in Utopian Studies, Volume 14, Issue 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 36-50 — 
The objective of this article is a discussion of George Berkeley (1685-1753)'s project to build a 
theology college in the Islands of Bermuda (the so-called "Bermuda Scheme") in terms of Utopian 
projections and symbolic geography, and in the light of a set of traditions and patterns of thought governing 
the Western (Christian) representations of the "happy islands", "earthly paradise", "eschaton", and so forth. 
There are at least three points 1 will be trying to make in this writing: 
Firstly, the way in which Berkeley considers the Islands of Bermuda (in his private letters, as well 
as in his Proposal) is very similar to that in which the "earthly paradise" has been traditionally described 
and represented within the medieval mirabilia, medieval and Renaissance travel literature, and various other 
"amazing" accounts on the Happy Islands. 
Secondly, Berkeley's project, far from being an isolated negligible attempt, could be placed in the 
long tradition of the "educational" Utopias. From such a standpoint, Berkeley's Bermuda seems to be very 
close to that Bildungsprovinz described in Herman Hesse's Das Glasperlenspiel: an ideal scholarly society, 
located in some privileged space, clearly separated from the corrupted and corrupting outside world, and 
designed to embody the noblest values and virtues of the humankind. 
Finally, following Mircea Eliade's and especially Harry M. Bracken's and David Berman's 
studies, I will be showing that Berkeley's American Project is hardly understandable without taking 
seriously into account its Messianism — that is, in Berkeley's mind, the propagation of Gospel and the 
conversion of the Indians had a spiritual value, and were clear signs of the approaching Second Coming. 
1. 
It was in 1725 that George Berkeley published a paper entitled, not particularly 
concisely, "A Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, 
and for Converting the Savage Americans, to Christianity, By a College to be erected in 
the Summer Islands, otherwise called The Isles of Bermuda" (VII 343-60). This title is in 
fact describing almost the whole project. Prior to that, the philosopher, since about March 
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1722, had written several private letters to friends and acquaintances on the same topic, 
each of them containing enthusiastic descriptions of the Bermuda islands. The letter to 
Lord Percival, dated March 4 l h 1722 (VIII 127-9), is of special interest, as in it Berkeley 
announces for the first time his intention to establish a "theology and fine arts college" in 
those remote islands, and, more than that, to spend there all the rest of his life ("It is now 
about ten months since I have determined with myself to spend the residue of my days in 
the Island of Bermuda, where I trust in Providence I may be the mean instrument of doing 
good to mankind [VII I 127])2. Finally, there are of course those famous stanzas by 
Berkeley dedicated to the project, confessing his lack of satisfaction, i f not 
disappointment, with the Old World, and announcing that "Westward the Course of 
Empire takes its Way" (VII 373). 
Despite the fact that he had never travelled to Bermuda (and, ironically, he would 
never do so), Berkeley offered in both his letter to Percival and his Proposal an 
amazingly detailed description of the islands, their natural landscapes, beauties, 
resources, richness, prosperity, and their inhabitants (emphasising, for example, the purity 
and innocence of their manners). Since the description itself is an excellent piece of 
writing and plays a significant role in my demonstration, I wi l l reproduce a few excerpts 
from it: 
The climate is by far the healthiest and most serene, and consequently the 
most f i t for study. [ . . . ] There is the greatest abundance of all the 
necessary provisions for life, which is much to be considered in a place for 
education. [ . . . ] It is the securest spot in the universe, being environed 
round with rocks all but one narrow entrance, guarded by seven forts, 
which render it inaccessible not only to pirates but to the united force of 
France and Spain. [ . . . ] The inhabitants have the greatest simplicity of 
manners, more innocence, honesty, and good nature, than any of our other 
planters, who are many of them descended from whores, vagabonds, and 
transported criminals, none of which ever settled in Bermudas. (VII I 128) 
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On the other hand, although the Proposal is written some years after this letter, it still 
retains the same enthusiasm, strong determination, and idealization as does his letter to 
Percival: 
no Part of the World enjoys a purer Air, or a more temperate Climate, the 
great Ocean which environs them, at once moderating the Heat of the 
South Winds, and the Severity of the North-West. [ . . . ] the Air of Bermuda 
is perpetually fanned and kept cool by Sea-breezes, which render the 
Weather the most healthy and delightful that could be wished, being ... of 
one equal Tenour almost throughout the whole Year, like the latter End of 
a fine May. (VII 351) 
A crucial part of the description is that in which the numberless natural "beauties of 
Bermuda" are listed. The islands seem unusually ful l of wonders and blessings, 
abundantly supplied with natural resources as useful as beautiful. As it were, the fact that 
the island seemed to be a "chosen" place for unusual spiritual accomplishments was 
beyond any reasonable doubt. The only thing one can do is just to admire unreservedly 
what one "encounters" there: 
the summers refreshed with constant cool breezes, the winters as mild as 
our May, the sky as light and blue as a sapphire, the ever green pastures, 
the earth eternally crowned with fruits and flowers. The woods of cedars, 
palmettos, myrtles, oranges & c, always fresh and blooming. The 
beautiful situations and prospects of hills, vales, promontories, rocks, lakes 
and sinuses of the sea. The great variety, plenty, and perfection of fish, 
fowl , vegetables of all kinds, and (which is in no other of our Western 
Islands) the most excellent butter, beef, veal, pork, and mutton. But above 
all, that uninterrupted health and alacrity of spirit, which is the result of the 
finest weather and gentlest climate in the world. (VII I 128) 
Now, one of the first ideas that occurs when reading such a description is that the way in 
which Berkeley describes the Islands of Bermuda is strikingly similar to that in which the 
"earthly paradise" has traditionally been described and represented within the medieval 
mirabilia, within the medieval, Renaissance and early modern travel literature, and 
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various other "amazing" accounts on "Happy Islands". One of the most interesting things 
about his islands is that no actual documentation lies behind his detailed description of 
them, but only the primordial phantasm, so to speak, of a wonderful, innocent and 
uncorrupted world. In a way, Berkeley did not need to go and see the islands to be able to 
describe them: he apparently found them, with all their wonderful paradisiacal 
appearance, in the repertoire of his own inner intellectual world. On writing these texts, 
Berkeley seemed to be driven by a strong tendency towards "idealization", or towards the 
"sacralization" of something otherwise quite profane. He ends up attributing to a group of 
Atlantic islands almost all the ennobling characteristics of the "earthly paradise", as it had 
traditionally been imagined since the Greco-Roman antiquity3. 
First of all, it is the very notion of island that confers on the whole story a special 
character4. An island is not a place like any other; an island is a clearly privileged space, a 
space that, thanks to its isolation, remoteness and difficult accessibility, to its 
mysteriousness and autonomy, has acquired a particular cultural-symbolical dignity from 
the very outset of human culture5. The sophisticated dialectic of water and land, the 
agonic and difficult relationship between these two primordial elements (stoicheia) gave 
birth eventually to an intermediary entity: the island. As Claude Kappler put it, " [ i ] f there 
are any places that have a special appeal for imagination it is islands. [ . . . ] an island is by 
its nature a place where marvels exist for their own sake outside the laws that generally 
prevail.... Ever since Greek antiquity, islands have been favorite places for the most 
astounding human and divine adventures" (Qtd. in Delumeau 98). 6 This eives islands an 
impressive metaphorical value: like mountains, for example, they are often involved in 
several forms of the intellectual discourse: literary, poetical, theological, mythological, 
Utopian, political, etc. An island could be made to signify, from case to case: hope, 
survival, salvation, " f i rm ground", freedom, independence, regeneration, una vita nuova, 
certitude, and so on and so forth. No wonder then that the earthly paradise itself has often 
come to be located somewhere on an island: Dante "gave the earthly paradise the 
characteristics of an island, and in many medieval travel stories, especially Mandeville's, 
the kingdom of Prester John is located on an island. According to Mandeville, mysterious 
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India is 'divided into isles on account of the great rivers which flow out of Paradise'" 
(Delumeau 98). 
The usual name under which the "earthly paradise" islands have been traditionally 
known is that of "Happy Island(s)". Why this particular name? Medieval scholars had a 
particular way of explaining it. Pierre d 'Ail ly , for example, says that "[t]he name 'Happy 
Isles' means that these islands contain all good things. It is the fruitfulness of the soil that 
makes people believe that paradise was located in these islands..." (Qtd. in Delumeau 
99). In fact, as Jean Delumeau has showed, this explanation was borrowed from Isidore of 
Seville, and it was widely spread throughout Middle Ages. In his Etymologiae, Isidore 
states that: "The name 'Happy Isles' means that they produce all sorts of good things; that 
they enjoy a quasi-blessedness and have the advantage of happy abundance. By their very 
nature they give birth to precious trees and fruits. The slopes of the hills are naturally 
covered with vines. Instead of grass the soil for the most part yields crops and vegetables" 
(Qtd. in Delumeau 99). 
This very repetition, in several cases, of the same explanation, emphasizing the 
same factors (abundance of goods, ideal climate, wonderful landscapes, etc.) strengthens 
the tradition, and confirms that the "Happy Island" was not an isolated and marginal 
topos at all, but a deeply rooted and long lasting one: 
the Happy Islands stand in a Greco-Roman poetic tradition that is based on 
passages in Homer, Hesiod, and Plutarch. According to this tradition, 
beyond the towering Atlas there lie islands with enchanted gardens, a 
constant temperate climate, and fragrant breezes, where human beings 
have no need to work. In the Christian era Isidore of Seville gave this 
belief a new popularity by assigning it a place in his geography, which 
then exerted a lasting influence on Western culture. (Delumeau 99) 
What is interesting at this stage is that Berkeley himself, in another private letter, openly 
uses the term: he came to talk about "that happy Island" (VIII 156) with explicit reference 
to his Bermuda project. He was a lecturer in Greek and Latin and had an impressive 
classical training, so that it is reasonable to suppose that he knew something about this 
tradition of insula pomorum que fortunata vocatur (the island of apples that is called the 
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happy island), as Geoffrey of Monmouth (d. 1 154) describes it in his Vita Merlini, and 
about the various ways in which the "Happy Islands" had been searched for, described, 
and eulogized in the European world. 
Based on the (imaginary) account that Berkeley gives of the Island(s) of Bermuda, 
and on the similar accounts by ancient, medieval, early modern authors, it can be 
suggested that Berkeley's representation of the location and settings of his future theology 
and arts college was marked by some nostalgia for an earthly paradise. It was probably 
the religious substance of this feeling that gave him the strength and determination to 
pursue his project for so many years, and overcome all the criticisms it encountered from 
the more practical politicians and "technicians" of the day. And it may have been this 
"nostalgia" for the "earthly paradise" that made him be so wonderfully enthusiastic7 and, 
as we shall see below, unrealistic about the real situation of, and problems with, those 
islands. The project eventually failed, Berkeley being much laughed at, and even 
considered mad, by some London wits of that time 8. 
Finally, Berkeley's generous description of the Bermudas, with all their countless 
wonders, amazing resources, and paradisiacal landscapes, may well be placed in the 
tradition of those "detailed maps from the end of the Middle Ages [which] still teach, on 
the authority o f Isidore of Seville, that there exist in the West paradisal islands 'that 
abound in all good things'. These islands combine most of the elements that make for an 
earthly paradise: pleasant warmth, perpetual spring, delicious and fragrant fruits" 
(Delumeau 100-02). Certainly, it is not a very common thing for a philosopher, the less so 
for a promoter of the "new philosophy", to deal with such "un-serious" and speculative 
things as the "earthly paradise". But this is maybe what makes Berkeley so interesting: his 
being a truly uncommon philosopher. 
2. 
The "nostalgia for an earthly paradise" revealed by Berkeley's Bermuda project is 
only one of the facets of Berkeley's "Bermuda Scheme". The "happy island" is only the 
spatial framework within which something (important) is going to take place, the item of 
symbolic geography based on which his project is going to be put into practice. 
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Therefore, there must be another element of this scheme we have to deal with; it is, 
namely, its Utopian dimension. Berkeley's project, far from being an isolated attempt, 
might be placed in the long tradition of educational Utopias. 
As Northrop Frye put it, any Utopia is ultimately a discourse about education. I f 
not in their explicit purposes and statements, Utopian authors presuppose, at least 
implicitly, a consideration of education as a decisive factor in transforming humans. In 
Frye's view, this has a certain Platonic component, whether or not the Utopian writers are 
Platonists themselves: 
And though not all utopia-writers are Platonists, nearly all of them make 
their Utopias depend on education for their permanent establishment. It 
seems that the literary convention of an ideal state is really a by-product of 
a systematic view of education. That is, education, considered as a unified 
view of reality, grasps society by its intelligible rather than its actual form, 
and the Utopia is a projection of the ability to see society, not as an 
aggregate of buildings and bodies, but as a structure of arts and sciences. 
(Frye 37-8) 
Of course, in a rigorous sense, Berkeley's is only an incomplete, partial Utopia. So to 
speak, it is not a hard, but a soft Utopia.9 More than the ideal state envisaged in Plato's 
Republic, Berkeley's Bermuda resembles to some extent, for example, that 
Bildungsprovinz described in Herman Hesse's Das Glasperlenspiel: an ideal scholarly 
society, dedicated to cultivating superior arts and sciences, located in some privileged 
space, clearly separated from the corrupted and corrupting outside world, and designed to 
embody, preserve and convey the noblest values and virtues of the humankind. The island 
becomes in such a case a spatial symbol of salvation and regeneration through learning, 
science and fine arts. 
The notion of (utopian) separation from the outside (profane) wor ld 1 0 , of self-
protection and inaccessibility is clearly expressed several times by Berkeley: "The Group 
of Isles [ . . . ] walled round with Rocks, which render them inaccessible to Pirates or 
Enemies; there being put two narrow Entrances, both well guarded by Forts. It would 
therefore be impossible to find any where, a more secure Retreat for Students" (VI I 352). 
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Needless to say, Berkeley's emphasis on this aspect of his project is perfectly justified: 
remoteness, difficulty of access, and isolation are necessary not only for keeping innocent 
students safe from the corrupting profane world, or for preventing it from intervening in 
the normal course of the academic/utopian affairs, but also for conferring a high prestige 
and esteem on this scholarly community. For the strength of such an ideal scholarly 
community does not consist only in the intrinsic nature, in the volume and quality of its 
learning or in its scientific accomplishments, but also, maybe more importantly, in its 
publicly and socially recognized image. 
Once all the specific requirements are met, Berkeley's soft Utopia is ready to make 
its debut: 
Among a People [the inhabitants of Bermuda] of this Character, and in a 
Situation thus circumstantiated, it would seem that a Seminary of Religion 
and Learning might very fit ly be placed. The Correspondence with other 
Parts of America, the Goodness of the Air, the Plenty and Security of the 
Place, the Frugality and Innocence of the Inhabitants, all conspiring to 
favour such a Design. Thus much at least is evident, that young Students 
would be there less liable to be corrupted in their Morals; and the 
governing Part would be easier, and better contented with a small Stipend, 
and a retired academical Life, in a Corner from whence Avarice and 
Luxury are excluded." (Berkeley VI I 353) 
As it appears, life, of course, private life included, in such an ideal community is 
dominated by a certain form of artificiality: as it were, life is not allowed to take its 
natural course, but it is very carefully and in detail regulated, ordered, surveyed, 
engineered, kept far away from any possible vices and temptations, in short, life is 
thoroughly rationalized. As has been said, "Utopias are necessary for many reasons. One 
reason is that there is always a need to accommodate the excess of private desires to the 
public good, politics to ethics, moderation to freedom" (Mazzotta 60). This process is an 
essential characteristic of any Utopian organization, starting with its very outset: 
recruitment of its members. As has been said about the recruitment of new members in 
Hesse's Das Glasperlenspiel, "an exchange between Castalian institutions and their 
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surroundings persists: since all Castalians are celibate men and since they do not have any 
alternative form of perpetuating their ascetic community (immortality, regeneration, 
cloning, etc.), lay children are recruited on the basis of their intellectual and artistic 
performance by thoroughly combing the schools of the real world" (Antohi xi). Similarly, 
Berkeley's ideal scholarly society regularly needs new members. Its main intention is to 
produce worthy priests and missionaries who are to be involved in the propagation of 
Gospel and conversion of Indians; consequently, there is a need for an established way of 
replacing them and permanently renewing the Utopian community. 
It is at this point that Berkeley's system differs significantly from that envisaged 
by Hesse. For, among the toughest procedures in Bermuda are those related to the 
recruitment of future members of the scholarly community. Basically, the "young 
Americans necessary for this Purpose, may in the beginning be procured, either by 
peaceable Methods from those savage Nations, which border on our Colonies, and are in 
Friendship with us, or by taking captive the Children of our Enemies" (VII 347). This 
controversial aspect of Berkeley's Bermuda scheme has long been discussed among 
Berkeley scholars. David Berman regards this violent solution as chilling and, despite his 
constant sympathetica! consideration of Berkeley, he cannot help being very sarcastic at 
this point: "The Indian children are to be kidnapped. Why? No doubt, for their spiritual 
advantage" (132-3). 
Apart from that, there are clear and detailed regulations with regard to the 
schooling itself. As in other Utopias, such as Plato's Republic, there are rationalized and 
detailed procedures regarding access to the Utopian community, starting age, precise 
subject matters to be taught, and so forth: 
It is proposed to admit into the aforesaid College only such Savages as are 
under ten Years of Age, before evil Habits have taken a deep root; and yet 
not so early as to prevent retaining their Mother Language, which should 
be preserved by Intercourse among themselves. It is further proposed, to 
ground these young Americans thoroughly in Religion and Morality, and 
to give them a good Tincture of other Learning; particularly o f Eloquence, 
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History and practical Mathematics; to which it may not be improper to add 
some skill in Physic. (VII 347-8) 
This is the only reference Berkeley makes to the curriculum to be used in his college. 
Berkeley's own philosophy does not play any role in shaping his Utopian project. It is as 
if, when designing it, he ceased being the immaterialist philosopher, and just followed the 
Utopian way of thinking. The details he provides in his Proposal are derived not from his 
philosophical opinions, but from the inner logic of the utopianism. 
Insofar as it is possible to talk about a "perennial Utopian theme", as Frank 
Manuel has put it (Manuel 70), Berkeley's Bermuda project can be better understood i f 
regarded as belonging to that tradition of thinking within which this Utopian theme has 
been approached, developed, and made famous. A l l these detailed and unpleasant 
provisions, regulations and tough measures Berkeley envisaged are, as it were, born out 
of an ardent genuine desire to see his neighbours happier, less distressed and more 
virtuous, just as in any other Utopian project. Besides, Berkeley lived in an age that had 
not witnessed any real attempts at putting Utopian projects into practice. 
I f a "state of mind is Utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality within 
which it occurs" (Mannheim 192), then Berkeley's state of mind when conceiving of and 
proposing his Bermuda project was certainly Utopian. The huge and unbridgeable gap or 
"incongruity", in Mannheim's terminology, between the real (geographical, natural and 
social) situation of the islands and their ideal situation in Berkeley's mind, i . e., the way 
in which he (mis)represented them, is revealed by both some of the contemporary 
opponents to his scheme and, maybe more importantly, by several accounts of the real 
Bermudas from the first colonists there, dated some decades before Berkeley's scheme 
and which are still extant. 
Arthur Aston Luce, who thoroughly studied the whole affair, found that, when the 
project came to be discussed in the British Parliament, opposition to the project was not 
all the time malevolent or unjustified. There were some realistic people (enlightened 
opposition) who criticized Berkeley's project on the basis of their own knowledge of the 
real situation of the Islands. Among them, William Byrd of Virginia, for example, "who 
with local knowledge opposed the project, not as undesirable, but as impracticable", 
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brought, it is true, in an ironical form, pertinent and solid arguments against Berkeley's 
project: 
Byrd saw the Dean [Berkeley] as 'a Don Quixote in zeal', and his pious 
design as a 'visionary scheme'. There is no bread in Bermuda; there is 
nothing fit for the sustenance of man but onions and cabbages; its 
inhabitants are healthy, because, forsooth, they have so little to eat; the air 
is pure because swept by storms and hurricanes. Such criticisms look 
captious; but Byrd is on sure ground when he examines the proposal to 
educate Indians at the college. There are no Indians in Bermuda, 'nor 
within two hundred leagues of it upon the continent, and it wi l l need the 
gift of miracles to persuade them to leave their country and venture 
themselves upon the great ocean, on the temptation of being converted'. 
The Dean must take the French way and dragoon them into Christianity. 
He must take half a dozen regiments, and 'make a descent upon the coast 
of Florida, and take as many prisoners as he can.' Behind the sarcasm, not 
altogether unfriendly, is the assurance of the man with local knowledge 
(Luce 137). 
On the other hand, there are accounts from the first colonists in Bermuda, such as those 
published as The Rich Papers. Letters from Bermuda 1615-1646. Eyewitness Accounts 
Sent by the Early Colonists to Sir Nathaniel Rich, describing both the natural 
circumstances under which the islands were then planted and administrated, but also the 
numerous problems, such as serious social troubles caused by the drunkenness and 
immorality of the inhabitants. The sharp contrast between the poor state of reality in 
Bermuda and Berkeley's too enthusiastic state of mind is marked at times by such chilling 
fragments as this one: " I f the Adventurers [the company then administrating the islands] 
send noe clothes to this poore people before this time 12 months, many of them wilbe 
naked i f not dead" (Ives 1984: 14). Undoubtedly, some of the problems might have been 
solved by Berkeley's time, but it is not reasonable to believe that the very unfriendly 
climate, for example, had changed very much in the meantime. 
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These accounts depict a small world, with its fortunes and misfortunes, with its 
happy and unhappy events, all of them bearing apparently no resemblance to any earthly 
paradise. Life in Bermuda was taking its course in a more or less bearable manner, but 
sometimes there were events so horrific that seemed to seriously jeopardize the very 
minimal conditions of living there. For example, one such event was a tremendous 
invasion of rats: 
Rattes have been and are a great judgement of God upon us. A l l the Hands 
have been in a manner like so many Cunny [coney, rabbit] warrens, which 
did put the people much out of heart. It is incredible how they did swimme 
from Hand to Hand, and suddainly like an armie of men did invade the 
Hands from one end to an other, devouring the fruites of the earth in 
strange manner. (Ives 14) 
Then, far from being "the best air in the world", as Berkeley said in a private letter 
(Berkeley V I I I 156), Bermuda's air was often violently agitated by "terrible winds", 
causing much trouble to the Bermudans: 
Mr Lewis [a settler], one friday last, beeing the 6 t h of this present, hath 
taken a greate hurt by a fall , which hath bruised him much, and his [he is] 
att this instant very weake, the force of the wind beeing soe terrible. Att 
the same tyme the like was never seen. Mr Lewis, goeing to the governors, 
the wind beeing so stronge that it bente hime to the ground. And the same 
day there were many of our howses blowne downe. We have hadd a very 
unseasonable summer and winter that it hath hinred [hindered] much 
labour, which otherwise might hadd been performed. (Ives 85) 
As for the morals of the inhabitants, highly praised by Berkeley, they were not, at the time 
of writing of these accounts, exemplary. For example, some of the Bermudans seem to 
have been seriously fond of drinking. A Bermuda priest wrote to Sir Nathaniel Rich: 
Good sir, for God sake do what you can to send hither godly preachers, 
before sinne hath got the upper hand. It is lamentable to see how sinne 
aboundeth every day more and more as the people do increase. I am not 
able to expresse the abhominable drunkeness, loathsome spuing [spewing, 
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vomiting] swearing, swaggering and quarrelling, while the ship is in 
harbour with any wine or strong waters in her." (Ives 161-2) 
There is a sense in which Berkeley's Bermuda project has a deep and interesting 
significance as far as the central claims of his philosophy are concerned. For it can 
reasonably be said that in a certain way such a Utopian and un-earthly mode of thinking as 
that of the Bermuda project is consistent with his immaterialist philosophy. In other 
words, there is some deeper continuity of thought connecting his Utopian propensity to his 
main philosophical message. A Utopia would be an idealism "applied" to the social order, 
some sort of practical idealism. Just as Berkeley's natural world lacks material 
substantiality, so his Bermuda project lacks those basic features that generally 
characterize "realistic" projects. His being a "dreamer" in social affairs could be quite 
consistent with his being an immaterialist in philosophical matters, and his Utopian 
"unrealistic" proposals could be regarded as some social or civic reflection o f his claims 
that matter does not exist, and only spirits and minds exist. It is basically the same 
dissatisfaction with the current states of both natural and social affairs, and the same 
tendency toward replacing the existent state of things with an ideal one, that is manifest in 
both cases. Fraser even uses the term "social idealism" with reference to Berkeley's 
project: "It [The Proposal] is the lamentation of an ardent social idealist over the corrupt 
civilization of Britain and the Old World" (Fraser IV 342). Berkeley's Bermuda project 
reveals a dominant tendency toward an idealization of real people, real states and 
situations, a propensity toward generosity, benevolence and even self-sacrifice. It was 
probably something of this sort of relationship between Berkeley's philosophical credo 
and the character of his own life that his friend Jonathan Swift meant when saying that 
Berkeley was "an absolute philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power" (Qtd. in 
Luce 1949 100). There are many other records witnessing to his unusual generosity, 
kindness, philanthropy, good nature, benevolence, and so forth in his biography. For 
example, one of the most important modern Berkeley scholars, Arthur Aston Luce, 
concludes his Life of George Berkeley in this vein: "He was clearly something of a saint" 
(Luce 225). 
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J. 
Berkeley's college was not an end in itself, but simply a means. Its ultimate 
mission was to produce worthy priests and theologians, missionaries able to persuade the 
savage Indians to accept Christianity, which mission had at that time some special 
connotations. This is why I now turn to a consideration of Berkeley's Proposal within the 
context of the cultural and religious (apocalyptic, millennialist and eschatological) ideas 
that lay behind the early transoceanic voyages of discovery (and then of colonization) of 
America. As both Mircea Eliade and especially Harry M . Bracken and David Berman 
have shown, Berkeley's American Project is hardly understandable without taking 
seriously into account its messianism11. Bracken suggests that Berkeley agreed with the 
then popular analogy between the Lost Tribes of the Israel, whose conversion would have 
had a special value from a Paulinic point of view, and the American Indians. Hence 
Berkeley's eagerness to convert those Indians in an attempt to ready the Second Coming. 
And it is precisely this messianic feature of Berkeley's project that is much indebted to 
the religious and theological background against which the first transatlantic voyages 
occurred. 
There is some agreement among historians and religious scientists that a crucial 
factor in realizing the new geographic discoveries was, as Mircea Eliade has put it, "the 
nostalgia for the earthly paradise that the ancestors of the American nations had crossed 
the Atlantic to f ind" (Eliade 261). According to such a line of thought, the deeper causes 
and motivations of the transatlantic voyages of the early discoverers and colonists are to 
be found in an atmosphere characterizing the European world towards the end of the 
Middle Ages: that is, an atmosphere marked by eschatological expectations, millennialist 
dreams, and by need for a radical moral transformation and regeneration. And it was 
within "this messianic and apocalyptic atmosphere that the transoceanic expeditions and 
the geographic discoveries that radically shook and transformed Western Europe took 
place. Throughout Europe people believed in an imminent regeneration of the world" 
(Eliade 262). Jean Delumeau is one of the historians supporting this line of thought: 
Scholars have long pointed out how the search for paradisal islands was an 
important stimulus to voyages of discovery from the fourteenth to the 
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seventeenth centuries. Nostalgia for the garden of Eden; the conviction of 
Christopher Columbus and missionaries that the end time was at hand; the 
wi l l to bring religion to new lands; and the desire to find gold, precious 
stones, and other rare commodities: all these combined to spur travelers, 
religious, sailors, and conquerors on to new horizons. Their culture and the 
dreams it brought with it led them, at least in the beginning, to see in the 
strange lands opening up before them the characteristics of those blessed 
countries that had haunted the Western imagination since antiquity. 
(Deiumeau 109-10) 
An easy way of exemplifying such an interpretation would be to try to find out what the 
discoverers and first colonists themselves thought about what they were then seeing, 
experiencing, doing, etc. 
We can thus see how, in a letter sent by Amerigo Vespucci to Lorenzo de Medici, 
sometime between 1499-1502, the famous navigator talks about 
the friendly land, covered with countless very tall trees that do not lose 
their leaves and emit sweet and fragrant odors and are loaded with tasty 
fruits that promote the body's health; the fields of thick grass that are filled 
with flowers which have a wonderfully delightful perfume; the great 
throng of birds of various species, whose feathers, colors, and songs defy 
description. [ . . . ] For myself, I thought I was near the earthly paradise." 
(Qtd. in Deiumeau 110) 
Christopher Columbus openly considered his transoceanic enterprise in terms of Sacred 
History, and saw his "mission" as definitely belonging to a divine plan. He "did not doubt 
that he had come near the Earthly Paradise" and consequently, however strange this might 
appear today, he considered his adventurous navigation in theological and mystical rather 
than secular terms: 
He believed that the fresh water currents he encountered in the Gulf of 
Paria originated in the four rivers of the Garden of Eden. [ . . . ] The New 
World represented more than a new continent open to the propagation of 
the Gospel. The very fact of its discovery had an eschatological 
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implication. [ . . . ] Columbus was persuaded that the prophecy concerning 
the diffusion of the Gospel throughout the whole world had to be realized 
before the end of the world, which was not far off. In his Book of 
Prophecies, Columbus affirmed that this event, namely, the end of the 
world, would be preceded by the conquest of the new continent, the 
conversion of the heathen, and the destruction of the Antichrist. (Eliade 
262) 
Such a state of mind not only persisted after the establishment of the colonies, but it also 
increased in intensity, developed and spread widely throughout America 1 2 . The first 
colonists' dreams and phantasms were so intense that after crossing the ocean this 
experience actually confirmed all their eschatological expectations and millenarist ideas: 
"the most popular religious doctrine in the Colonies was that America had been chosen 
among all the nations of the earth as the place of the Second Coming of Christ, and the 
millennium, though essentially of a spiritual nature, would be accompanied by a 
paradisiacal transformation of the earth, as an outer sign of an inner perfection" (Eliade 
264). Thus, the awareness of their being "chosen", the sense of their blessing, election 
and mission, and the corresponding responsibilities, made them feel in some way 
associates or partners of God, trustful implementers of His plans. Theirs were not simply 
human enterprises, their doings were not facts of social history, but were apocalyptic and 
divine affairs: 
The first English colonists in America considered themselves chosen by 
Providence to establish a 'City on a Mountain' that would serve as an 
example of the true Reformation for all Europe. They had followed the 
path of the sun toward the Far West, continuing and prolonging in a 
prodigious fashion the traditional passing of religion and culture from East 
to West. [ . . . ] The first pioneers did not doubt that the final drama of moral 
regeneration and universal salvation would begin with them, since they 
were the first to follow the sun in its course toward the paradisiacal 
gardens of the West. (Eliade 264) 
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4. 
Generally speaking, this was the religious context within which Berkeley's 
Proposal emerged. Since one of the main aims of his projected college was to supply the 
colonies with virtuous, well-prepared priests and missionaries,13 some commentators, 
based also on the last stanza of that famous poem that Berkeley dedicated to America, 
concluded that his ultimate motivation in initiating and pursuing the project was in fact 
one of an eschatological and millennialist nature. The poem, America or the Muse's 
Refuge. A Prophecy, was disseminated to get more support for his scheme. At the 
beginning it was circulated anonymously, but eventually Berkeley published it in the 
Miscellany (1752) under his own name. David Berman discusses "the eschatological 
aspect of Berkeley's poem and project" (Berman 116), and one of his conclusions is that 
it is "evident that his poem is apocalyptic and eschatological" (118). 
The last stanza received special attention from commentators: 
Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way, 
The four first Acts already past. 
A f i f th shall close the Drama with the Day, 
The world's great Effort is the last. (Berkeley V I I 370) 
In interpreting the symbolism of the five acts Bracken refers to the Old Testament, saying, 
" I take the symbolism of the final stanza, the four plus one Acts, to be from Daniel, 
chapter 2, where the four kingdoms, usually taken to be Babylon, Persia, Greece and 
Rome, shall be succeeded by a f i f th : 'And in the days of these kings shall the God of 
heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed...' (2: 44)" (Bracken 71). 
According to Bracken, "the key to this extraordinary proposal is that Berkeley accepts the 
[then] popular view that the American Indians are the Lost Tribes of Israel. As Jews, their 
conversion is especially dear to God and each conversion promises, as Paul tells us in 
Romans xi, to bring closer the Second Coming" (73). Following Bracken's hypothesis, by 
converting the Indians, the graduates from Berkeley's college would have converted the 
Lost Tribes of the Israel, which, according to St. Paul, was a clear sign of the much 
expected, triumphal end of the world: the Apocalypsis. Thus, in Berkeley's mind the 
propagation of Gospel in America and the conversion of the Indians living there would 
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have been at the same time preparations for, and signs of, the approaching Second 
Coming. Hence the need to build a missionary college in Bermuda: "Given what we 
know about Berkeley, we must find a reason not only for his committing himself so 
completely to his American dream, but especially for the savagery he was prepared to 
inflict on Indian children" (Bracken 80). 
Bracken's interpretation has the merit of underlining the complexity of the 
Bermuda project, and of suggesting some ways of explaining several of the confused 
aspects of Berkeley's enterprise14. More than that, it is consistent with the complex 
religious context presented above. Bracken's reconstruction of Berkeley's way of 
thinking might be applied to the way in which many of his contemporaries were thinking. 
For, " [ i ]n the eyes of the English ...the colonization of America merely prolonged and 
perfected a Sacred History begun at the outset of the Reformation. Indeed, the push of the 
pioneers toward the West continued the triumphal march of Wisdom and the True 
Religion from East to West. For some time already, Protestant theologians had been 
inclined to identify the West with spiritual and moral progress" (Eliade 263). 
5. 
At least two fundamental Christian ideas were inextricably interwoven in 
Berkeley's Bermuda Project: a "nostalgia for an earthly paradise" and the "the 
expectation of a kingdom of happiness that is to be established on our earth and to last for 
a millennium" (Delumeau 1). The "happy island", despite its imaginary, Utopian nature, 
or more precisely because of that, has been the chosen space for such an enterprise, its 
privileged environment. Its isolation from the outside world, its purity (as it is surrounded 
by the water of the endless ocean), its difficult accessibility, exoticism, paradisiacal 
appearance, beauties, innocence of its inhabitants, etc. all these are attributes enabling us 
to consider that island as some un-earthly or un-natural place, a place where the marvels 
or such supernatural events as the Second Coming and Millennium are at any time 
possible. 
Then, the millennialist interpretation of Berkeley's Bermuda scheme adds to his 
Utopia a character somehow different from that of a political/social Utopian project. It 
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remains a Utopia in the tradition o f Plato, Campanella, Thomas More or Herman Hesse, 
but, in addition to that, it is characterized by chiliastic elements. Berkeley's is a 
religiously modeled Utopia, an educational Utopia with a certain soteriological mission. 
Even i f the main emphasis is not placed upon Messianism, the chiliastic features are 
present and have something to say about the ultimate specificity of the Bermuda scheme. 
To be more precise, the Messianism belongs not so much to the project itself (explicitly 
and essentially) as to its unspoken presuppositions, to the intellectual and religious 
background against which it was conceived. The Millennium is rapidly approaching: 
under such circumstances, getting ready (praeparatio) is the crucial and most urgent thing 
to do. Hence the necessity of preparing a body of worthy, well trained and dedicated 
people, ready to prepare, in turn, their neighbours for the big event, to save their souls in 
aeternum. Or, instructing such special people is an extremely difficult and demanding 
job, a job that is made possible only within the firm boundaries of a highly disciplined 
educational Utopia. And this is where Berkeley's project belongs. 
Notes: 
1 There are a number o f people, professors, colleagues and friends o f mine, to whom I owe special thanks 
for the help they offered me in relation to this article. First o f all, I wish to thank David Cooper, my Ph.D. 
supervisor at the University o f Durham, for his generous and warm supervision, as well as for his always 
kind and precious advice. A much shorter version o f this paper was presented in absentia at "The Ninth 
Annual Conference o f the Group for Early Modern Cultural Studies", held between 15 th-18 t h November 
2001 in Philadelphia. I have to thank Prof. Fritz Fleischmann, f rom Babson College, who so kindly read the 
paper on my behalf. Some (other) parts of the paper were delivered in June 2002 within a summer seminar 
{Global Mappings - Symbolic Geographies Revisited) at the Central European University, in Budapest. I 
wish to thank Prof. Larry Wol f f , f rom Boston College, and Prof. Sorin Antohi, f rom CEU, for their support 
and encouragement. Last but not least, I wish to thank the two anonymous referees from Utopian Studies 
who read carefully my paper and supplied me with their important comments. 
2 "For whatever reasons, Berkeley seems to have lost confidence in the Old World and was looking 
hopefully to America. For it was probably in the early months o f 1722 that he conceived his plan for a 
missionary and art college in Bermuda, which was to engage him for the next decade" (Berman 100). 
J O f course, he says several times that he was informed about the islands by very trustful persons (yet, he 
does not give any names), but, as we shall the below, his description did not f i t the real situation o f the 
islands at all. He was either misinformed or, more probably, the trustful persons conveyed to him something 
of the popular medieval view of the "paradisiacal islands". 
4 It is true, later on, when the project had already started to fai l , that Berkeley showed himself ready to build 
the college somewhere on the American mainland. But what I am particularly interested in here is his first, 
genuine, impulse and intention, as recorded in the letters mentioned and the Proposal. 
5 "Distance lends enchantment, and isolation preserves things in existence. Later on, many 'Utopias', among 
them that o f Thomas More, would be located on islands" (Delumeau 98). 
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6 Kappler's book, cited by Deiumeau, is Monstres, demons et marveilles a la fin du Moyen Age. Paris: 
Payot, 1980. 
7 Sometimes his enthusiasm infected others. For example, one o f his contemporaries said: "Young and old, 
learned and rich, all desirous o f retiring to enjoy peace o f mind and health o f body, and o f restoring the 
golden age in that corner o f the world." (a contemporary [Dan Dering] Qtd. in Luce 97) [emphasis added] 
8 Many people "found the entire enterprise absurd. ...those with first-hand experience o f the American 
Church or educational scenes were profoundly distressed with Berkeley's ignorance. It is clear that for 
many years, Berkeley was seen as something o f a nut" (Bracken 68). 
9 I am not the only one to use this term in relation to his Bermuda project. One hundred years ago, dealing 
with Berkeley's educational project, Fraser talked about Bermuda as "a region whose idyllic bliss poets had 
sung, and from which Christian civilisation might radiate over the Utopia o f a New World, with its 
magnificent possibilities in the future history o f the human race" ( IV 343). 
1 0 According to some authors, this remoteness o f the island from the American mainland was in fact one o f 
the main causes o f the failure o f the entire project. Arthur Aston Luce, for example, considers that "the 
tragedy of the Bermuda project was just Bermuda. Six hundred miles o f ocean separate it from the nearest 
point o f the mainland. Students might have come sixty miles, but not six hundred. The romance o f Bermuda 
won support for the scheme, the facts o f Bermuda killed i t " (Luce 99). 
1 1 And, as Bracken recognizes, this is not only the case with Berkeley. Even i f for different reasons, "there 
is hardly a single great mind o f the period which is not involved in millennial thinking. Henry More, Sir 
Isaac Newton, and Sir Robert Boyle may be the names best known to academic philosophers" (Bracken 
78). 
1 2 "[CJertain pioneers already saw Paradise in the various regions o f America. Traveling along the coast o f 
New England in 1614, John Smith compared it to Eden: 'heaven and earth never agreed better to frame a 
place for man's habitation... we chanced in a lande, even as God made i t . ' George Alsop presents Maryland 
as the only place seeming to be the 'Earthly Paradise'. Its trees, its plants, its fruits, its flowers, he wrote, 
speak in 'Hieroglyphicks o f our Adamitical or Primitive situation.' Another writer discovered the 'future 
Eden' in Georgia, a region located on the same latitude as Palestine: 'That promis'd Canaan, which was 
pointed out by God's own choice, to bless the Labours o f a favorite People.' For Edward Johnson, 
Massachusetts was the place 'where the Lord wi l l create a new Heaven and a new Earth.' Likewise, the 
Boston Puritan, John Cotton, informed those preparing to set sail from England for Massachusetts that they 
were granted a privilege o f Heaven, thanks to 'the grand charter given to Adam and his posterity in 
Paradise'" (Eliade 264-5). 
1 3 " [T ]o provide, in the first Place, a constant Supply o f worthy Clergymen for the English Churches in 
those Parts; and in the second Place, a like constant Supply o f zealous Missionaries, well fitted for 
propagating Christianity among the Savages" (Berkeley V I I 345). 
1 4 In general, he is very careful and scrupulous in his analysis. He admits that his is only a partial and 
possible interpretation, with the possibility o f other points o f view: "(Jit is granted that Berkeley hoped to 
use the traditional symbolism of Daniel so that he might characterize America in messianic terms then we 
have a partial answer to the point o f the American Project" (Bracken 73) [emphasis added]. 
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